Alice Coulter
Many of the above criticisms of the US aid package to Colombia were raised within the US during the package’s passage through congress. Issues such as human rights conditions, domestic drug consumption, and the potential escalation of violence were all considered, and largely overruled as the package became law. One of the explanations offered for the relatively easy passage of the aid package through Congress, despite its inherently controversial aspects, rests on the importance of business interests and the fact that some sectional interests within America stood to benefit from the aid package to Colombia.
The debate over the aid package in the Senate provides a clue to US domestic concerns. Senator Chris Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, usually a leading sceptic about military aid to Latin America, was at the forefront of support for the proposed aid package. The Blackhawk helicopter, one of the major components of the planned "push", is produced by the defence contractor United Technologies, a major employer and campaign donator in Dodd’s home state.[38]
As well as helicopter manufacturers, major oil companies stood to gain financially if the package was accepted. The weakening of guerrilla groups, who frequently target large American oil companies in Colombia, would provide an attractive incentive to lobby the government in favour of the package. Many of these corporations united to form powerful and aggressive lobby groups hoping to influence Congress.
There are undoubtedly strong economic interests incorporated within the US package. In 1999 Colombia was the seventh largest source of US crude oil imports, and many of these oil companies frequently suffer from guerrilla violence.[39] With global oil fields constantly threatening to dry up, the desire to stabilise one of the most profitable oil producing countries in Latin America was strong. The ability of the major oil companies, such as Occidental Petroleum, Enron, BP Amoco, and Texaco, to influence Congress and the US administration should not be overlooked.
While the official line of the US aid package is to offer support for Plan Colombia’s "plan for peace, prosperity and strengthening of the state", the focus on counter-narcotics is left undisguised. If, as US officials insist, this attack on the drugs trade is essential to peace in the region, the two goals of peace and drugs reduction are co-dependent. However, if the militarised focus adopted by the US is both ineffective in curbing drug production, and actually provokes increased violence with guerrilla groups, then these two goals appear contradictory.
The drugs trade is a major source of violence and corruption throughout the world. Not only does trafficking directly affect drug users, it can also affect whole communities and even regions. The wealth that is generated can be used to bolster illegitimate activities and undermine legitimate institutions. As such, the narcotics industry can exacerbate political instability and violent conflict.
The relationship between drugs and conflict, however, is not a simple one of linear cause and effect. While the drugs trade is frequently blamed for causing conflict, more frequently the growth of an informal economy based on the illegal drugs trade is a proximate cause of conflict building on previous instability. In Colombia, for example, the civil war has been ongoing for decades, long before the growth of the drugs trade. Therefore, to fully understand the situation in Colombia today it is necessary to understand its history.
"Colombia’s crisis of legitimacy is rooted in a history of exclusionary politics, deep poverty, vast social inequalities, human rights abuse, and impunity, all of which have sapped public confidence in Colombia’s political institutions. These are fundamentally political, not security issues".[40]
In this paper I have tried to outline some of the main concerns about the US aid package to Colombia. The package is aimed at reducing the production of illegal drugs through aggressive counter-measures such as aerial fumigation. Such tactics have proved relatively successful at reducing drug production in certain countries but fails to dent the overall global consumption of drugs. The failure of this strategy to target the production side of the drugs industry seems to undermine US motives in reducing domestic drug consumption. Recognising the dubious record of the main recipient of the aid package, the Colombian Army, several human rights conditions were attached to future aid. Yet these were subsequently diluted by a presidential waiver. Other countries in the region were concerned about the potential spread and escalation of violent conflict, and Colombian civil organisations were growing disillusioned with a peace process that seems to ignore the interests of the majority of the population.
All these issues were considered within the US debate, but domestic economic and political considerations overrode the objections. The focus of the US strategy on counter-narcotics, whilst reflecting domestic concerns, also reveals a US conception of national security that is highly authoritarian and prescribes a strategy based upon limited understanding of the Colombian conflict.
The US strategy for Colombia demonstrates the US belief in militarised solutions. Claims that violent situations - in Colombia’s case, the violence of drug barons and other armed actors - can be solved by the use of military aid, are commonly held, yet are frequently misguided. In the case of Colombia this strategy has two major problems. First, military aid to the Colombian Armed Forces means strengthening an institution with an appalling human rights record, thereby enabling further violations and even legitimising their actions. Second, as stated earlier, many of Colombia’s problems, including social exclusion and the weakness of political opposition, stem from a militarised concept of Colombian national security. Historically, targeting human rights activists and political opponents of the main parties stunted the Colombian political arena and provoked much of the contemporary conflict. Therefore any ‘solution’ that merely continues this tradition can only be ineffective at promoting peace in the country.
Also inherent within the US strategy is the belief that eliminating cocaine production is an essential prerequisite for peace. This is certainly the case given the seriously destabilising effects of the illegal drugs trade. However, this strategy attempts to separate this element of the Colombian situation to the detriment of other factors involved. As argued in the introduction of this paper, there are many root causes of contemporary conflict in Colombia. Drugs are indeed a major factor but political exclusion and economic inequality are equally destabilising for the peace process. A real commitment to the Colombian peace process would require that the whole spectrum of interdependent factors are addressed simultaneously. Therefore, by emphasising one element to the detriment of the whole situation, the US strategy is not only ineffective but potentially damaging for peace in Colombia. For the sake of the Colombian peace process, it seems essential to find alternative solutions.

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