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Is Indonesia Breaking Apart?

Nicola Demme

The West Papuan Independence Struggle Against Jakarta: History and Prospects

 

I. Introduction

The Papuan struggle for independence has had only little attention in the international community. With the independence of East Timor in May 2002, however, West Papua has gained more regional and international attention recently. The question has arisen whether it might be the next province to secede from Indonesia. How likely is it that West Papua will succeed in its call for independence? Latest developments are complicating the situation and spoiling all achievements of mutual conciliation of the last years. Jakarta has set out on a “divide and rule” course and called for a division of Papua into three smaller provinces. Under the mantle of “ameliorating administration” the main purpose of this strategy is to undermine the continuing independence movement.

The prospects for the West Papuan struggle for independence is depending on three main factors, the strength and organisation of the West Papuan independence movement itself, Jakarta’s interests in the province and its policies, and the attitude of the international community.

Historical background

West Papua (WP) became part of the Netherlands East Indies in 1828. As such it was claimed by the founders of Indonesia to become part of the Indonesian state when Indonesia gained independence in 1949. Everything that belonged to the Dutch colonial territory should be “freed” and integrated into the new Indonesian state. The Netherlands, however, did not cede WP to the Indonesians - for various reasons. On the one hand they sought to keep a base in the Pacific and on the other hand they did not consider West Papua culturally belonging to the Indonesian archipelago. They were supported in this view by the West Papuans themselves, who had always seen themselves ethnically, culturally, and politically distinct from Indonesia.

During the 1950s, Dutch administration slowly built up West Papuan nationalism by fostering a Papuan identity separate from Indonesia and preparing WP for self-determination. (Osborne 1985).

In the 1950s, international pressure on The Netherlands to return all colonies rose. This pressure in connection with the immense costs for the development of the territory led to a change in Dutch attitude by the end of the decade. (Osborne 1985) The option of handing over WP to the young state of Indonesia was taken into consideration. In addition, Indonesia under the Sukarno administration made it clear that it would not accept a separate WP. Sukarno gained support from the U.S. and the international community, since relations with Indonesia were given more importance than cultural, ethnic and moral arguments which had been raised in favour of West Papuan independence. As a result of the international shift in attitude, WP was handed over to Indonesia in August 1962 in the New York Agreement, which had been achieved under UN mediation.

As a result of the Dutch politics of building a separate Papua identity, WP has fought against Indonesian rule since integration in 1962, which they considered an illegal act of annexation in a new form of colonialism. Many bloody battles have been fought out between the armed guerrilla fighters of the West Papuan independence movement and the Indonesian military. The ideal of an independent state for West Papua has successfully been kept alive within the province.

As a “face-saving gesture” (ICG 2001, p. 3) to The Netherlands after handing over WP to Indonesia, it was agreed to have an Act of Free Choice for the people of West Papua being conducted between 1962 and 1969.

This “Act of Free Choice” took place in 1969. 1025 selected West Papuan leaders were brought to Jakarta, where they voted for joining the Republic of Indonesia. The vote was conducted without much consultation of the people in West Papua and under great pressure from the Indonesian authorities under the Soeharto administration. The “Act of Free Choice” was certainly not an act of free choice but could rather be referred to as an “act free of choice”. (May 1986, p. vi)

In the early 1960s, those opposed to Indonesian rule formed the Organisation OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), the Free Papua Movement. It started as a loose group of guerrilla fighters, poorly equipped and without much experience. During the following decades the OPM became the main representative organisation fighting for independence from Indonesian rule. Since integration into the Indonesian state until today many bloody clashes between the OPM and the Indonesian military and police forces have occurred. The Indonesian authorities followed a harsh course of repression and intimidation.

Only in 1998, with the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia embarked on a new political course of Reformasi. President Habibie initiated the politics of national dialogue and softened Indonesia’s attitude towards the demands of the West Papuans and other parts of the country pursuing independence politics. In order to meet some of the demands of West Papua, Aceh, and East Timor, President Habibie developed a decentralisation program, which came into effect in 2001. Indonesia had a highly centralised system before and this decentralisation program was directed towards a fairer distribution of economic and financial resources and the integration of the provinces in decision-making processes concerning their own domestic affairs. The implementation of the program, however, was commented by West Papuan leaders as “inadequate to overcome the deep anti-Indonesian feeling in Papua” (Lloyd 2000).

