France, Germany and the Constitution and the enlargement of Europe
Ulrike Guérot
With the declaration of the EU-Summit in Laeken, the European Union engaged openly in a constitutional process, to finally fill the gap of a Politcal Union missing since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. After stumbling from ‘Amsterdam-left-overs’ to a ‘post-Nice’ and then to a ‘pre-Laeken’-process, the clarification of the vocabulary is a healthy exercise to name with appropriate words what now has to happen within the EU: the set-up of a trans-national, legitimised, transparent and efficient political system to frame monetary union.
The role of the Convention
The Convention starting its work on 28th February marks the shift from a Union of the States towards a Union of the Citizen. Two-thirds of the Convention will be representatives from Parliaments, either national or European. Though there is no legal requirement for the next Intergovernmental Conference in 2004 to endorse the result of the Convention, the political impact of the Convention should not be under-estimated: the more concise the document is, the less governments will be able to disregard it.
The advantage of the Convention will be to circumvent the traditional ‘horse-trading’ of the EU-Council meetings. Last year’s European Convention on Human Rights quickly divided into either adherents of classical-traditional[1] or defenders of progressive or modern[2] human rights. Probably, the ideological dividing line of the constitutional Convention will neither be along national borders, but along federal versus intergovernmental positions. ‘National interests’ will, thus, not be a decisive factor for the Convention. Instead, the main question for the outcome of the Convention’s document will be the attribution of an European executive to either the Commission[3] (federal version) or the Council[4] (intergovernmental version).
The decision on an European executive
Whereas in recent weeks the mainstream in the German debate tended to strengthen the Commission (and, thus, indirectly, the EP) by electing the Commission’s president out of the EP, the mainstream-thinking in France as well as in Great-Britain favours promoting the Council as the European executive. This constellation might have changed with the common Schröder-Blair-letter signed on 24th February at the fringes of the ‘Progressive governance’-meeting in Stockholm[5], pledging an in-depth reform of the Council that should become the most important institution in the future political system of the EU.
Yet, for the German administration, the election of the Commission’s president remains a central question to obtain what is called ‘democratisation’ by ‘politisation’ of the EU political system: if the president of the Commission is elected, then European parties will have to run EP-elections with candidates and present a political working-program for the ‘Commission-Executive’. The European people would have the chance to either sanction or to support the European ‘Commission-Executive’ by vote - a milestone towards democracy in the Union.
France, the ‘F-word’ and the Republic
Here, the role of the Franco-German connection comes in, since France senses more than it admits that the future of the enlarged Europe lies in a system of ‘functional federation’[6] for the EU, in order to enable the Union to effectively shape globalisation.[7] It senses also that its own political future and influence in the enlarged Europe lies in the strategic partnership with Germany. Yet, the historical dilemma of France is that its partnership with Germany in a strong federal[8] Europe is only reachable at the price of an institutional reform of the Union that denies all the traditions of its own political system.[9] The acceptance of a federated Europe might be the French price to pay for Berlin not becoming Europe’s capital.[10] It is Jean-Pierre Chévènement who mirrors this to the French citizens in campaining for to maintain the ‘Republic’ in the presidential elections.[11] Probably, this talk will cease after the elections that may end ‘Cohabitation’, but, at least, will synchronise French presidential and parliamentary elections with the side-effect of giving France a breath for positioning in European policy without the fear for politicians to be immediately outvoted.[12] This would leave some room for Giscard d’Estaing and the Convention to work out a political system and a Constitution for the Union in transcending the ideological debate on the ‘F-word’ by pragmatic solutions. Yet, the Convention’s institutional outcome, as constructive as it may be, is just one part of the challenges that Europe will have to face within the next two years.
No constitution without budgetary constitution
The real crux of the Convention is that it will have to fix a European Constitution without having a say on the financial constitution of the EU. This may turn out like the question of the hen and the egg. It is not only the French concern about CAP reform that will make France hesitate to accept the future institutional system (polity) before fixing the contents (policy). The German wish to clarify the competencies within the EU in delimiting properly the competencies of the EU from those of the national or regional level runs into the same dilemma. For the question of competencies is nothing other than the question of the budgetary constitution of the EU. The talk on competencies, i.e. a say on how to use the structural funds, conceals that it is a debate about the ‘right’ (read: competence!) to subsidise enterprises on a regional policy level or the ‘right’ to take parts of regional economies out of the EU-competition law[13]. The Franco-German ‘contents-institution’-conflict that many analysed[14] after the publication of the SPD-paper[15] on Europe and Lionel Jospin’s speech[16] last year materialises here: without fixing the goals and the extent of the EU-policies (CAP or structural policies), it will be difficult to fix the institutional set-up, including the sharing of competencies. No state will agree on a federal system with QMV in all policy domains not knowing whether its own budgetary interests will be considered. And representatives at the Convention of the German Bundesländer - which, in structural terms, are as deadlocking for European Integration as ‘Cohabitation’ in France - won’t accept more competencies for the EU-level without having some steering capacity on the management of the EU-expenditures. To this extent, the German debate on a precise ‘catalogue of competencies’ (read: more competencies for the regional level) is just a reaction to the asymmetry in the institutional system of the Union that favours small national entities and disadvantages big regional entities.
