South Africa: Foreign Policy

Verane Castelnau

From 1948 to 1994, South African foreign policy sought to justify and protect its authoritarian apartheid political system. The cost of this strategy was South Africa’s branding as "an international pariah" (Peter J. Schraeder, in The Round Table, 2001) within the African continent and the wider international community, ultimately leading to what was referred to as the "diplomacy of isolation". This pariah status ended in 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected president thereby giving South Africa the duty to lead the "African renaissance" in re-examining and restructuring its foreign policy practices and relationships. When Mandela explained in "Foreign Affair" several months prior to the 1994 elections that he considered the charting of a new foreign policy as a "key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country", he already took advantage of his charismatic image which would in the future make South African foreign policy often follow his public statements, rather than his public statements reflecting a consensus opinion within the foreign policy establishment. But beyond this "Mandela effect", how did South African foreign policy adapted to the new realities of post-apartheid era? Four issues seem to be at the core of the South African shift towards a certain renewal in its foreign policy.

First, the new foreign policy emphasises the centrality of the African continent, as well as the importance of South Africa in Africa’s future political and economic potential. Indeed, as points it out Andrew F. Cooper (International Journal, 1997-98) "because of its unique experience with transformation, the expectations on South Africa to act as a catalyst for an African renaissance remain exceptionally high". Thabo Mbeki’s administration, which has hold the office since 1999, is strongly attached to this concept. One of the highest concern is the promotion of regional integration and development, which is partly dealt with through South Africa’s leadership role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Besides, the country joined in 1994 the Organisation of African Unity and allocated in 1999 up to 250000 Rands to the emergency fund to fight against starvation and dryness. It has well understood that the African development as a whole would speed up its own expansion and that as De Klerk puts it "South Africa can become a small Japan in Southern Africa".

But working for the improvement of living conditions in Africa amounts to working for peace and security, which is another standpoint of the South African foreign policy. As shown by Mandela’s willingness to serve as a third-party mediator in an attempt to resolve ethnic conflict in Burundi or his anterior intervention in Zaire, South Africa is committed to conflict prevention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. On this matter, it has restored civilian control over its security apparatus including in its constitution restrictive conditions under which South African military should be deployed internationally. South Africa has also made special efforts in the non-proliferation and disarmament field. Nevertheless, with no external threat on its territory, South Africa paradoxically remains the first African military power.

Nelson Mandela declared to "Foreign Affairs" again in 1993 that "a democratically elected government will not be indifferent to the rights of others. Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy ... South Africa will ... be at the forefront of global efforts to promote and foster democratic systems of government". In these terms, the new South Africa intends to regain credibility by radically shifting from an anti-democratic and anti-human right country to a respectful one fighting internally as well as internationally for the defence of freedom. However South Africa’s means do not equal its ambitions and its idealism finds itself often diminished. For example, South Africa prefers not to get involved in the Zaire and Nigeria issues not to jeopardise its good relations with these two countries. Besides, it ends up recognising communist China instead of democratic Taiwan overvaluing economic considerations to ethical ones.

The last point on the part of South Africa’s foreign policy is the economic diplomacy. South Africa intends to sell its new image abroad through its acceptance of the liberal economic model of free trade and investment. The Mbeki administration has underscored the critical role of foreign trade and investment in the process of domestic reconstruction. Towards this end, the South African government’s close co-operation with South African businesses has yielded enormous success in penetrating the Southern African market, as well as other regions of the continent and the world in general.

All in all, South Africa’s foreign policy is dual. It unveils high ambitions and awareness regarding South Africa’s role in the region and at the same time shows moderation and weaknesses that often make the country step back to its heavy past status. One may not forget that South Africa’s transformation is first and foremost a domestic process that intends to cleanse a once poisoned society. The foreign policy comes behind and follows the internal conditions in its development. With time and perseverance only, should it play a growing role in Africa’s future as a whole.

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