This course was, nevertheless, continued by Wahid until 2001. Although it was intended to ameliorate the relation between Jakarta and the province, it rather facilitated a further development of the independence movement in West Papua which grew from a resistance struggle mainly led by the OPM into a civilian movement led by traditional leaders and an educated elite who favours independence by peaceful means.

Under the president Megawati, Indonesia seems to return to its course of suppression of all secessionist movements of the republic. NGOs report repeated attempts of intimidation and threats by the military and police forces. Arbitrary killings and arrests, tortures, the burning of villages and the expulsion of thousands of West Papuans have aggravated the situation significantly. (Watch Indonesia 2002) On the other side, however, the Megawati administration has realised the critical situation and offered a “Special Autonomy” arrangement which would provide the province with more influence and financial resources.

This offer eventually led to a split up of the independence movement and more and more moderate voices started to support the Special Autonomy path as a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Only in early 2003, the issuing of a Presidential Instruction by Megawati, though, has thrown back the course of consolidation in the province. The proposition to divide Papua into three smaller provinces has triggered new conflicts between Papuan leaders and Jakarta and within the province.

II. The Papuan Struggle

Strong Papuan nationalism

Ethnic, cultural and religious differences between the people of West Papua and Indonesia form a major factor in the development of the distinct West Papuan nationalism. The West Papuans are Melanesians and mainly Christians, due to the important role the church played under Dutch colonial rule. As colonial administration was rather limited, the main responsibility for infrastructure like education or health services lay in the hands of the missionary stations. These differences were one reason why The Netherlands did not accept the Indonesian claim for their territory and eventually did not cede West Papua to Indonesia when it became independent in 1949.

The Indonesian identity was largely formed by the common struggle for independence and the fight against this “opposite” force of colonial rule. As West Papua did not take part in this struggle, its people lacked from the very beginning the feeling of identification with the Indonesian “nation” or state. In addition to that, the Dutch administration supported the development of a distinct Papuan identity by implementing policies directed towards the goal of the establishment of an independent state of West Papua. (ICG 2001)

The Papuan society is far from being ethnically homogeneous with more than 250 ethno-linguistic groups. Due to the large number of Indonesian settlers, however, Papuans define themselves as one national group in reference to the Indonesians.

Already under Dutch colonial rule, Indonesians were given preference for integration into colonial administration as officials, police, teachers, or missionaries. Colonialism was for Papuans as much associated with Dutch as it was with Indonesians. (ICG 2001) Also economically, the gap between the Indonesians and the Papuans is wide. Indonesians settled mainly in the economic centres of the province and most were economically successful. Papuans remained in the traditional sectors of the province’s economy such as agriculture whereas the major sectors of economy were soon dominated by the settlers. Particularly in the foreign companies, which are exploiting the plenty resources of the province, higher positions are dominated by Indonesians or other non-Papuans. (Wilson 2001). West Papuans developed a feeling of being excluded and underprivileged when comparing themselves with the Indonesian settlers. This form of inter-group comparison sharpens ethnic identity and often functions as a forging force through which different ethnic groups join together and develop a common identity distinct to the outer group. (Horowitz 1985) This increased the Papuans’ feeling of being one identity group regardless their different tribal affiliations. In this way, Papuan nationalism has been reinforced.

Hostilities against the Indonesians were nurtured by the constant violation of human rights by the Indonesian military. Throughout the last decades since integration in 1962, the military repeatedly suppressed West Papuans by using force and violence in often very brutal actions against villages and the people. (Osborne 1985)

As the ICG report (2001) argues, there is some evidence that ethnic tensions between Indonesians and West Papuans are being reinforced by Indonesian authorities in the region in order to shift the perception of the conflict from an independence movement towards an ethnic conflict. This, however, only spills water on the mills of Papuan nationalism and is likely to attract even more support for independence.

The West Papuan nationalism is certainly one of the strongest forces which drives the independence movement forward and serves as the greatest motivating factor for it.

