Fortsetzung: Economic sanctions as an instrument for promoting international peace and security, case of Iraq
Alice Coulter
Iraq’s WMD programme
Whether Iraq has, or is developing, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a crucial factor in the justification for the current sanctions regime (and the case for military action in light of the international war on terrorism). US government officials claim that there is no doubt as to Iraq’s current WMD capacity, and that it still constitutes a significant threat to international security. Yet, this is hotly disputed by Iraqi officials and indeed doubt is raised by the wide range of opinions around the world.[19] Adding to this uncertainty is the fact that weapons inspectors have not been allowed into Iraq since 1998. Yet, even this core debate is rendered less relevant by critics complaining of double standards in the application of international intervention. According to this logic, the emphasis placed upon reducing Iraq’s weapons capacity is used to undermine the country’s regional status and therefore apply some form of Western domination in the region.
In 1994 President Bill Clinton signed a Executive Order stating that: "The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States".[20] Given Saddam Hussein’s open hostility towards successive US governments, and his regime’s use of WMD during the Iran-Iraq war, it would appear to be justifiable for the US to focus on reducing Iraq’s WMD capability in the aftermath of the Gulf War. But how developed are Iraq’s current weapons programmes, and do they still constitute a threat to international security?
"Iraq poses an extremely serious threat to the United States and to U.S. allies not only because of its continued possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also the increased likelihood that it will use such weapons in any future military conflict."[21] This view of Iraq constituting an international security threat is commonly heard in official US circles, particularly so in the post September 11th period as President Bush and his deputy, Dick Cheney, attempt to gain international support for an expansion of the war on terrorism. Yet, following the 1998 withdrawal of UNSCOM weapons inspectors, this assessment of the situation in Iraqi is based almost entirely on assumptions about Iraqi WMD capabilities and the values and perspectives of the Iraqi regime.
The lack of certainty concerning Iraq’s current arsenal has produced a mixture of opinions, even among former UNSCOM inspectors. Colonel Terry Taylor believes that Iraq will have continued to pursue its WMD programme in the years since UNSCOM’s withdrawal. "Having been at close quarters with these programmes over a number of years in Iraq I concluded that they would make every effort to conceal their weapons of mass destruction programmes and continue to develop them as far as possible."[22] In contrast, Scott Ritter – another former inspector who resigned in protest against what he perceived to be the manipulation of inspections for ulterior purposes – believes that claims about Iraq’s weapons capacity are overstated and that the 5-10% of Iraq’s known pre-1990 stockpile of chemical and biological arms that was unaccounted for by UNSCOM would now be unusable.[23]
Outside the debate concerning assessments of Iraq’s military capabilities, complaints are increasingly being heard, particularly in the Arab world, about the double standards of international intervention, and the tendency of the West to ignore the fact that: "the Iraqi government had developed its destructive and repressive capacity with the support and encouragement of its friends in Washington, London, and other Western capitals, and that Israel had a nuclear weapons arsenal of some two hundred warheads and continued to occupy southern Lebanon, as well as the territories it had illegally seized in 1948 and 1967, in violation of numerous unenforced UN resolutions".[24]
UN Security Council resolution 687 identified the goal of "establishing in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and all missiles to deliver them, and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons", and conditioned the lifting of sanctions against Iraq on the destruction of that country’s WMD programmes. Yet, the prolonged duration of the sanctions regime, combined with the introduction of intermediate steps before the conditioned removal of sanctions in UNSC resolution 1284, and the growing sentiment of hypocrisy in their application, has led critics to assume ulterior motives other than the destruction of Iraq’s WMD programmes, such as ensuring Western influence in the region.[25] Scepticism about the UN mission in Iraq has been compounded by the delayed admission that US members of the UNSCOM inspections teams were indeed acting as spies for US intelligence, as claimed by Saddam Hussein.[26] This damaging admission backed up the complaints of former UNSCOM inspector, Scott Ritter, who resigned "when it became clear that the US and Richard Butler, Executive Director of UNSCOM, were manipulating inspections as a vehicle for maintaining economic sanctions, instead of disarmament".[27]
Whether or not retaining influence in the region is an accurate perception of the motivation for the US-led sanctions policy, the UNSCOM revelations undoubtedly undermine the legitimacy of future weapons inspectors returning to Iraq. Without weapons inspectors the ability of the international coalition to reduce Iraq’s weapons programmes is greatly reduced.
[19] Julian Borger et al., "Iraq: the myth and the reality," The Guardian (15 March 2002)
[20] Prof. Gerald Steinberg, "U.S. Responses to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," Middle East Review of International Affairs 2(3) (September 1998) http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/responses.htm
[21] Dr Kathleen C. Bailey, Iraq’s Asymmetric Threat to the United States and U.S. Allies, (Fairfax: National Institute for Public Policy, 2001). http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Iraq%20Asymmetry.2.pdf
[22] Colonel Terry Taylor, former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, as quoted in Julian Borger et al., "Iraq: the myth and the reality," The Guardian (15 March 2002). http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763, 667669,00.html
[23]Scott Ritter, former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, as quoted in Julian Borger et al., "Iraq: the myth and the reality," The Guardian (15 March 2002). http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763, 667669,00.html
[24] Anthony Arnove, "Iraq Under Siege: Ten Years On," Monthly Review 52(7) (December 2000) http://www.monthlyreview.org/1200arnov.htm
[25] Doyle, "Sanctions," p. 174.
[26] Nick Simeone, "U.S. Iraq Espionage," The Voice of America (2 March 1999)
[27] Scott Ritter, as quoted in, Ian Williams, "Secrets and Spies," New Internationalist (Issue 316) (September 1999) http://www.oneworld.org/ni/issue316/secrets.htm Fortsetzung: Economic sanctions as an instrument for promoting international peace and security, case of Iraq
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