Nabiha Gul
Afghanistan is among the most unfortunate states of the world. It has a long history of foreign intervention and, for more than 20 years, it has been consumed by war. Peculiarly positioned between three important regions – Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia – Afghanistan has always been a source of interest for big powers. Continuous foreign interventions and war not only devastated a large part of Afghanistan but have also bred extremist elements and added further insecurity to the already conflict-prone region.
Following the 9/11 events, the world community was compelled to view terrorism as a common challenge which was projected as the foremost source of global insecurity and threat. The strategies applied to cope with this challenge drastically changed the global security dynamics. Once again a war was waged in Afghanistan, this time, to root out terrorism. This US-led war not only transformed the state Set-up but also gave a new dimension to regional politics, peace and security. A new pattern of trilateral relations among the states of this region has evolved. These trilateral relationships, coupled with anti and pro-US alliances, present a peculiar scenario. From the Bonn Agreement to recently held parliamentary polls an 18 September 2005, the US has played an influential, rather a dominating role in the country. Now, it is not only the delicate nature of peace and the security scenario in Afghanistan that alarm its neighbouring states but also the continuous and seemingly long-term presence of a Superpower that jeopardizes their security and regional stability.
The objective of this paper is to present a view an the major powers' interests in Afghanistan and their impact an regional stability with a special focus an the security concerns of neighbouring states in view of post-9/11 developments in Afghanistan.
The US-led war in Afghanistan lasted for almost two months, resulting in the fall of the Taliban regime. An interim government was formed under the Bonn Agreement – a roadmap for peace, stability and democracy in Afghanistan – which was signed an 5 December 2001 at Bonn, Germany,by the Afghan military commanders, representatives of the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, and representatives of Afghanistan’s different ethnic groups. They agreed on an interim power-sharing arrangement, the creation of a new constitution, and on holding parliamentary elections within two years after the completion of the six-month term of the interim government. The Agreement restored the Afghan constitution of 1964 with the exception of provisions relating to monarchy.[1] This arrangement brought Hamid Karzai to power as the chairman of the interim administration in Afghanistan. One of the important provisions of the Agreement was the decision on the meeting of the Loya Jirga (grand council), to be held before the completion of the six-month term of the interim government.
In an unprecedented move, the Loya Jirga met after 23 years on 12 June 2002 in pursuance of the Bonn arrangements. Foreign intervention and the absence of an independent state set-up had deprived the jirga of its powers.[2] The jirga elected interim leader Hamid Karzai as the head of the state for another two years. It was clear that the US was engaged in behind-the-scenes manoeuvering to have the Pashtun, Karzai, nominated as head of the state, while at the same time ensuring that the minority Tajik community and other smaller groups, which held many of the key positions in the outgoing administration, were not alienated. After all, the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance had dominated the centre – Kabul.[3]
Apparently, the focus of the international community was to stabilize the System of governance in Afghanistan. The Afghans were allowed to participate in the political process from the approval of the new constitution to participation in the parliamentary polls. The new constitution was unveiled for public comments on 4 November 2003 and was approved by the Loya Jirga in January 2004. After that, the Afghans exercised their right to vote in the first-ever direct presidential polls held on 9 October 2004 and then in the recently held parliamentary polls.
Despite some improvements at the socio-economic level, the country continues to suffer from serious instability. Continuous air strikes and the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban members have marred the process of development. Warlords and other armed factions, including the remaining Taliban forces, are dominant in most parts of the country and routinely violate human rights which undermines the credibility and functioning of the Karzai regime. Holding of parliamentary polls was one of the basic provisions of the Bonn Agreement constituting peace and democracy. However, many of the most important provisions, without which peace and democracy can never be established in a true sense, have not been implemented. Militia forces occupying Kabul have not withdrawn from the City, no significant disarmament of militia nationwide has taken place (demobilization goals were reduced to a target of less than 40 per cent which was not met), and many militia leaders have retained their autonomous leadership over what are essentially private armies.[4] Nevertheless, the precarious nature of the Afghan administration perhaps gives an excuse to outside powers, especially the US, to maintain their influence in the country and continue to protect their own interests.