Effects of the “Transmigrasi”-program

As it has been pointed out above, the mere presence of Indonesian settlers fostered inter-group comparison which was a major factor in the development of Papuan nationalism. However, the settlement of Indonesians, controlled and largely enforced by Jakarta, also had the effects it was meant to have. The transmigrasi program was introduced by Indonesia in order to relieve to population pressure on overpopulated islands like Java. At the same time it was also meant to function as a subtle form of colonisation and assimilation of the Melanesian population of West Papua. In this sense it has had its effects as the demographic situation in West Papua has changed drastically since 1962. With almost half of the population being Indonesian today and having closer ties in terms of political and cultural identity to Jakarta, the broad support for independence in West Papua can slowly be undermined. Jakarta wants to ensure the loyalty of the province by fostering the settling of more and more Indonesians who are culturally and ethnically closer to Indonesia, as it is the identification with the state and the acceptance of the leadership, which gives authority to the government. West Papuans now are facing the risk to becoming a minority in their own land through which they will lose the legitimacy of claiming the land – at least in the eyes of Indonesia and probably also in the eyes of the international community. (Dyer 2002)

The OPM and the political organisation of the independence movement

In the early 1960s those opposed to Indonesian rule in Papua formed the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM). Its struggle is often referred to as a “sporadic, localised and low-level armed struggle in the jungles of the province” (ICG 2001, p.2) and the members of OPM seen as a “rag-tag bunch of terrorists” (Lloyd 2000) by the Indonesian military. However, the OPM was long time the only form of organisation in West Papua’s fight for independence.

In 1971 the OPM announced the formation of a “Provisional Republic of West Papua New Guinea”, and proclaimed independence for the territory in order to ensure its own domination within the whole independence struggle. The proclamation, however, was badly organised and did not have the expected effect. Only in the following decades, the OPM and its sub organisations in the villages and mountain regions slowly gained more support due to the reprisals of the Indonesian military. This support of the population however, was sporadic and did not develop into an unconditional acceptance of the OPM as the main representative of the West Papuan people. Fractions within the OPM and their poor equipment in terms of weapons and resources were major factors why the OPM stayed a relatively unorganised, and localised movement without the strength to unify all branches of the independence movement behind it. Sporadic unity against the “enemy” was formed when Indonesian military ferocities became so intense that the OPM “had no time to concern itself with rival factions” (May 1986, p. 57). The most brutal Indonesian attacks on West Papuan villages to crash down West Papuan resistance occurred in the late 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the OPM split into factions again and lost its unity and therefore also its uniting force in the province. In 1981, one of the OPM branches took several Indonesian and one Chinese-Malaysian hostages demanding 2 mio US $ and machine guns. The hostages were safely freed 8 months later. This incident caused great damage to the OPM’s image as wide parts of the population found that innocent civilians had been maltreated. During the course of the 1980s, Indonesian attacks were ongoing and the different OPM groups kept fighting in a guerrilla struggle against the military. Nonetheless, the OPM’s attempt to take over the leadership and overthrow the Indonesian authorities could not succeed due to the lack in resources, structure, unity and local and international support. (May 1986)

Therefore, in the late 1990s a new leadership in form of political organisations emerged. In 1998, Church leaders and activists established the “Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society” (Foreri). It was founded as a forum to seek for opportunities for Papuans to manage their own affairs, through autonomy, a federal system or independence. Between 1998 and 1999, several meetings between the Foreri and President Habibie took place. (ICG 2001) In 1999, a delegation of 100 Papuan leaders met with President Habibie where for the first time they openly demanded independence. (Lloyd 2000)

In 2000 a presidium was elected under the leadership of Theys H. Eluay to develop a program for negotiations with Indonesia and The Netherlands and to gain support from the regional and international community. To some extent, these efforts were successful and Jakarta – under the increasing pressure in the province and outside - had to respond. However, although Papuan independence leaders had been given more freedom to meet and express their demands, all this was happening against the background of continued political oppression and Jakarta's refusal to openly discuss independence.

III. Indonesian Politics vis-à-vis Papua

Importance of Resources

WP is the fourth richest province of Indonesia thanks to abundant mineral resources like copper, gold, nickel, wood, bauxite, mineral oil and natural gas.

