Issues and Consequences of Enlargement
Ulrike Guérot
Brussels, November 9-10, 2000
‘The debate on the Finalité of the EU – From Delors and Fischer to Blair’
Since the early beginnings of European Integration, the question `Which Europe do we actually want?` has been raised time and again. Already in the 70s, François Mitterrand claimed that ‘Europe would either be socialist, or it would never be’. In the 80s, Altiero Spinelli drafted a constitution for a political union. And in the 90s, the continued debate of the same question dominated the steps of European integration that were undertaken at the time.To simplify: the debate on Finalité basically is, and has always been, a debate on the federation of the EU. The proposals of the Christian-Democratic Party of Germany in 1994, which called for a core-Europe, have to be seen against this background. Europe, so the argument ran, would have to be a federation in order to be able to cope with the intensified need for policy-coordination after the realization of the Monetary Union through the Treaty of Maastricht. To achieve this objective, the Commission had to develop into a full-fletched executive while majority voting in the Council had to be the general principle. The long-lasting debate about the meaning of the word ‘federation’ in the 90’s, especially with France, prevented both, Germany and France, to come up with convincing proposals for deepening the European Union. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, thus, did not solve the issue the ICG had raised. The following issues have remained pending ever since the debate on integration began: extension of majority-voting, reduction of the number of Commissioners and a new weighting of the Council votes. Complicating matters further, these three elements were by their very nature regarded as a synonym for a federalization of the institutional system of the EU. So, far from being negligible footnotes, these issues form the core questions of power sharing within the EU, which, however, remain as yet unanswered.
Although the debate on a European Federation is not new in itself, Joschka Fischer`s famous speech at the Berlin Humboldt-University in May 2000 caused a new dynamic. There are two main causes for this new dynamic of the debate on ‘finalité’: first, the forthcoming introduction of the Euro and secondly, the pressure that the EU-enlargement puts on the institutional debate.
1. It is stating the obvious, that the Euro will entail further need for economic co-operation and co-ordination. This started already to be organized in the ‘Euro-11-group’, the informal group of the euro-members within the ECOFIN-Council. Economic co-ordination and co-operation spill over in many policy fields, such as fiscal policy, tax policy or even social policy. EMU will therefore trigger the need of co-ordination in policy-fields which touch the heart of political government. To make that acceptable, more political legitimacy will be needed within the institutional system of the EU. Members of Euroland therefore need to take a bold step forward towards political Union. This, by the way, might be an essential question for the U.K. Being outside of the euro will prevent the U.K. from shaping parts of the future institutional system of the EU, as far as economic co-operation is concerned. This might, in the end, be an incentive to join.
2. The second element for the new velocity is the institutional pressure triggered by the enlargement of the EU. How can one nevertheless ensure efficiency and the capability to act? The future institutional system of the EU cannot be designed unless it has first been outlined, if not determined, where we want to go together. If we fail on this point, people will no longer go along with the integration project. In this regard, the EU and the way of further integration can be compared to a dark corridor: you need a candle with some light at the end to dare to go through the tunnel. Similarly, the forthcoming EU-Summit in Nice will not be able to pass a fundamental institutional reform, which also includes major decisions on the three core questions, if there is no clear and comprehensive picture of what a democratic and efficient institutional system of the EU should look like. To draw up such a picture, we need to have the idea of a European democracy in mind. I would like to give an example which illustrates how the three core questions are tied together: if we agree on the perspective of a two-chamber-system for the EU, then more demographic proportionality is required for the composition of the EP which would then be a first chamber representing ‘one person, one vote’. Analogically, the Council could become a second chamber, representing the states. This would certainly influence the weighting of the votes. The question of the representation via the EP and the representation via the Council are closely linked. If the Council were to decide with qualified majority, then the EP should have the right of co-decision in all policy fields in which QMV applies. The question of QMV and co-decision are also linked. Last but not least: in order to develop the European Commission into a true European executive, one would have to break with the system of national representation. The composition should then be based on the number of portfolios really needed. This in turn depends on fixing the competences for the European Commission as caucus for a future executive.
Regarding the connection between these elements of the institutional reform, the task in Nice will be tremendous. Much political drive will be needed to succeed, and it should come from France and Germany. Unfortunately, both are caught up in the dispute over the representation of their votes in the Council. Yet, for the political survival of the Franco-German engine, it seems to me very important that France and Germany remain on an equal footing as regards their votes. The political dynamism which fired the ‘engine’so far stems from the institutional equality of these two countries. We may well witness a deadlock in the future if this principle is broken.