What makes Afghanistan important is not only its Landmass but also the significant geo-strategic location it enjoys. From the north-east, the narrow Wakhan corridor connects it to China. On the south and south-east it is bordered by Pakistan, an the west by Iran and an the north, it has borders with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This peculiar location of Afghanistan has always attracted the major powers to exercise their influence in this resource rich region through the country.
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the Taliban and their gradual seizure of 90 per cent of Afghan territory alarmed the US. The world community had not recognized the Taliban government, except Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Pakistan. For many reasons, the US wanted to overthrow the Taliban. One of these was the ‘Islamization’ of the country which was being viewed as a provocative factor for other Islamic factions inside the Central and South Asian region. Long before the 9/11 attacks, the US was charging the Taliban with sheltering and hiding Osama bin Laden who was wanted by the US in some terrorist acts. The 9/11 events provided an opportunity to the US for eliminating the Taliban.
The current trends in US foreign policy, based on ‘unilateralism,’ are detrimental to the regional and international cooperative security arrangements. The absence of a great power rival appears to have generated a conviction in the US administration that it is unstoppable in pursuit of its objectives. In many ways, this affects the security and sovereignty of the developing states. They have become vulnerable because of their weak democratic norms and human rights which provide entry points for interference by the US in their internal affairs.[5] In other words, the US wants to actively intervene and use its resources to shape the political structures within these states, according to a US-centric notion of democracy and openness. According to one writer ‘The US National Security Strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of its values and national interests.’ The US now feels that it has the power and influence to shape the world, including the internal dynamics of weaker states.[6]
In the case of Afghanistan, the unilateralist approach has well been exercised. It has facilitated the pursuit of war against terrorism and the US long-term engagement in the region. It has been proved that al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have only been used to rationalize a strategic move or grand strategy-which the US had long contemplated after the demise of the Soviet empire-to consolidate its unipolarity.[7] On the other hand, the support which the US secured from major powers for its decision to wage war against terrorism, was a successful implementation of its unilateral internationalism.
The fact that the US presence clearly disturbs the power equation in the region makes it a difficult task for regional players to set the future course of their relations or policies in the regional context. As it is, the interests of most of the states are at odds with one another. On the one hand, there is Russia, once a superpower and rival of the US which is determined to maintain its dominance in this region. On the other hand, China is also gradually building up its influence both in political and economic terms. India enjoys dominance in South Asia and is a close ally of both Russia and the US. Moreover, with its all-time support to the Northern Alliance, India has played the role of a traditional ally of Afghanistan. Russia and China are on friendly terms with each other but with the US they have diverse equations. As for China, the long-term presence of the US in the region does not bode well for the country’s economic and strategic interests in the region. One of the objectives of the US grand strategy in the region is to counter the growing influence of China in South Asia as well as its bid to seek access to West Asia.
Another important feature of the imbalance in the power equation in this region is ‘trilateralism.’ The gradually growing trilateral relations – Russia-India-Afghanistan, China-Russia-Afghanistan, Iran-Russia-India, US-Afghanistan-India, US-Afghanistan-Pakistan – indeed present an intricate situation (see figure) which, in view of the US presence and its grand strategy, may negatively affect bilateral relations between these states. Moreover, the US, through its influence and the kind of relationships it enjoys, especially with India and Afghanistan, may manipulate the regional economic and security alliances, mainly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and SAARC.
The existing scenario in Afghanistan, and a power combination in the South-Central Asian region, poses various security challenges to its immediate neighbours – Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
In terms of security, Pakistan has always seen Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth against India. It has sought to protect its western border in lieu of insecurity an its eastern border with India. To this end, its long-standing objective in Afghanistan has been to have a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul. The reasoning was that such a government would be friendly to Pakistan which also has a significant Pashtun population.[8]
Pakistan has always paid a heavy price for its support to Afghanistan. In the US-led war against terrorism again, the possible grave consequences of saying ‘no,’ left Pakistan with no choice other than supporting the US. It provided every possible assistance to the US, including military bases in the country. The presence of foreign troops was widely condemned inside the country, as it was believed to be a threat to the state’s security and sovereignty. Now the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have gradually been improving but there still exists an element of uncertainty as the security situation along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border remains fragile.