The US-based Freeport McMorran company now operates the world's largest gold mine on the Grasberg site in the province. It became Indonesia’s largest single taxpayer and the country is strongly depending on this tax income. (Wilson 2000) In Bintuni Bay, Manokwari, a large gas field is currently being developed by BP Amoco and Pertamina and other foreign companies are encouraged to invest in the province. (ICG 2001)

Many NGOs are criticising that the exploitation of the resources are destroying large parts of the country and the habitat of the indigenous population. Under a West Papuan administration, foreign investors would certainly be more restricted in their now careless dealing with the land and therefore lobby strongly for the continuation of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. The Indonesian government is depending on the tax income of the foreign companies and has less scruple to sell off the land. It is an “open secret” that the Indonesian military is closely linked to the foreign companies, namely the Freeport mine, in order to protect the mines and the land to ensure the security and further development of the foreign companies. (Watch Indonesia 2002)

Unity of Indonesian state

Indonesia’s slogan “Unity in Diversity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) (Lloyd 2000) summarises briefly Jakarta’s attitude towards secessionist movements. Indonesia is by nature no ethnically or geographically homogeneous country. Therefore it can not grant regions with “distinct” ethnical, historical or geographical character independence. This would lead to a complete split up of the whole country and would undermine the legitimacy of the existence of an Indonesian state.

The struggle of Indonesia to “free” West Papua from the Dutch became part of Indonesia’s ideology of a unitary state. President Sukarno used the West Irian dispute as an instrument to solidify the nation’s unity by fighting against this outer enemy of a colonial power and therewith unifying all political groups within Indonesia. West Papua came thus to play an important role in the Indonesian self-perception. (ICG 2001). In addition, West Papua played an important historical role during the revolution, when most independence fighters of Indonesia were detained on the island by the colonial rulers during the 1940s. Merauku became a place to cast the youth movement leaders, including the Indonesian founding fathers, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta (History - Jakarta Post 2002).

The current President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the first president Sukarno, established the preservation of the unitary state as her government’s top priority. She referred to her father’s ideals with the words “(…) without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is not complete.“ (ICG 2001) and therewith made it clear that she would not be soft on the independence issue.

A factor that has to be given further consideration is the current economic and political situation. In the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Indonesia was one of the most affected countries and still has not recovered yet. Politically, after the end of Soeharto’s rule and the following years of reform politics, Indonesia has been weakened a lot and is still striving for a more stable future. (Wilson 2000). As domestic politics and economy are still on the way of recovering the national unity is generally fragile. This atmosphere of unstable circumstances has led to stronger calls for more autonomy and in the provinces of West Papua and Aceh. Jakarta’s fear of a possible disintegration of the whole state in times of political and economic weakness is certainly one major reason why Indonesia will suppress any forms of secessionist movements. (Llyod 2000)

The years of the presidential periods of President Habibie and later President Wahid were marked by the will of a mutual conciliation. However, against the background of the happenings in East Timor, both Wahid and his successor President Megawati were urged by their advisors and Jakarta’s leading politicians to act more decisively against separatists.

In order to find a peaceful resolution for the conflict –or a resolution at all - the Megawati administration repeatedly made the offer of a so called “Special Autonomy” arrangement that goes further than the introduced laws of regional autonomy. It guarantees a high level of West Papuan authority through political representation and the placement of a West Papuan as provincial governor, the establishment of a local police force, and the withdrawal and deployment of Indonesian troops in the province. Between 70 and 80 percent of provincial revenue remain in the province, which would mean a significant rise in annual income for West Papua. It also officially recognises the name “Papua” as the official name of the province and gives Papuans the right to develop their own symbols such as a flag and anthem, which are being accepted as symbols of provincial identification but not as symbols of sovereignty. In addition, it mandated the establishment of a Papuan People’s Council (MPR) as an advisory body to the Provincial Parliament. Moderate forces in Papua welcomed this proposal of Special Autonomy, as a window of opportunity to resolve the separatist struggle through non-military means. They said it proposes a wide range of measures, which - if agreed upon - could provide enough support for a cessation of calls for independence. (Wilson 2001 and ICG 2003)

Latest Developments

Jakarta was determined to make Special Autonomy the only option, and the law No. 21 on Special Autonomy for Papua was passed on October 22, 2001. Nothing should stop its implementation – not even the fact that, the influential Presidium Dewan Papua, a Papuan leadership council, under the leadership of independence fighter Theys Eluay, rejected the law. They were not prepared to settle for anything less than full independence. Two weeks later, Eluay was abducted and killed by members of the Indonesian militia Kopassus. The murder was a shock for all Papuans and further undermined trust in Jakarta. During the last year, Papuans were focused on the unfolding case and investigations against Kopassus, while implementation of the Special Autonomy took its course until early 2003.