To disentangle the complexity of the institutional reform, the Nice-Agenda has to be separated from the ‘post-Nice’-agenda. As Janis already pointed out, the Nice-agenda includes the above mentioned three core questions (reduction of Commissioners, QMV and weighting of the Council), the question of enhanced co-operation and the development of CFSP. The latter entails the question of core-Europe, including the problem of doubling the institutional structure for the core-members.
The ‘post-Nice’-agenda includes the legal status of the European Chart on fundamental rights, the simplification of the Treaties, the delimitation of the competences between the EU and the member states and the role of national parliaments in the architecture of the European institutions.
To some extend, the ‘post-Nice’ agenda is in itself the constitutional debate of Europe, in so far as the four elements of the ‘post-Nice’-agenda touch upon the vertical (between the EU and the member states) and the horizontal (between the EU-institutions) power sharing in the EU, which are the two components of a constitution.
In their speeches, both, Joschka Fischer and Jacques Chirac, avoided to mention the ‘F-word’ as well as the word ‘constitution’; nevertheless, at least Fischer in his speech outlined nothing else than a full-fletched federal system as a blue-print for a democratic European Union, including, what he called, ‘a full parlamentarisation of the EU’ as well as the creation of a two-chamber-system. Both expressed the importance of the nation state as key-element in the future political system of the EU. The strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity is meant to allow the member states to better develop and maintain specific political traditions in various policy fields. In doing so, the misunderstandings which we had in the 90’s on the survival of the nation as a political entity within the EU could be avoided in the recent debate. This is to say that, apparently, we are no longer struggling with terminology which is a positive development of the European debate. Even if somehow ‘toothless’, the notion of a ‘federation of nation states’ kind of combined the French and the German approach to the institutional question and allows to mirror your conception. Of course, the creation of a word doesn’t solve the problem and the dialectic between a more intergovernmental and a more federal Europe seems more to be papered over than anything else, but at least, this notion allows the debate to continue.
A deeper look of course reveals quite rapidly that Fischer’s concept of a complete parliamentarisation of the EU, including a two-chamber-system, an empowered EP and a strong position for the European Commission does not correspond at all to the conception Chirac offered in his speech. Chirac’s approach is, as everybody noticed, much more intergovernmental, based on a more or less weakened Commission which depends on the Council, a not fully sovereign EP and, on the other hand, a Council strengthened through a permanent secretariat. But at least the debate is reanimated. Blair’s concept is somewhere in the middle which is quite interesting. On the one hand, Blair promotes a small, efficient and strong Commission, mainly to keep the Single Market functioning. On the other hand, he is against any idea of a core-group. He is in favour of a stronger role of the nation state within the institutional system and against increased powers of the EP.
The basic problem we will have to face with this constitutional debate is probably, that we will not decide on a European Constitution with unanimity. The concepts are far too different. And looking back in history, a constitution has never been accepted unanimously. As for any constitution, we will need a two-third-majority, which is to say: a federated vote, either by the EP or by QMV in the Council or by national referenda. This implies an `exit-clause’ for those countries who are not ready to accept the EU`s constitutional step forward.
We can look at this crucial point from all possible angles: we will not perform a ‘constitutional quantum leap’ without its acceptance in the European population. This is to say: not without a voting procedure that offers the political legitimacy we need. If we cannot gain support from each and every country, we will have to face a situation where we will only be able to follow through with the ’constitutional quantum leap’ towards a political Union with the countries that are disposed to do so. Therefore, we urgently need a broad public debate on the future of the European Union and the way people want to be governed on the European level. This debate should focus on the cost of non-integration.
One problem here seems to me that a core-Europe with a number of member states which is inferior to the members of Euroland does not make much sense if we consider the idea of political spill-over. Secondly, it seems somehow infeasible, considering that it is exactly the euro that will promote the need for closer co-operation in hard-core policy fields. I would like to mention here a quotation from Jean-Claude Juncker who once said: ‘Europe is much too complicated to be held together just by a Single Market’. The question whether Europe should be only a Single Market or more, remains to be answered in the British camp.
Whatever the political system of the European Union will be, it is a fact that the EU 15 and the accession states will have to decide this together as they will have to live together in this Union. There cannot be a second-class membership! The enlargement is necessary and has to come quickly for major geo-strategic reasons. But, within the same historical momentum, we will have to succeed finally in the deepening of the Union in order to ensure her efficiency. For the accession countries it also applies that there is no interest in joining a weak Union if this Union is meant to be ultimate stabilizer for these countries in economic as well as in political terms. So, at the end of this very comprehensive and complex debate, we truly need a common result and the willingness to present it to people and to have a vote!
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