Turkey, Islam, and European Identity
Giacomo Luciani
It is axiomatic that one’s identity, self-awareness, and capabilities are defined or strengthened by the need to respond to major challenges. So it is with Europe, a functionalist design par excellence that was set in motion by an apparently minimalist agenda—coal and steel, nuclear energy, trade liberalization—in the conviction that it would progressively grow into something quite different and vastly more important.
The founding fathers of the European Community certainly did not expect things to develop the way they did, and would probably be bemused by the results so far. But Europe did not spring full-grown like Athena from Jupiter’s forehead. It has been evolving slowly, warts and all, and has become an entity sui generis, one that in many ways defies definition.
Enlargement or, to put it another way, the drawing of the European Union’s expanding and ultimate external borders is now one of Europe’s main challenges. Previous rounds of enlargement have had a profound impact on the shaping of European institutions and will have an even stronger impact in the future. Europe, as was once said of Italy, is a geographic expression, but pinpointing its particular cultural and political character is a complex task.
In the self-definition that is taking place in this year’s European Convention one central question will surely be whether there should be a religious dimension to the definition of European identity. Is Europe necessarily Christian, as then German chancellor Helmut Kohl was once famously overheard saying?
In fact, most European states do not define themselves on religious grounds in their constitutions, even if they sometimes note that a specific creed is the religion of the majority of their people. Indeed, most Europeans shrink from a public display of religious beliefs, if they have any. The declining role of ideology in our electoral politics is illustrated in the disappearance of the adjective ”Christian” in the names of several parties that now call themselves ”people’s” parties instead.
In history, of course, Europe was always home not only to Christians, but also to prominent non-Christian minorities—Jews first and foremost—and members of these minorities made essential contributions to European culture. In recent times too, thanks to the emphasis on tolerance and respect for human rights that we believe is a cornerstone of European political culture, the religious landscape has grown increasingly diversified. Islam is now part and parcel of the European cultural landscape, because of immigration and some conversions. It is currently estimated that Muslims in the 15 EU member states total some 12 million; if non-recorded immigration is taken into account, the real figure is much higher. Islam is now the second largest religion in the Union, after Christianity. Most EU member governments acknowledge in one form or another the presence of significant Muslim components, and have in recent months been keen to stress that they reject the concept of a clash of civilizations.
So far the Union does not have any single model of relations between states and religions any more than it has a single blueprint for relations between the state and its citizens. In all cases the different national solutions have deep historical roots and are unlikely to be changed easily. Tensions emerge from time to time in one or another country and spark heated debate; and individuals who believe their right to freedom of religious expression is being negated regularly bring suits to the European Court of Human Rights. The Turkish government, for example, has been sued over the restrictions it imposes on public manifestations of the Islamic faith such as the dress code.
It is therefore theoretically possible that at some future point the question of defining a European model of church-state relations could arise. The likelihood seems slim, but if it came to that, the controversy could lead to dangerous polarization within the Union and individual EU member states.
Christianity, with its teachings, divisions, and internecine and external wars, still plays a fundamental role in shaping the European character, of course. And some Europeans will undoubtedly object to future accession to the EU by countries in which the dominant religion is Islam. But most probably, no broad consensus on defining Europe as specifically Christian will prove possible.
The Turkish Example
The determining case will be EU candidate Turkey, a secular state that will nonetheless force the EU to define itself more precisely in religious terms. Secularism was one of the basic tenets in the ideology of founding father Kemal Ataturk, and Kemalism remains the dominant political culture in the country, one that the army defends forcibly from time to time, to the distress of other Europeans. And even before Ataturk’s twentieth century revolution secularism reigned for centuries; the Ottoman caliphate clearly subordinated religion to the state—a phenomenon that might have been repeated farther west had Henry VIII been King of Rome. Just as no one would question the secular nature of the United Kingdom just because the queen is also the head of the Church of England, so no one challenged the Ottoman empire’s form of secularized Islam.