Early in 2003, Megawati changed her course and called for a speeded implementation of the earlier Law No. 45, which mandated for the division of the province into three parts. This Law had been passed in 1999 but due to heavy protests within the province and the political chaotic situation in Jakarta during these years, it had never been implemented. Only now, almost 4 years later, Megawati suddenly issued a Presidential Instruction No. 1 (Inpres), calling for the division of Papua into Irian Jaya (the name “Papua” which Papuans had fought for for such a long time is again being replaced with the hated name “Irian Jaya”), West Irian and Central Irian. It further called for the establishment of provincial parliaments and the activating of the positions of governors and other necessary bodies of administration.

The Inpres had been issued without any consultation of the MPR or Provincial Parliament and is thus being criticised as illegal since it undermines the Special Autonomy Law. Once again, Papuan advisory bodies were being passed over and had no voice in their own affairs.

Official motivation behind the Inpres was to facilitate the implementation of Special Autonomy in a huge and remote province which is almost impossible to handle for a single provincial government. However, the way the three provinces were drawn sheds light on the real motivation behind it. The new geographical order does little to improve administrative efficiency and many protests and critical voices from both, Papuan opponents to and proponents of the division have been raised. The capital of Central Irian, Timika, for example, can only be reached by plane from certain areas of the province, which would mean that people requiring administrative services would have to walk all the way over hills and mountains for hours or even days. Infrastructural and geographical considerations have obviously not been taken into consideration.

Hence, it is clear that the real motivation behind the division lies somewhere else. Under the motto of “divide and rule”, Jakarta has made the attempt to divide not only the province but with it the independence movement. While the movement had been relatively quiet within the province, Indonesian officials raised concerns about the success Papuan activists had abroad in generating international support for a re-examination of the “Act of Free Choice” of 1969 and for the military arm of the independence movement, the OPM.

As the first reactions to the Inpres have shown, this “divide and rule” strategy has had some effect. At least it has generated conflict within the governing elite of Papua which split up in a division supporting group, a group supporting division but on different geographic terms, and a group being completely opposed to the division rejecting it as illegal and against Papuan interests. At the same time, friction within and across the districts of the provinces is emerging since all fear an inequitable distribution of financial resources. As several NGOs and foreign observers say, grass-root support for the various positions is being activated and what is now being organised as relatively harmless demonstrations could easily develop into violent conflicts. (ICG 2003)

In this context, it is questionable whether Jakarta really had the amelioration of administration in mind, or rather a subtle generating of tensions to produce low-level conflict, which in turn would serve as argument to increase the presence of armed security forces again.

The step was a dangerous one by Jakarta and probably not very well advised. It is spilling water on the mills of Papuan nationalism and spoiling the little trust which had developed over the last month of Special Autonomy implementation. The heavy rejection of the Law No. 45 within the province came as a shock for Jakarta, which is now left with only very limited policy option. Implementing this decree over all massive objections would mean to enter very dangerous terrain. Jakarta would have to deal with all consequences, which almost certainly would include the violent crack down of all opposition and therefore involve further human rights violations. Against the background of the national elections in 2004, Megawati has a lot to lose if she considers the revoking of the decree. Thus, the only way out now would be a deliberate delay of the implementation at least until after the 2004 elections and maybe until a chance would have been given to the re-examination of the provincial borders. Special Autonomy must remain in effect, since this is the only basis on which all sides can eventually find an agreement.

IV. The attitude of the international community

Without doubt, the recent Inpres has facilitated a new emergence of strong independence voices and provided them with new arguments. However, an important prerequisite for independence is not only the will of the province but also a favourable international climate. The history of West Papua shows that its claim for self-determination has largely been depending on the attitude of the Dutch during the independence negotiations over Indonesia. It was the Dutch and not the West Papuans themselves who prevented the integration into the Indonesian state. In the 1960s, when international pressure to release all colonial territories grew stronger, it was again the international community who decided about the fate of West Papua. And in 1962, the integration into the Indonesian state was decided by the Dutch under strong pressure of the U.S., who were eager to establish and maintain a good relationship with Jakarta due the American plans in Vietnam at that time. And the case of East Timor shows that the support of the international community is vital for the success of an independence movement and the establishing and maintaining of a new viable state.

