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Crisis in Kashmir – An Introduction to the Issues

Robin Ellis

The May 1998 nuclear testing carried out by both Pakistan and India captured the world’s attention and also highlighted the importance of a solution to the crisis in Kashmir, one of the main sources of tension between India and Pakistan. The possibility of nuclear war between two countries whose relationship has been volatile since their founding increased international diplomatic pressures on India and Pakistan, who both lay claim to areas of Kashmir. The September 11 attacks also increased international attention to militant Islamic terrorism in the region, the U.S. being especially concerned with al Qaeda network activity. By early 2004, internal and external pressures prompted India and Pakistan to begin taking steps towards the negotiation of peace in the region, where an armed insurgency has raged for 14 years.

Previous attempts to reach a peaceful solution through diplomatic talks were repeatedly thwarted, however, by the results of Kashmir’s turbulent political heritage, the polarizing effects of more than a decade of violence between Indian Security Forces and Muslim separatist fighters, and the defining significance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India have fought two out of their three wars over the region since independence from Britain in 1947, and for both nations the Kashmir issue remains symbolic of their founding ideologies. While Pakistan’s claim to the Muslim-majority state rests on founder Muhammed Ali Jinnah’s “two nation theory” that Hindus and Muslims could not exist together in one country, the state of Kashmir is also key to India’s identity as a secular, multi-religious nation.

Historical Roots of the Conflict

The origins of the current situation in Kashmir lie in the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan at the end of British colonial rule. Some 600 princely states were forced to choose one of the two new nations, with the decision generally made based on religion. Although the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim majority and a boarder with Pakistan, its ruler was a Hindu maharaja and many areas of the state were heterogeneously populated. Hoping to remain independent, Maharaja Hari Singh delayed making a decision until an invasion of Pushtun tribesmen from Pakistan forced him to accede to India in order to gain military support.

The conflict escalated into a war between India and Pakistan and ended in 1949 with a cease-fire line established by the UN that divided the princely state in two. 1948 and 1949 UN Resolutions called for Pakistan to withdraw forces from the entire area, for India to reduce troops to a bare minimum, and for an internationally monitored plebiscite to be held in Kashmir on whether to join Pakistan or India. Due to military tensions and security concerns, however, the plebiscite was never implemented, and in 1972 the cease-fire line was officially recognized as the ‘Line of Control’ (LoC), the de facto boarder between India and Pakistan. Pakistan continues to argue for Kashmiri self-determination through a plebiscite, although without the possibility of a third choice for independence.

The areas of the former princely state under Pakistan’s control are Azad (“free”) Kashmir and the Northern Territories. The Indian controlled area, which includes the regions of Jammu, Ladakh, and the Kashmir Valley, is incorporated as the state of Jammu and Kashmir and is the only Muslim-majority state in India.

Simla Agreement

Whereas Pakistan advocates the UN recommended plebiscite in the settlement of the Kashmir question, India has long insisted on a solution through bilateral talks without third party intervention or mediation. In the 1972 Simla Agreement Pakistan and India agreed to settle disputes through bilateral negotiations only. This peace agreement followed a war between India and Pakistan fought 1971 along the Punjab border and in Kashmir, which resulted from India’s support for the creation of an independent Bangladesh. The exclusion of third party mediation has had far-reaching consequences for attempts to resolve the conflict in Kashmir, with Pakistan often trying to ‘internationalize’ the situation despite the agreement. India has been criticized for ignoring the Kashmiri people in its insistence on talks between Islamabad and Delhi only.

The Question of Autonomy

The state of Jammu and Kashmir initially had a uniquely autonomous status in India, with the central government responsible only for defense, foreign affairs and currency. This autonomy clause was amended in the 1950s however, as India feared demands for independence by separatist leader Sheikh Abdullah. Fears of Kashmiri nationalism have long resulted in the deprivation of political freedoms as well as fraudulent elections, which in turn have strengthened Kashmiri animosity towards the central government and increased readiness to express dissent through violence.

Violence in Kashmir

Following a series of rigged elections, a grassroots insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) broke out in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989. As support for the separatist movement grew, the Indian security forces sent by the central government increased as well, leading to a rapid escalation of violence by all parties in the conflict. Although the levels of violence have varied greatly, often in relation to Indo-Pakistani diplomacy, fighting in the region has been continuous since 1989. The involvement of foreign Islamic militant fighters increased in the 1990s; the degree to which they make up the insurgent forces in Kashmir and the amount of military support they receive from Pakistan remain contested.