However, neither the Ottoman nor the Kemalist solution has solved the problem of relations between Islam and politics. Islam does not admit that there should be a distinction between religion and state, and only truly accepts government if it is just, i.e., Islamic. This should not seem unfamiliar to the West; there today’s distinction between religion and politics emerged only after centuries of much bloodshed. Even now ”integralist” tendencies still continue to surface here and there in European political life, as a testimony to the difficulty of divorcing personal ethics wholly from political preferences. Debate about abortion, euthanasia, the limits to medicine and science—these are all very much with us and are profoundly conditioned by religious belief.
For their part, Muslims are far from uniform in their concept of the proper relationship between the state and religion. Many live in countries in which political legitimacy is based on circumstances and principles other than religion, and it is increasingly clear that the prospect of ”Islamic rule” does not appeal to a majority of people even in countries in which Islam is the dominant religion.
That said, the process of internalizing the separation of religion from the state appears in general to be less advanced in Islamic countries than it is in Europe. Explanations for this phenomenon vary. Some perceive a general underdevelopment of most Islamic countries, with their record of severely restricted political debate and a monopoly of the mosque in political discourse. Others maintain that there is an intrinsic difference in Islam that blocks acceptance of the separation of religion from the state. Whatever the reasons, the issue is open, and it gives cause for serious concern. Political Islam is a dangerous phenomenon, because it can lead to fanatical behavior and disregard for life.
It follows that Europe cannot be indifferent to developments and equilibria in the Islamic world. On the contrary, it has a strong interest in supporting those countries that espouse the principle of secularism even if a majority of their citizens are Muslim. Turkey is only the most visible and important example.
Secular Nature
Currents and movements that may be considered part of political Islam exist in Turkey, of course, and they certainly do not propel the country closer to Europe or to EU membership. These forces should not be underestimated, and they must be defeated. Here the prospect of eventual EU membership is crucial for those Turks who view Europe as their country’s best hope for the future, work patiently to establish conditions that meet the criteria for membership, and try to maintain the separation of religion and state. The secular nature of the Turkish state remains fragile and potentially reversible, as do its democratic institutions, macroeconomic stabilization, and marketization. In this, Turkey shares the common position of all candidate countries; all seek to join the club—sometimes at considerable political cost in the short term—because they see in the EU the anchor for their fragile democracies and complex economic transitions. If prospects for membership come to seem remote, enlargement would lose much of its momentum and urgency.
The pro-European forces in Turkey know well that their country, if abandoned by the rest of Europe, would risk a challenge to its democratic and secular institutions and to its basic economic reforms. The EU is unhappy about the tutelage and pressure the military still exerts on Turkish institutions, and rightly so. Yet this tutelage, however insufficient and short-term it may be, is a response to underlying fragility that will disappear only if Turkey is drawn progressively closer to the rest of Europe.
The Islamic-inspired political forces within Turkey do not favor closer ties with the European Union and have in the past—with negligible success—attempted to construct an alternative geometry of ties with the Arab countries, Iran, and Central Asia. This strategy might not be a very appealing substitute for closer ties with the EU—it is in fact much more persuasive as a complement to the latter than as an alternative—yet it remains very much a part of Turkish political discourse. The European orientation of Turkish politics is not a foregone conclusion; it is a strong but vulnerable movement, and it requires efforts and commitment from within Turkey as well as from the Union.
Here several problems will have to be addressed and overcome; Islam is one of them. At the level of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Brussels, the matter is easily addressed, thanks to the secular orientation on both sides. But at the level of public opinion, and therefore also of debates among elected officials, the issue will reverberate for a long time to come.
Again, there is nothing strange or unique in this situation. Prejudices and misgivings—on religious, linguistic, or geographical grounds—abound among Europeans. It is a huge success that such mutual suspicion—which over centuries plunged Europe into war after war—no longer escalates to bloodshed, in most cases.
In this respect Turkey has much to contribute in supporting the process of healing of the very recent wounds inflicted in the name of religion and/or ethnicity. For its part, the European Union must, again and again, find the leadership and political courage that is required to overcome popular suspicion, and proceed with the construction of Europe.
Giacomo Luciani is a professor at the
Robert Schuman Centre at the
European University Institute in Florence.
Druckversion
Seite empfehlenbookmarken bei...