Iran's policy, conversely, was derived from a similar quest for strategic depth an its eastern border and its bid to link up to Central Asia by supporting Afghanistan.[9]Right after the Karzai interim government was sworn in, Iran was in the forefront of pledging to spare no effort in working for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Later, on different occasions, Iran expressed full support to Afghanistan in achieving economic stability through agricultural development and finding a viable alternative to poppy cultivation, the most important concern of the two neighbours.[10]
The fact that the Iranian government had used all means at its disposal to oppose the Taliban regime, well before the international community became worried about the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan, helped it to set the course of its relations with the new Afghan government. In terms of security, both Iran and Russia had common worries over the possibility of the US obtaining a bigger foothold and permanent bases in Central Asian states like Uzbekistan and Afghanistan itself.[11] Russia and Iran enjoy cordial relations and Russia is supporting Iran in the defence field. The US is gravely concerned about Iran's military build up and nuclearization policy which Iran continues to pursue with rigidity. The US-Iran antagonistic relationship is threatening for regional stability.
Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours strongly believe that their security interests are threatened by the instability and fragile peace in that country. As a region, the Central Asian states are threatened by the narrowing of financial and security options and the potential rise of extremism. Hence, the Central Asian countries, keeping in view the military and security cooperation issues, although keen to leave the door open for further Western assistance, appear more comfortable in dealing with Russia.[12] The presence of the US in the region is a clear disappointment for these states. The war against terrorism brought in external military forces into the region. For the states of the region, security concerns continue to predominate after 9/11. The introduction of foreign coalition troops in two of Afghanistan’s neighbouring Central Asian states – Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – upset the local power balance amongst all these states. Moreover, given the strategic neighbours of the Central Asian states, including Iran and China, the entry of the US military within the region has posed new security threats to these states.[13]
Afghanistan, on its part, has largely banked an the US and, for many reasons, has sought long-term US involvement in the country. The main reason is that the central government is only confined to Kabul and the
periphery is still controlled by the warlords and other armed factions. It was widely believed that, if tradition is anything to go by, the Afghans would soon want to be left alone. They are fiercely independent-minded people and tend to be extremely suspicious of foreigners meddling in their national affairs. The US, while attempting to restore normalcy to Afghanistan, has produced some positive results but they seemed to be cosmetic and fragile.[14]
It is important to note that, in the spirit to consolidate regional peace and security and to constitute a friendly neighbourhood, all the seven neighbouring countries of Afghanistan signed a non-intervention patt an 22 December 2002 in Kabul.[15] They pledged never to interfere in the affairs of that war-ravaged country. The agreement emphasized constructive and amicable relations, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The states made a commitment to refrain from actions that could jeopardize peace and security.
It was a momentous step, reflecting the willingness of these states to move towards harmonization of relations and regional integrity. But the fact remains that the region is prone to conflicts and these states still lack a common platform from where they could address common regional issues, challenges and threats.
The evolution of the concept of security is closely related to the increase of unconventional security threats. Unconventional security problems refer to new issues in fields other than conventional military, political and diplomatic conflicts. These issues constitute major threats to the survival and development of a state, and are interactive with one or more other states. Factors of unconventional security include the economy, energy, information, environment, terrorism, proliferation of weapons, organized crime, illegal migration, refugee influx, smuggling of drugs, and food security.[16]
Apart from the conventional security issues, another cause of concern for the near and distant neighbours of Afghanistan is unconventional security problems emanating mainly from the post-9/11 developments in the country. If the conventional threat to regional stability is the presence of the US, the unconventional security problems are not a lesser challenge.
The major intra-regional unconventional security concerns are:
• Extremist elements.
• Opium production and drug trafficking.
• Refugees.
• Armaments.
