Alexandra Délano
During the NAFTA negotiations, begun in 1991, Presidents George Bush (1988-1992) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) agreed to restrict the discussions to commercial and financial matters. Both believed that the political costs of including migration in the agenda would be too great and could be an insurmountable obstacle for the conclusion of NAFTA. Both agreed that the problems that caused and arose from Mexican worker’s migration to the U.S. would be solved indirectly by NAFTA. Economic development through the liberalization and integration of markets would eliminate the pressures for out-migration in Mexico. Stimulated by capital investment flows, economic growth in Mexico would provide more jobs and better salaries, thereby eliminating the incentives for emigration.
This solution was based on a limited analysis of the migration dynamic and the various aspects that need to be taken into account in order to produce a real solution. It implied that migration was only a result of Mexican economic problems and eliminated the issue of the permanent demand for low-wage labor from employers in the U.S. Without recognizing this explicitly, both governments’ strategies ensured that undocumented migration flows would continue as in the past. There would be no explicit policy for managing and controlling the hiring of Mexicans in the U.S., which implied that the workers would still come to the U.S. in a vulnerable position, subject to abuses, and lacking work benefits or protection. Even so, by accepting this situation the Mexican government could still secure the flow of remittances and preserve an alternative to unemployment. For the U.S., securing migrants’ labor without any formal contracts or agreements was an inexpensive solution to its lack of labor force (specially for low-paying jobs). Although labor unions were aggravated by the workers’ presence their pressures were not enough to counterbalance undocumented workers employers’ support to the government’s policies.
Such was the reality of migration flows, known by both governments, but in their discourse it was disguised according to political and economic interests that were at play during the NAFTA negotiations. On the Mexican side, Salinas followed the tactics that his predecessors had used to avoid diplomatic tension with the U.S. and domestic criticism when dealing with the migration issue. Since the 1970’s, the Mexican government had resorted to the rhetorical discourse that “Mexico wanted to export goods, not people”. On the one hand, this guaranteed U.S. economic and political support for the maintenance of the Mexican government’s policies. On the other hand, it shadowed discussions about Mexico’s lack of explicit and successful migration policies, and its failed attempts to protect its population abroad. The U.S. also appealed to this strategy for negotiating “goods instead of people”. This discourse would prevent opposition from traditional anti-immigrant groups in the U.S. and even from employers who saw a formal migration agreement as a risk to their access to low-wage workers and the possibilities of avoiding government controls and sanctions for hiring undocumented migrants.
Even though the effects that NAFTA has had on the Mexican economy cannot be evaluated thoroughly in every area, due in part to the fact that it has only been in force for nine years, and that data is not yet available, it is obvious that the “solution” proposed for migration is far from being achieved. Not only have the economic asymmetries between both countries persisted, but also great problems have arisen as the competition in some sectors surpasses their capacity for adjustment. This is especially the case of the agricultural sector, where most but not all migrants’ communities of origin are located.[2] Any comprehensive migration policy has to include a program for investment and development in Mexican rural areas and sending communities as NAFTA negotiators suggested, but even this measure is not sufficient. An adequate solution has to go beyond the traditional economic explanations of the phenomenon (i.e. wage differentials, cost-benefit rationales, market failures, etc.); it must take into account all the characteristics of these flows and explore the reasons for their historical changes (Massey et.al., 2002).
Recent data and studies from Mexico and the U.S. show that the characteristics of Mexican migratory flows have changed in the past few decades due to demographic, political, economic, and social circumstances.[3] A migrant worker population once composed mainly of middle-age men from rural areas now includes more females, younger males, and urban populations with higher education levels. The migrants’ behavior has shifted into longer periods of stay in the U.S., which means that the circularity and temporality of the flows has decreased. The number of undocumented workers has increased, inducing more migrant smugglers (“coyotes” or “polleros”) who charge higher fees, more document falsification, abuses, violation of human rights, and an alarming number of deaths at the border. The Mexican-American community is now the largest ethnic minority in the U.S. amounting to approximately 22 million (14 million are American citizens of Mexican origin, between 8 and 8.5 million are legal migrants, and 3 or 4 million reside illegally in the U.S.).
In their most recent publication, Massey, Malone and Durand document the fact that “immigration may begin for a variety of reasons, but the forces that initiate international movement are quite different from those that perpetuate it” (Massey et.al., 2002, p. 18). Some examples of the perpetuating forces in the case of Mexican migration to the U.S. include the existence of family and employer networks that facilitate the arrival of new immigrants, the dependency of remittances in Mexico (which currently amount to USD $10 billion per year), and growing social and economic ties between the countries. Both Mexico and the U.S. have favored the existence of this flow, which has become a structural factor for their economies. Migration policies (or lack there of) have influenced the ways in which the phenomenon has developed, and the costs and benefits implied.
[2] When NAFTA’s deadlines for the complete liberalization of agriculture arrive, the Mexican government’s ability to deal with the competition in this sector will be tested; not with a very positive outcome, it seems. This could increase the pressures for out-migration and create economic and political instability in Mexico, which would considerably affect both countries and revive domestic debates and criticisms over NAFTA.
[3] Examples of these data can be found in the U.S.Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov), Migration Information Source (http://www.migrationinformation.org), CONAPO (The National Population Council, http://www.conapo.gob.mx), INEGI (The National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics, http://www.inegi.gob.mx).

bookmarken bei...



