Olympia Bekou
University of Nottingham, UK
The adoption of the treaty establishing the permanent International Criminal Court[1] following a six week conference which took place in Rome in 1998, has been characterised as a giant step in the history of mankind. The ICC is expected to play an important role in the future in the battle against impunity and it has jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide[2]. The road to Rome was not easy and some of the most contentious issues found their way into the Statute literally on the eleventh hour. The question of when the Court will seize jurisdiction is certainly one of the most difficult issues negotiated and is part of the general question of how national and international spheres interact with each other.
To address the question of inter-relationship, the principle of complementarity[3] was put forward. "Complementarity" defines the relationship between the International Criminal Court and national courts and determines who should have jurisdiction in a particular case. Under this principle, international proceedings will co-exist, rather than pre-empt, with national mechanisms already in existence. Unlike its predecessors, i.e. the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda[4], the ICC will not assert its primacy[5] but will, in fact, supplement the domestic proceedings. The adoption of complementarity is regarded as a product of a compromise which emerged in the negotiations for the ICC and serves the delicate balance between the competing interests of state sovereignty and judicial independence[6].
Thus, complementarity is a novel concept which is expected to play a key role in the effectiveness of the new institution and despite its importance, no reference to the term complementarity is made in the Statute. Most importantly, no definition of its content is provided therein. It can be found in the 10th preambular paragraph, as well as in articles 1 and 17. The latter provides also the preconditions for the application of the principle. Finally, the question of complementarity has to be seen also in relation to article 20 of the Statute which deals with the ne bis in idem principle.
Coming now to the specifics of complementarity, both the preamble and article 1 of the Statute simply state that the ICC shall be complementary to the domestic systems[7].
The essence of complementarity can be more clearly discerned in article 17[8] of the Statute. Accordingly, in order for the Court to seize jurisdiction over crimes proscribed in its Statute, national courts must be proven "unwilling" or "unable". Some indication of what genuinely "unwilling" and "unable" mean is provided for in the second and third paragraph of article 17.
First, when "unwillingness" is concerned, it should be mentioned that taking into account the principle of due process, the national courts of a state should be declared unfit should the proceedings or the decision be undertaken in order to shield the accused from his/her criminal responsibility. Moreover, the undue delay may be considered as giving right to the ICC to establish its jurisdiction. Furthermore, lack of independence or impartiality enables the seizing of jurisdiction of the international court since the national authorities are presumed inconsistent with the intent to bring the alleged perpetrators to justice.
Second, with regard to the "inability", one should examine the third paragraph of article 17 which grants jurisdiction to the court in the case of total or substantial collapse or unavailability of the judicial system of a state as a result of political upheaval, armed conflict etc. This provision was inserted to take account of situations which arose in recent years in various parts of the world. Such was the situation faced for example by Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia or El Salvador.
Be it as it may, the content of both "unwillingness" and "inability" enshrined in the Statute remains rather vague and it could create problems in the future. For, no indication is given as to the methods or standards to be used, for instance, in order to prove those concepts. This might create double standards when complementarity will be applied to very differing domestic systems.
Concurrent jurisdiction entails the risk that a person may be tried twice for the same crime. This has led the drafters of the treaty to adopt the principle of ne bis in idem in the Statute of Rome. This principle ensures that a person already tried for an offence is not tried de novo for the same offence. Otherwise known as the prohibition of double jeopardy, the said principle can be found also in other human rights instruments, such as article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[9], article 4(1) of Protocol No. 7 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[10] and article 8(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights[11]. Thus, Article 20[12] of the ICC statute provides that the Court shall try no person who has been convicted or acquitted by the Court. Similarly, no other court may try a person for crimes falling under the Statute for which he/she has already been convicted or acquitted. Moreover, should a person be tried by another court for a conduct constituting a crime under the ICC Statute, he/she will not be subsequently tried by the ICC, except for those cases where there have been "sham proceedings" or the independence and impartiality of that court are in question.
In sum, the concept of complementarity constitutes a key principle for the operation of the newly established International Criminal Court and is expected to become one of the most important principles of the emerging international criminal law. It is vital in order to understand the role and the effectiveness of the proposed Court but its actual character will be further clarified through its application, once the ICC is functioning.
Author: Olympia Bekou, LL.B. (DUTh), LL.M. (Cantab.), Ph.D Candidate, University of Nottingham, UK; the author can be reached by e-mail at o_bekou@hotmail.com
[1] Hereinafter ICC. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/Conf.138/9, 1998, reprinted in 37 ILM (1998), p. 999.
[2] See article 5 of the Statute.
[3]
See inter alia Holmes J., The Principle of Complementarity, in Lee R.
S. (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome
Statute - Issues, Negotiations, Results, Kluwer, 1999, pp. 41-78; Brown
B.S., Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 Yale J. Int?l
L. (1998), p. 383; Arbour L.A., Bergsmo M., Conspicuous Absence of
Jurisdictional Overreach, in Von Hebel H.A.M., Lammers J.G., Schukking
J. (eds.), Reflections on the International Criminal Court, Essays in
Honour of Adriaan Bos Asser Press. The Hague, 1999, p. 129; Schabas W.,
An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 66-70; See also commentary to
relevant articles in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observer?s Notes, Article
by Article, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1999.
[4] See Statute of the ICTY annexed to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 and Statute of the ICTR annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, respectively.
[5] See article 9(2) for the ICTY and 8(2) for the ICTR.
[6]
See McKeon P.A., An International Criminal Court: Balancing the
Principle of Sovereignty against Demands for International Justice, 12
St. John?s Legal Commentary (1997), p. 535; see also Bachrach M., "The
Rome Statute Explained", 12 SPG Int?l L. Practicum (1999), p. 37 at 40;
Pejic J., "Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The
Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness", 29 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. (1998),p. 291 at 311. Arguably, the protection the ICC will
provide will compensate for the relinquishment of whatever sovereign
rights. On this particular issue see Bhattacharyya R., "Establishing a
Rule-of-Law International Criminal Justice System", 31 Tex. Int?l L. J.
(1996), p. 57 at 75; See also Brand R. A., "External Sovereignty and
International Law", 18 Fordham Int?l l. J. (1995),at 1696, 1697.
[7]
Para. 10 of the preamble stipulates: "Emphasizing that the
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions". Moreover, article 1
reiterates the principle by stating that "An International Criminal
Court ("the Court") is hereby established. [-] and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions".
[8]
Article 17 on issues of admissibility reads: "1. Having regard to
paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine
that a case is inadmissible where: (a) the case is being investigated
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution; (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness
or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of
the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court. 2. In order to determine unwillingness in
a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one
or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were
or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court referred to in article
5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in
the circumstances is inconsistent with the intent to bring the person
concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.3. In order to
determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of
its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry
out its proceedings".
[9] 999 U.N.T.S. p, 171
[10] ETS 117, Strasbourg 22.XI.1984
[11] 9 ILM, p. 673.
[12]
Article 20 states: 1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person
shall be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which formed
the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or
acquitted by the Court. 2. No person shall be tried by another court
for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person has already
been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 3. No person who has been
tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7
or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct
unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not
conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of
due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice".
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