Fortsetzung: The US Embargo on Cuba
Alice Coulter
Conclusions
In summary, many of the inferred and official objectives of US policy towards Cuba have not been met. Even the few positive outcomes that have been achieved can be credited to external developments beyond the scope of the embargo.
Return of US property nationalised during the 1959 Cuban revolution has not occurred, despite US legislation prohibiting so-called "trafficking" of the confiscated property. While this legislation may or may not be an violation of international law, it has provoked enmity and consternation around the world. (Demonstrating their contempt for the Helms-Burton Law, two Canadian parliament officials introduced legislation allowing loyalists who fled to Canada at the time of the American Revolution to sue US citizens for compensation for property confiscated by the US government of 1776).[30] A less internationally provocative method for pursuing retribution for capital confiscated from US citizens would be produced through dialogue between the two countries, as has occurred with every other country that had claims against Cuba.[31]
The Soviet-Cuban alliance has now dissolved and Cuba is no longer actively involved in international revolutionary movements. While these developments fulfil some of the main objectives of US policy, they were a result of international events unrelated to the US embargo on Cuba, and did not induce a softening US stance. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet economic support for Cuba, provided a unique opportunity for the rest of the world to promote democracy and human rights improvements. Yet, US policy at this time removed the possibility of direct US influence, instead opting for an isolationist policy to economically and politically undermine the regime. The continued reign of the Castro regime signals the failure of this approach, which could actually be seen to have strengthened Castro’s domestic standing by playing directly to Cuban fears of US imperialism.
The human rights situation in Cuba is an issue of real concern to many human rights organisations. The criminalisation of political dissent has also affected the democratic situation in the country. While these were both key aspects in the official US statement of objectives of its policy towards Cuba, four decades of sanctions have not produced any definitive results. Indeed, according to many independent organisations the US stance has actually impeded the promotion of these issues by limiting international co-operation and providing a scapegoat for domestic failures.
The failure of all the above objectives can perhaps be understood by the priority placed upon the removal of the Castro regime. "By focusing on punishing Castro, the U.S. hinders its pursuit of key objectives, such as laying the groundwork for better relations with future Cuban leaders, defending U.S. security interests in the region, maintaining good relations with U.S. trading partners, and providing meaningful support to the Cuban population".[32] Yet, even this overriding objective has not succeeded. Castro’s domestic popularity is perhaps not what it once was, but would likely be worse if US sanctions did not produce a siege mentality within the island. As mentioned above, the island’s history of struggle against imperialist powers has created a hero of the revolutionary leader. This effect has been prolonged by US isolationist policies, and Castro has survived over 40 years of US opposition. Since the crucial objective of US policy towards Cuba has not been achieved, why does the policy persist?
The longevity of the embargo, particularly in the post-Cold War era, can partly be understood by its codification in the Helms-Burton Law, whereby Congressional approval is required to alter the policy. The prospects for this are not encouraging given the significant political influence of the Cuban exile community in Florida, and that state’s relevance as a swing state during election time.
With the decline in international bearing of the Cuban political slant, the need to maintain momentum against the regime became a prominent issue for many within the exile community. In particular the hard line approach has been, and continues to be, driven by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). The best outcome for the CANF would be a major internal revolt, removing the Castro regime and paving the way for the reintegration of the CANF into the Cuban political scene, confident of US support in its efforts to install and operate a conservative government with strong ties to US financial and commercial institutions as well as the US government.[33] With this aim in mind, anti-Castro groups promote the US embargo hoping to exacerbate the country’s harsh economic and political climate, and promote uprising. Failure of this approach is not an option, as any form of US-Cuban bilateral arrangements would be unlikely to provide the necessary space for such significant political change.[34]
"Present U.S. policy is simply sterile. It neither brings about Castro’s downfall nor encourages the sort of bloodless evolutionary change that would serve the interests of the U.S., neighboring countries, and the Cuban people themselves - everyone, in fact, except the right-wing Cuban exiles. Peaceful change would not suit their purposes at all, for that would leave them out of the picture. The only way they can hope to gain power in Cuba is as the result of a bloody conflagration. They therefore have no interest in dialogue and a process of gradual reform".[35]
This deadlock is unlikely to be resolved until either Castro relinquishes power, or the Cuban community in the US softens their stance. There is growing evidence of both these developments, with Castro becoming increasingly elderly and infirm, and the emerging generations of American-Cubans developing less hard line attitudes towards the island.[36] In the meantime, if the US is to have any influence in a post-Castro Cuba, it needs to rethink its current Cuba policy and promote political engagement with the island as soon as possible.
[30] United Empire Loyalists Land Reclamation Act (Godfrey-Milliken Act) Bill C-339. http://www.parl.gc.ca/francais/hansard/088_96-10-22/088RP1E.html
[31] Smith, "Cuba," p. 2.
[32] Shawn Malone, "Cuba: Policy Agenda for the Future," Foreign Policy in Focus 4(29) (November 1999).
[33] Carroll, "Cuba: A New Approach," p. 2.
[34] Anya K. Landau and Wayne S. Smith, "Keeping Things in Perspective: Cuba and the Question of International Terrorism," Center for International Policy. http://www.ciponline.org/cuba/ipr/keepingthingsinperspective.pdf
[35] Wayne S. Smith, as quoted in Carroll, "Cuba: A New Approach,".
[36] Tony Karon, "Cuba Contemplates Life Without Castro," Time (14 August 2001). Fortsetzung: The US Embargo on Cuba
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