Although united against the Indian government, the separatist movement is internally divided. The All Parties Hurriyat (“Freedom”) Conference is an umbrella organization of Kashmiri opposition groups whose positions on independence or accession to Pakistan vary considerably. The JKLF consistently advocated independence, but its voluntary disarmament in 1994 weakened the independence movement. Islamic militant fighters trained in Afghanistan and based in Pakistan are motivated by pan-Islamic fundamentalism rather than Kashmiri nationalism and aspire towards a union with Pakistan. While Pakistan insists that it gives only “moral and political” support for Kashmiri insurgents, India accuses Pakistan of providing intelligence and military aid, especially through its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

Indian security and paramilitary forces have been criticized for meeting violence with indiscriminate violence and thereby worsening religious polarization in the formerly peaceful Kashmir Valley. Human rights organizations report severe and frequent human rights violations by Indian security forces including hundreds of custodial killings, tortures, rapes and ‘disappearances’ each year. These abuses have fueled Kashmiri animosity toward the Indian central government and increased the willingness to retaliate.

Further complicating the situation is the government’s counterinsurgency policy of recruiting former mujahideen who are disillusioned and looking for pay to work as special police officers. The lack of work in the region, aggravated by a tourist economy shut down by years of fighting, further prompts young men to join one side or the other.

In the early 1990s militant groups terrorized the Hindu Pandits who subsequently fled the Kashmir Valley in large numbers. 1998 brought an increase in terrorist border-crossing and a shift in the insurgency to Jammu, including the Muslim-majority areas of Poonch, Rajauri, and Doda.

Firing across the LoC between Pakistani and Indian troops has remained a constant in the past decade, though often varying in intensity in relation to political events. In the two weeks following the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the intensity of shelling was the highest since the 1971 war and resulted in 150 casualties.

1999 Kargil conflict

The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan marked the first conventional war between two nuclear powers and aroused an international outcry in light of the previous year’s nuclear tests. Two months after the highly publicized Lahore talks between the countries’ prime ministers, the Indian army was caught off guard by Pakistani troops who had crossed the LoC during the winter months and infiltrated the mountainous Kargil region. India fought back decisively while remaining on the Indian side of LoC and was praised internationally for this demonstration of self-restraint. Recognizing the need for retreat, Pakistan’s then-President Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf accepted President Clinton’s invitation to the U.S. to declare the Pakistani withdrawal there.

Terrorism in 2001 and International Response

General Musharraf, who seized power in 1999 and declared himself President of Pakistan in 2001, has come under strong pressure from the U.S. since the September 11 attacks to curb terrorist organizations in his own country and especially those crossing the boarder into India- controlled Kashmir. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly building in Srinagar on October 1, and on the National Parliament in Delhi on December 13 also prompted international demands for a solution to the conflict,

India claimed Pakistan supported the militant group that allegedly carried out the attacks and in response recalled the Indian ambassador to Islamabad as well as terminating cross-border bus and rail links – important symbols of the relationship between the two nations. In January India increased the troops stationed along the LoC to one million and positioned short-range nuclear-capable missiles in East Punjab. As the situation threatened to escalate, the U.S. and U.K. upped their diplomatic pressures. The U.S. designated two Pakistani-based groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Pakistan responded by outlawing them.

On January 12, 2002, President Musharraf gave a televised nationwide address condemning terrorism in Pakistan and followed with the arrests of close to 2,000 terror organization members. The speech was received by many in the international community as a change in Pakistan’s position towards India and its support for “freedom fighters” there.

However, border-crossing and terrorist attacks in Jammu increased in the spring and India accused Pakistan of allowing terrorists to cross into the Indian-held territory. A round of rhetorical brinkmanship followed, with India threatening attacks in Azad Kashmir, and India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declaring in a May 22 speech that the time had come for a time for a “decisive fight.” As shelling across the LoC escalated, the U.S., U.K. and Russia increased their diplomatic involvement, especially pressuring Pakistan to further curb cross-border terrorism. As India’s tone remained belligerent, the U.S. and U.K. issued a warning for all citizens to leave the subcontinent. Eventually, continued international pressure and diplomatic visits combined with the economic costs of such brinkmanship led to a toning down of the threats and a partial deflation of the crisis.