• Energy resources
One of the major unconventional security concerns for South-Central Asian states is extremism leading to militancy and terrorism. Due to the US-led war, terrorist activities at the local level in and outside Afghanistan sharply increased. Firing incidents, shelling and bomb blasts were routine. The most affected by these terrorist incidents was Pakistan. The US strategy to use forceful means to capture the al Qaeda and Taliban members led to a volatile situation. The US believed that attacks on coalition forces inside Afghanistan were carried out by al Qaeda fugitives hiding in the mountainous region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan started an army operation to hunt the so-called foreign militants. Around 80,000 troops were deployed by Pakistan in the region that led to heavy clashes between the troops and local tribals. Pakistan’s extensive support to the US in this regard generated opposition from different political forces inside the country and created a volatile situation. There was also a sudden spurt in terrorist acts inside Pakistan which were viewed as the reaction of al Qaeda fugitives.
Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours have also been confronted with an upsurge in extremist activities since their independence. They have been trying to curtail the growing religious fundamentalism and extremist activities with the help of Russia. The emergence of the Taliban was considered to be a potential threat to the growth of extremist elements in these states. After 9/11, various al Qaeda and Taliban members fled to the Central Asian states which created a perilous situation. Heavy troops deployment facilitated by Russia, and the US hunt for the fugitives increased tension in the region.
Afghanistan has the dubious distinction of being the world leader in opium production. UN and US officials estimated that, in 2004, the opium produced in Afghanistan accounted for approximately 75 per cent of the entire world supply, and approximately 90 per cent of that consumed in Europe. The opium is mainly transported through Pakistan and the Central Asian states. It is important to note that poppy cultivation in the Taliban era had been reduced to only around 6-7 per cent of the world production.
The tans-border drug trade is linked to organized crime groups operating throughout the Indian Ocean periphery, Russia and Europe. Trans-border illegal trade has undermined Pakistan’s authority and funded corruption, thereby contributing to the crisis of legitimacy of Pakistani institutions.[17]
Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime, there was a sudden rise in poppy cultivation. The linkage between warlords, local commanders, poppy cultivators and heroin traders apparently runs deep in Afghanistan. Drug money plays a very crucial role in financing and sustaining warlordism in the country. The dependence of the Karzai administration and the West on these warlords in maintaining the Bonn-mandated political process has been a major factor in the fight against the drug menace in Afghanistan. The contradictions in the twin US objectives of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics have been apparent all through the years following the Bonn-based arrangements. The drug trade continues to penetrate into Tajikistan and other Central Asian states through Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran each became home to hundreds of thousands of opium and heroin addicts, and HIV/AIDS started to spread rapidly as a result of intravenous drug use.
The refugee problem has been a daunting task for Afghanistan and its neighbours since Afghanistan got involved in the unfortunate war within its borders. Pakistan and Iran have been the main hosts of the Afghan refugees. Continuous refugee influx has created various socio-economic security problems for the two countries. Both the countries were already hosting approximately four million Afghan refugees before 9/11. During the US-led war after 9/11, the number of refugees rose to five million in Pakistan and approximately two million in Iran.
The Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran can be divided into genuine civilian refugees and fugitives, including the members of al Qaeda and the Taliban and other extremist factions. Since they all cross the border as refugees, it is hardly possible to determine whether a refugee is a civilian or a militant.
In the 1980s, Afghan refugees were provided not only with arms but also with military training within the refugee camps by Pakistan in order to counter the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From then on, the ‘kalashnikov culture’ prevailed in Pakistan because of the presence of the Afghan refugees. Now, both in Pakistan and Iran, Afghan refugees still possess large amounts of small arms which are security hazards.
Pakistan faces serious economic implications from this refugee problem. Not only are the refugees a burden an our economy but the state also has to spend heavy amounts an fencing and placing barricades along the border. On the other hand, most of the low-wage jobs are held by these refugees which affect the lower stratum of local population. Economic insecurity and discontentment among the masses, caused by the lack of job opportunities, leads to frustration and social chaos which may create security problems.