Yet, the financial constitution will remain the work for the (enlarged) EU-Council and, thus, an affair for the 25 Heads of States in 2006, when the budgetary framework of the ‘Agenda 2000’ is to be reconsidered, whereas the Convention will close its work already in mid-2003. The European integration process might suffer from the fact that both processes are disconnected; on the other hand, both processes overlap in a very dense time: 2003 end of Convention and mid-term review of the ‘Agenda 2000’, 2004 IGC and ratification of the accession treaties (let alone EP-elections and a new Commission), 2005 enlargement and 2006 re-negotiation of the budgetary frame. ‘Vaste programme!’, De Gaulle would have said.. Strategic alliances will be needed to achieve the reform of the Community policies in order to make a success of enlargement.
France and Germany do matter more than others: Germany needs the enlargement more than France and France doesn’t want to pay for it more than Germany. The key for a reform of CAP lies in the Elysée-Palace; at least one key for a successful enlargement lies in a reform of CA... Thus, France and Germany alone provide ‘critical mass’, even though their mutual understanding is only the necessary, not the sufficient condition for steps in European integration.
Tandem out of step?
The Franco-German relationship is certainly now - thanks to the so-called ‘Blaesheim-process’[17] - better than it was immediately after the disaster of the Nice Treaty, but it is still not as good as it was in the ‘golden years’ of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. The decade of creeping erosion in the 90’s, when the tectonic shifts in the relationship after German reunification were pasted over with friendship-rhetoric[18], ended finally with two clashes. The first at the Berlin EU-Summit in March 1999 on the financial frame of the EU (the so-called ‘Agenda 2000’), where France blocked German proposals to nationally co-finance the CAP[19]; the other at the EU-Summit in Nice in December 2000, which was supposed to prepare the institutional system of the EU for enlargement, but failed to do so. The meagre results of both summits and France’s nearly desperate attempts to maintain - for it’s own budgetary reasons[20] - the ‘solidarity’ of the CAP in Berlin, and - for major symbolic reasons[21] - the parity of the votes in the EU-Council in Nice disclosed what never had been spoken about: there is no common Franco-German concept to cope with the enlargement of the EU. France feared not only being marginalised in institutional terms in the enlarged EU, but, in addition, having to pay - via the reform of the CAP - the lion’s share of enlargement, though it would serve mainly German political and geo-strategic interests. Hubert Védrine’s recent attempt to torpedo the Commission’s plans for enlargement in speculating about a ‘Big-Bang’-scenario with twelve states[22] (instead of only 10) in 2004 shows the growing French nervousness.
France and Germany’s talk at cross-purposes: a chance for Great-Britain?
The Franco-German attitude to play down the structural incompatibility of their institutional reform proposals, the French reluctance to position itself in European politics in the eve of presidential elections and a lacking concept how to finance enlargement has created a vacuum. The declaratory common papers of the two governments and both Assemblees[23] in the eve of the EU-Summit in Laeken didn’t change much to that. Instead, the vacuum is amazingly filled by very concrete and pragmatic British proposals as regards the reform of the European institutions, especially the Council,[24] that are partly picked up by Germany. France might see in this second ‘Schröder-Blair’-letter another thorn in its side; yet, the risk is a self-fulfilling prophecy on the French side: the more it marginalizes in the European reform discussion, the more it might be marginalised in an enlarged Europe, also in terms of coalitions. To keep its strategic role, France needs to anticipate enlargement more than to deadlock it. But those who believe that enlargement might be done ‘against’ France, are wrong, too. There are helpful supplements to the Franco-German engine, but (still) no substitutes. It will be Germany’s task to put France on the track of enlargement.
The conditions of success for Europe’s enlargement and Europe’s constitution are double: First, an energetic Convention that transcends the ideological dispute on ‘F’- and ‘C’-words and that comes up with a blueprint for an efficient and transparent political and institutional system for the EU. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has sufficient ambition for that, and, since he is French, he might have the vigour to bring France back to its path in European policy.[25] Second, the discernment of the Heads of State to come along with a substantial reform of the Community policies before enlargement is about to happen in 2004/5. Concerning the latter, the most recent reports of the Commission[26] on CAP and the Structural Funds proof at least that there is much creative thinking in the tube.[27]
Neither French nor German (nor other) politicians should be too hesitating as regards the Convention: opinion polls[28] show increasing interest and a wish for more and stronger Europe in the population. After the launch of the euro, time might be ripe to merge the symbolic act of a Constitution with a concept of power projection for the EU. The window of opportunity is a small one. But the question of an European wide referendum to pass the result of the Convention and the forthcoming IGC is already on the table and this alone shows that Europe is becoming a bit more citizen-driven and will have to deserve impatient public opinion rapidly. In France, in Germany and elsewhere in Europe...