WP, though, is in another situation than East Timor. East Timor has never been under Dutch colonial rule and being a Portuguese colony it had a historically distinct position in Indonesia. Indonesia sees itself as the rightful heir of the Dutch colonial territory and defines its borders through referring to the borders of the former Dutch East Indies. “Thus in one interpretation of international law, Indonesia has a legitimate claim to [West Papua] that it did not have to East Timor. And it is for this reason that Indonesia will not consider independence for [West Papua] for it could open a Pandora's Box.” (Verrier 2000)

Therefore, Indonesia’s sovereignty over WP is internationally accepted and no pressure is likely to be put on Indonesia as far as the granting of independence is concerned. International criticism is thus limited to the criticising of the Indonesian military’s use of force and the repeated violation of human rights.

At the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in 2000 in Kiribati, WP representatives took part as members of the Nauru delegation and achieved a minor success when the communiqué integrated a call on the Indonesian government to end all human rights abuses in WP and urged the conflicting parties to solve their differences through peaceful negotiations. WP’s status as an Indonesian province, however, was not questioned. During the Pacific Islands Forum in 2001, it became even clearer, that West Papua cannot count on international support of its claim for independence. Indonesia was invited as a dialogue partner and the West Papua Presidium representatives were excluded from taking part in the Forum. Although the communiqué did repeat the Forum’s concern about the continuing violation of human rights and loss of lives in the WP conflict, no expression of support for independence could be heard. Instead, the Forum expressed great support for the Special Autonomy solution. (ICG 2001) In the communiqué of the 2002 Pacific Islands Forum, Indonesia is explicitly mentioned as the “sovereign authority” in Papua and it merely has been urged in regard to the Special Autonomy to “ensure its full and timely implementation”. (Communiqué 2002)

Also the wider ASEAN region expressed its concern over the stability of the Indonesian state rather than the independence of West Papua. On 30 May 2000, Australia’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said that “Australia has always [supported] and continues to support and to recognise the integration of West Papua within the Republic of Indonesia”. Prime Minister Howard asserted that Australia “fully and unequivocally supports the sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia”. (cited in Lloyd 2000)

It is obvious that the international community, particularly the region is very much interested in maintaining Indonesian stability. The disintegration of the Indonesian state, which could be triggered by the secession of one more province, would lead to “the creation of additional, possibly unstable states lacking in resources and infrastructure, and the possibility of providing 'demonstration effects' to separatist movements in other Southeast Asian countries.” (Wilson 2001) This scenario - although very unlikely - is strongly feared by the region and ultimately also by the international community.

V. Conclusion

The Papuan struggle for independence is not likely to succeed. West Papua does have a strong national motivation for independence but its resources for a military conflict with Indonesia are far too limited to succeed. If the division suggested by Jakarta should be implemented, the independence movement will face even more difficulties in co-ordinating and organising its struggle. In addition, the province is of immense importance for Jakarta, politically and economically. Jakarta cannot afford to lose one of its provinces due to the unstable unity of the republic and the risk to trigger the break up of the whole country. As West Papua is rich in natural resources, Indonesia is financially largely depending on the revenues coming from the mines, oil and gas fields of the province. Therefore Jakarta is determined to keep WP with all means, either through Special Autonomy or if necessary through further suppression of the independence movement.

The international community stands on the side of Indonesia, as it is one of the major players in the Asia-Pacific regions. Neither the ASEAN region nor the Pacific Island Forum is likely to spoil its good relations to Jakarta for West Papua. The international community will put pressure on Indonesia as far as the violations of human rights are concerned but the West Papuan call for self-determination is very unlikely to be supported.

The only way to resolve this conflict is to resume dialogue between the Indonesian government and Papuan leaders. The continued ignoring of Papuan councils and other political bodies by Jakarta in designing a solution for the province has to find an end and true cooperation has to develop. The responsibility for it lies in the hands of the Indonesian government. Independence will be ruled out as an option from the Indonesian side and a continuation of current suppression politics are no option for West Papua. The further implementation of Special Autonomy, whether in a divided province or Papua as one province, must go hand in hand with the release of political detainees, the withdrawal of military units not needed for external defence, and the accounting of the Indonesian security forces for human rights abuses. Only then will Indonesia show its genuine will to solve the conflict peacefully and can the Papuans develop trust in the Indonesian government.

 

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Aktualisiert: 17. Dezember 2003.
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