Fall 2002 Elections

The fall 2002 state assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir were the first since 1987 and have been hailed by many as the most free and fair elections in decades. Held in phases from September to October because of security concerns, the elections drew an average voter participation of 47.9 percent despite calls for a boycott by the Hurriyat and election-related violence in which 800 people were killed. This participation was perceived by many as an opening for change and the desire of Kashmiris for peace. However, the results were also a rejection of the BJP Delhi government and its ally, the National Conference, in response to human rights abuses and the central government’s lack of economic support for the region. The new Chief Minister Mufti of the People’s Democratic Alliance is regarded as a skilled dialog initiator and is against violence and corruption, but the challenge of daily terrorism in the region remains great.

Possibilities for Peace

The Indian government estimates that as of 2004 more than 38,000 people have died in the past 11 years of the Kashmir conflict, and the economic and political costs remain high for both sides. In 2003 India and Pakistan inched closer to initiating diplomatic talks, although India insisted that Pakistan must stop all cross-border infiltration first. Speaking in Srinagar on April 18, Prime Minister Vajpayee extended a ‘hand of friendship’ to Islamabad and both countries publicly stated their willingness to work towards peace. A total cease-fire was enforced along the LoC in November 2003 and transportation routes across the boarder were reopened in January 2004. At a summit meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf in January, the first diplomatic talks in three years were scheduled. Three days of peace talks in February were generally hailed as promising, and further negotiations over Kashmir at the foreign minister-level were set for after the Indian general elections in the summer. In January 2004, the Delhi government also initiated landmark talks with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, signifying a greater readiness of India to dialog with representatives of Kashmir and a softening of India’s long held insistence on a purely bilateral solution.

Although diplomatic relations appear to be moving forward, a concrete solution to the Kashmir conflict remains to be found. India would like to declare the LoC the official boarder, arguing that the 1949 recommended UN plebiscite, favored by Pakistan, has since been rendered impossible to implement. The possibility of a border open for the movement of goods and people also exists, and could be combined with some form of Kashmiri autonomy.

The role of third party mediation remains open to debate; despite the Simla Agreement, outside diplomatic intervention has helped to defuse several potentially catastrophic situations. Relations with the U.S. are important to both countries and U.S. pressure on Pakistan has helped to curb terrorist activities, but the 2003 war in Iraq has also influenced views on U.S. intervention. Pakistan has urged the European Union to play a greater role in solving the conflict, and the strengthening of India-EU relations in recent years has increased the EU’s regional influence. In light of the recent progress in diplomatic talks made by India and Pakistan, the EU has declared itself “ready, at the request of the parties, to assist in any way that may be appropriate.”[1]

The centrality of Kashmir to Pakistan and India’s poor relations is also debated; some question whether a solution in Kashmir would solve all problems between Pakistan and India. Others recommend that negotiations start at the level of trade and transportation, building up a foundation of agreements before tackling Kashmir. Pakistan views Kashmir as central to its identity and foreign policy, but talks such as the 2001Agra Summit have repeatedly broken down over the issue.

Whether the current round of diplomatic negotiations will lead to a resolution of the dispute remains to be seen. The record is poor but the Indian government’s willingness to meet with Kashmiri representatives are encouraging, and the costs grow greater for both sides the longer the cycle of violence continues. As the 1998 nuclear tests and the armed conflicts of the following years proved, Kashmir is not a region that the international community can afford to ignore.

Sources

Behind the Kashmir conflict: Abuses by Indian security forces and militant groups continue / Human Rights Watch. - New York/N.Y., 1999. - ca. 70 S.
Kashmir: learning from the past / International Crisis Group. - Islamabad [u.a.]: ICG, 2003. - 38 S. & Lit.Hinw., Anh. S. 27-38.
Pakistan als Partner? : Zu den aktuellen Entspannungsbemühungen der indischen Regierung / Reifeld, Helmut, 2003; In: KAS-Auslandsinformationen (Sankt Augustin), 19 (2003) 9, S. 4-43.
Untangling India and Pakistan / Bajpai, K. Shankar, 2003; In: Foreign Affairs (New York/N.Y.), 82 (May-June 2003) 3, S. 112-126.
“The EU’s Relations with Asia: Troika visits to India, Afghanistan, Pakistan” 23 February, 2003 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/asia/gac.htm#india230204
The Kargil conflict / Anand, Vinod K., 1999; In: Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), 23 (October 1999) 7, S. 1053-1094.
“The EU’s Relations with Asia: Troika visits to India, Afghanistan, Pakistan” 23 February, 2003 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/asia/gac.htm#india230204