[1] Protection/defense of the citizen against the state
[2] i.e. right of genetic self-determination
[3] see i.e. Joschka Fischer’s speech of May 2000 or the speech of Johannes Rau in the EP, April 2001
[4] see i.e. the draft for an European Constitution of the French RPR (text at www.weltpolitik.net/texte/politicy/verfassung/ or speech of Tony Blair, Warsaw, October 2000
[5] see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.2.2002
[6] notion taken by Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin 5.12. 2001
[7] see Pierre Moscovici:‘L’Europe, une puissance dans la mondialisation’, Editions du Seuil, Paris 2001
[8] for the debate on the ‘F-word’, see: F. Niess: ‘Das F-Wort’, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, September 2000, p. 1105-1115; see also the speech of Jürgen Habermas: ‘Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung?’, Hamburg Lecture, 26.6.2001 (for the text see: www.zeit.de)
[9] see more in detail for that: Ulrike Guerot: 'Leerlauf im deutsch-französischen Tandem. Hat es noch eine Existenzberechtigung?’, in: Internationale Politik, 1/2002, pp. 33-39
[10] see Herald Tribune, June 12, 2001: ’In the last resort, the French will be prepared to pay a certain price for Berlin not becoming the capital of Europe’
[11] see Jean-Pierre Chevènement : ‘La démocratie en péril à Laeken’, in : Le Monde 14.12.2001
[12] France saw nearly a decade of elections - 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998 (regional), 1999 (local) - which prevented from clear-cut positions in European policy.
[13] see CDU/CSU-proposal for an European Constitution (Schäuble-Bocklet-Papier), November 2001. (For the text see: http://www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/verfassung/ cdu_verfassung.pdf)
[14] see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet:’Frankreich vor den Wahlen’, in: Politische Studien Nr. 380, 11-12/2001, (Hans-Seidel-Stiftung, München), pp. 79-89; see also Beate Neuss: 'Die Krise als Durchbruch. Die EU zwischen Vertragsreform und Verfassungsentwurf’, in: Internationale Politik, 1/2002, pp. 9-17
[15] for the text see www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/verfassung/ spd_leitantrag.pdf
[16] for the text see www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/verfassung/jospin_d.pdf
[17] The ‘Blaeheim-process’ are Franco-German talks every 6 weeks at the highest level (Gerhard Schröder, Joschka Fischer, Jacques Chirac, Lionel Jospin, Hubert Védrine), a kind of confidence-building measure set up after the Franco-German crises in Nice in January 2001.
[18] for more details about Franco-German relations in the 90s see: Guerot, Ulrike: ‘Ten Years after the Fall of the Wall. France’s New View of Germany’, in: Patrick McCarthy: ‘France-Germany in the Twenty-First Century’, Palgrave New York, 2001, pp. 35-57
[19] Common Agricultural Policy,
[20] Co-Financing would mean to nationally co-finance up to 50% all European spending in agriculture Since France is the biggest receiver of reflows in the CAP, this would mean proportionally a bigger disadvantage for France than for Gemrany.
[21] France succeeded in defending the ‘parity’ of the French and German votes in the Council. Yet, the Nice-Treaty set up a so-called ‘62-%-clause’ (which means a blocking capacity for those country gathering 62% of the EU-population.) Only Germany can reach this clause whith just two other countries, which might be important for future coalition building (i.e. D, GB and NL). So beyond the symbolic value of the ‘parity’, France lost weight in the council.
[22] See Hubert Védrine’s Press-Conference, 26th November 2001; see also Arnaud Leparmentier : ‘Qui osera dire ‘non’ à l’élargissement?’, in: Le Monde, 25./26.11.2001
[23] for both texts, the one of 23/24th November 2001, the other of 10th December 2001, see: ‘Internationale Politik’, 1/2002, pp. 101 ff.
[24] see Jack Straw’s speech in Den Haag: ‘Reforming Europe. New Era, new questions’, 21.2.2002
[25] For the changes in its own political system France needs to undertake for Europe, see Klaus Harprecht: ‘Die stille Revolution’, in: Die Zeit, 21.2.2002, p. 9
[26] see the documents of the Commission of 30th January 2002 on the Structural Funds: KOM (2002) 46 endgültig: ‘Mitteilung der Kommission. Erster Zwischenbericht über den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Zusammenhalt’; and SEK (2002) 95 endgültig: 'Erweiterung und Landwirtschaft: Die erfolgreiche Integration der Mitgliedsstaaten in die GAP. Diskussionspapier’ of 30th January 202
[27] i.e. the new proposals stop the dispute on co-financing CAP and suggest to ‘in-phase’ the new member-states in CAP by progressive rates : 25% in 2004, 30% in 2005 and 35% in 2006 in order to achieve full 100% of direct aid for the farmers in the accession countries in 2013.
[28] see ‘Les Français et l’Europe’, Etude IPSOS, Ministère des Affaires Européennes, Paris 2002
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