Einführung
Anne Kohli
by Anne Kohli
For the first time in 29 years, thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been allowed to cross the „Green Line”, the cease fire zone that had been established to separate the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1974. This happened one week after the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession agreement to the European Union in Athens. Will the opening of the Green line and the prospect of EU accession succeed where 3 UN plans have yet failed? Can the pressure of the population convince the leaders from both parts to review their position to find a solution?
Although there is hope that the short time remaining before Cyprus joins the European Union on May 1st 2004 will urge the Cypriots to find a solution, this historical moment should however be taken cautiously. Even though both communities have strongly shown their wish to live together, despite repression and persecution against those defending peace, despite media campaigns painting hostile images of „the other“ as it is often the case in protracted conflicts, and despite the argument that both communities cannot live together, the failure of the negotiations around the Annan plan in April 2003 still shows that many problems remain, especially at the state level. This further highlights the fact that the Cyprus problem has implications that go far beyond the reunification of an island. As was pointed out by the Turkish press “If the reunification of populations has happened, that of the territories is still to be completed.”
The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 with a system of power sharing and cooperation between majority Greek and minority Turkish Cypriots. Following a Turkish military invasion in 1974, in response to a coup by Greek nationalists, the island, where a Greek majority and a Turkish minority had previously coexisted peacefully, was divided up into two separate „ethnically cleansed“ areas. One third of the population- Greek as well as Turkish- were forced to leave their homes. The government of the Republic of Cyprus (now exclusively run by Greek Cypriots) continued to be recognised by the international community as the legitimate government of the island, unlike the Turkish Cypriot administration, which is only recognised by Turkey. The conflict has been going on for nearly thirty years despite efforts of the UN and the EU to resolve tensions. The ramifications of the stand-off go well beyond Cyprus and explain why there is so much interest from both sides of the Atlantic in a country with such a small population.
Cyprus’s EU membership, which for many initially appeared to offer the best hopes to help reintegrate the divided island, emerged as a pressing problem for the EU. In 1993, the European Community concluded that the Republic of Cyprus’ application for EU membership was made in the name of the whole island, which angered the Turkish Cypriots, who never agreed to join the EU, of which Greece was a member but Turkey was not. Turkey had made it clear that it would annex the northern part of Cyprus if the EU admitted the Greek Cypriots as the Republic of Cyprus without a settlement. On the other hand, Greece had threatened to use its veto power over the whole EU enlargement process unless Cyprus was included in the first wave of enlargement. The Helsinki summit in 1999 recognised Turkey as a candidate for membership but also declared that a solution in Cyprus was no longer a prerequisite for Cyprus admission (the Turkish side could no longer block Cyprus’ accession to the EU by refusing to negotiate). One can however wonder what will happen of Turkey’s candidacy if Cyprus (run by Greek Cypriots) becomes a member and therefore also has the capacity to veto Turkey’s membership! Moreover, if a solution is not found before Cyprus becomes a EU member in 2004, from a legal point of view Turkey’s 35000 troops in the North will be occupying part of a new EU state. This could jeopardise Turkey’s accession negotiations.
The Cyprus problem also has implications as far as the European and Security Defence Policy (ESDP) is concerned. After the accession of Cyprus to the EU, new complications might arise, which might widen the transatlantic rift between the EU and the US (because of NATO). In fact, the EU’s proposed ESDP sought to give the EU the right to use NATO assets, without non-EU members of NATO (such as Turkey) having an effective veto. Turkey feared that a European force would intervene in Cyprus or in the dispute with Greece over the territorial waters in Heagan and therefore vetoed EU-NATO arrangements and blocked EU access to NATO assets. An agreement was found in December 2001 when the UK guaranteed there would not be any intervention in Cyprus or over Greek-Turkish disputes. Greece however refused such an agreement. EU-NATO relations could be blocked by Turkey as a reaction to the accession of Cyprus. At a time where many wonder whether NATO will remain the main security organisation in the enlarged Europe or whether the EU will create the ESDP out of NATO, the resolution of the Cyprus problem could be one factor among others to help rebuild transatlantic relations. As was demonstrated by the Iraq war, Turkey is a key ally for the US since it is the door to the Middle East and is also an ally of Israel. The US have therefore been pushing for Turkey’s EU membership. At a time when efforts are being made to heal transatlantic relations, the failure of finding a solution for Cyprus would probably worsen the relations with Turkey and add yet another source of tension between the EU and the US.
The paradox remains that in order to find a settlement to the Cyprus problem, a solution will have to be found in Turkey. In order to engage in further dialogue, the Turkish military, which supports strong nationalist ideas, would have to be weakened. However, Turkish military leaders have recently felt strengthened by the US war plans in Iraq, which sought the help of Turkey.
By ruining the process in Cyprus in order to preserve what it sees as a crucial bargaining chip for negotiation on EU entry, Turkey is following a high risk strategy, which could jeopardise not only EU’s €208 million promised help to the North of the island, but also Turkey’s EU accession, as well as the already destabilised transatlantic relations.
Druckversion
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