Civil wars, foreign occupation and warlordism have flooded Afghanistan with weapons. For the region, the single most significant source of weapons was the first Afghanistan war, in which weapons were procured from around the world, many of which have since flowed to Pakistan and India and to Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours. The Soviet war in Afghanistan introduced massive quantities of small arms into Pakistan and provided capital for investment in smuggling. Moreover, the spread of an Afghan Pashtun diaspora facilitated the arms trade and smuggling throughout the region.[18]
The UN-led and Japan sponsored Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) Programme launched in 2003 is very crucial in diluting the power of the warlords by disbanding and disarming their militias. So far, the programme cannot be said to have been very effective. Most of the warlords, particularly those with militias running into several thousands, have so far resisted any disbandment of their forces or surrender of heavy weaponry.[19]
Globalization or interconnectedness of the world mainly focuses upon economic gains and prosperity. States are opting for larger economic alliances to secure their economic interest. Taking the trend forward, a new economic partnership is evolving between Pakistan-Russia-China, Iran-Pakistan-India, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan on the one side, and Russia-Iran-India, China-India-Russia, on the other. Regional contiguity is also a complimentary factor for these states. Their focus is mainly on energy resources, as energy projects herald an approach for unity and reconciliation.[20] Afghanistan provides a transit trade route to the three regions which, in every way, can boost economic activity provided the safety of supplies is ensured.
To ensure the safe, smooth and speedy export of energy supplies from and among Western, Central and South Asian states is a formidable challenge, keeping in view the volatile nature of the region. Trans-border energy supply is mainly threatened by the existing fragile peace in Afghanistan, extremist elements, presence of the US in the region and these states have not yet been able to come up with concrete collective strategies to cope with these threats.
As discussed earlier, Afghanistan is naturally positioned to provide transit routes to three most important regions and thus holds significance not only for regional states but also for extra-regional states. In an optimistic view, due to this geo-strategic distinction of Afghanistan, the future prospects for increased economic cooperation are brighter. But the fact remains that unfavourable elements such as the US presence, extremists or terrorists, continue to exist in the region and this 'transit route' is believed to be facilitating them also to exert their influence, thereby threatening regional stability.
The growing trilateralism in the region tends to create power centres rather than promoting multilateral strategies or activities. The increasing interconnectedness of the world demands collective measures to ensure security at both the state and regional level in order to ensure global security. The prevailing political and economic trends in the region are in contrast with the international trends hampering overall regional progress. Though Afghanistan is now said to be an the road to democracy, the existing situation both within and outside the country does not seem promising for regional peace and security in the near future.
Nabiha Gul is Research Officer at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi
[1] Shameem Akhtar, ‘Loya Jirga paves the way’, Dawn (Karachi), 20 June 2002
[2] Ibid.
[3] ‘Afghanistan: next phase’ (editorial), Dawn, 14 June 2002
[4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005, www.hrw.org
[5] Bharat Karnad, ‘Perils of a tight embrace: India, US, Kashmir and non-proliferation issues,’ Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. 26, no. 3, July-September 2002, p. 329
[6] Shireen M. Mazari, ‚The new US security doctrine: implications for the South Asian region,’ Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol. XXIII, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 15
[7] Mirza Aslam Beg, ‚Afghan turmoil: security imperatives for the region,’ The News (Karachi), 18 January 2003
[8] Paula Newberg, ‚Pakistan’, The Taliban and Afghanistan: Implications for Region and Options for International Action, Special Report, www.usip.org
[9] Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and the Collapse in the International System (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. XVIII
[10] Amera Saeed, ‘Post-9/11 Afghanistan and the international community,’ Regional Studies (Islamabad), vol. XX, no. 3, Summer 2002, p. 44
[11] Ibid.
[12] Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, ‘Factors of competition between Russia and the US in Central Asia,’ Strategic Studies, vol. XXV, no. 4, Winter 2005, p. 147
[13] Shireen M. Mazari, op. cit., p. 9
[14] M. H. Askari, ‘America’s post-Taliban role,’ Dawn, 26 June 2003
[15] Dawn, 23 December 2002
[16] Yang Wanming, ‘On the concept of comprehensive security,’ International Studies (Beijing), vol. 4, July 2005, p. 6
[17] Barnett R. Rubin, op. cit., p. XXVI
[18] Ibid.
[19] Vishal Chandra, ‘Warlords and Karzai’s balancing act,’ Strategic Analysis, vol. 29, no. 1, January-March 2005, p. 158
[20] Mohammed Ramzan Ali, ‘Gas pipelines and regional cooperation,’ South Asian Journal (Lahore), July-September 2005, p. 24-25
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