Fortsetzung: Mexico-U.S. Migration After NAFTA

Alexandra Délano

3. Mexico and U.S. Migration Policies in the 20th century: Asymmetry of Power and Domestic Factors

Throughout the history of U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations, the U.S. has generally formulated and implemented unilateral migration policies to which Mexico has almost always reacted passively. With the exception of the Bracero Program (1942-1964)[4], formal and explicit cooperation with the Mexican government has rarely been considered. The U.S. has been able to obtain low wage labor, recruiting and disposing of it according to economic circumstances, without assuming the political costs of an agreement. According to the theories of international relations this is a typical case of asymmetric interdependence (or asymmetric cooperation) in which the weaker party, in this case Mexico, usually cannot protect its interests or exercise pressure against the more powerful country (Krasner 1990, Keohane 1990). Even though this asymmetry is a structural condition in the bilateral relation, Mexico’s and the U.S.’s migration policies cannot be reduced to this explanation. The analysis of the historical, domestic roots of their positions provides the framework both for explaining the changes in the recent years, and for understanding the current challenges for further cooperation.

When tracing the origins of Mexican migration flows to the U.S. it is clear that geographic, economic, and demographic variables play a key role. Sharing an approximately 2,000 mile border, including territory which belonged to Mexico until 1848, it was natural for Mexicans to move across the border. The Mexican economic and political instability and the poor conditions in rural states during the Porfiriato and the 1910 Revolution pushed many campesinos (peasants) to seek alternatives such as migration. The fact that the U.S. lacked sufficient labor to consolidate its territory and to develop the Southwestern economy increased the incentives for Mexicans to emigrate in search of a job in a society receptive to them (Corwin, 1978). The majority of the workers provided their labor for agriculture, but as they gained experience, and as the U.S. economy developed, their mobility and social networks gave them access to other sectors (currently including industry, construction, domestic work, and services).

Even though the U.S. implemented restrictive migration laws to other countries, Mexico was an exception to the rule. Employers’ demand for immigrant labor was constant, and it grew during the First and Second World Wars due to an increase in production and to the fear of labor shortages. Mexican labor was easy to attract and dispatch; it was cheap and the migrants were hard working. The demand for labor surpassed emergency situations, becoming an essential and structural factor for economic growth in the Southwest. American workers, when available, were unwilling to occupy these harsh low-paying jobs, whereas Mexican laborers were always accessible, regardless of the salary, type of work or living conditions.

Although nativist and anti-immigrant groups were exercising pressures for the government to exclude “potentially dangerous” peoples since the beginning of the 19^th century, Mexican migrants were not their target until the 1920’s. The laws that had resulted from these pressures limited migration flows from Asia and Europe, which in turn led to a growth of Mexican migration, especially after the First World War. From then on, when economic or political crises occurred, public opinion began to notice the presence of the growing Mexican population, whom they blamed for salary depression, failures in labor union organizing, high welfare costs, and unemployment. The government responded to these pressures through policies such as deportation and repatriation (i.e. 1921, 1929, 1954), restrictive immigration laws and quotas (i.e. 1965, 1986, 1996), and border control reinforcement (i.e. 1994, 1996, 2001). Mexican migrants became the “scapegoats” for economic and political problems in the U.S.. By implementing visible policies to control a flow that had been managed through negligence in the past, U.S. governments gained legitimacy and distracted public opinion from deeper political or economic problems (Bustamante 1983, Andreas 2000).

Regardless of these measures, migration flows did not subside, rather, legal and controlled flows were replaced by illegal ones (Massey et.al. 2002). As Peter Andreas demonstrates, U.S. policies were more a symbol of political control than a real policy that recognized the structural demand for labor (Andreas 2000). Even so, they were successful because pressures from employers and public opinion were reduced. Employers could obtain even cheaper and more docile labor by taking advantage of the vulnerability of undocumented migrants and the absence of governmental sanctions or controls. Labor unions and public opinion were satisfied because the government appeared to control the territory and to protect its population’s interests and values. This “protection” meant increasing the number of fences and border patrols and the number of apprehensions and deportations by the INS, which amplified the risks and dangers of border crossings through areas that were unseen by the public. By maintaining the “back door” open for illegal migration, the U.S. satisfied its economic and political needs.

Even though the negative effects and unintended consequences of these policies (for both countries) were thoroughly examined and documented since they first began, the U.S. government maintained and even incremented border reinforcement and restrictive policies: a tendency which persists to date. The myths disseminated by the media and political leaders about the growth of the Mexican-American community and the insecurity and fear related to illegal crossings resulted in a vicious cycle of pressures for more immigration control. This explains President William Clinton’s (1992-2000) “dissuasive” migration policy, consisting of a series of border reinforcement operations and restrictive laws that increased the costs of border crossing and reduced social benefits for migrants.[5] The costs of these policies were assumed by the migrants and the Mexican government because they resulted in more abuse and violence against the migrants, whereas the U.S. government’s legitimacy and dominance were consolidated.

As the Mexican government became more aware of the problems and costs that a continuing and growing migration to the U.S. signified, and the potential domestic criticism and instability that could arise due to the long absence of an explicit migration policy and alternative development programs for rural areas and migrant-sending communities. When compared with the U.S.’s policies, the Mexican government’s response to these pressures exemplifies the asymmetric capacities of the countries for dealing with the costs of migration, and also their particular historical, political and cultural developments.

Since the 1940’s, the Mexican government had considered migration a “safety valve” for economic and political problems until the conditions for equal income distribution and social justice promised by the Revolution could be developed. Even though economic growth was sustained until the late 1960’s, the benefits of the “milagro mexicano” (Mexican economic miracle) did not reach the rural population that the revolutionary government had based its claims and legitimacy upon. Under these circumstances, migration turned out to be more than a temporary solution and became, instead, a permanent strategy for reducing political pressures from the citizenry. Moreover, it was a major factor for economic development because it secured the flow of foreign currency through remittances.

Even though during and after the Bracero Program, Mexicans faced abuses and serious risks in the U.S., the Mexican government’s efforts to protect them were limited. Part of those limitations resulted from its vulnerability in negotiating with the U.S.. Nonetheless, it is also true that Mexico preferred to guarantee the permanence of these flows and avoid tensions with the U.S. that could lead to massive repatriations or policies that impeded out-migration. Even so, this does not justify nor explain the fact that Mexican governments failed to introduce sustainable programs for development in rural areas or domestic institutions to protect migrants’ rights.[6] Although Mexico was losing an important part of its labor force, which implied social and economic changes in rural communities and created a greater dependency on remittances, policies directed to manage these circumstances were not sufficient. By 1974, after many failed attempts to negotiate another bilateral migrant labor program with the U.S., Mexico had decided to take a “non-policy” policy approach towards migration (Garcia y Griego 1988). This meant that the issue was kept low-key on the foreign policy and domestic agendas in order to maintain a convenient status quo for the government, regardless of its costs for the population.

After the demise of the import substitution economic model in the late 1970’s leading to the debt crisis of 1982 and pushing more Mexicans to seek job opportunities in the U.S., the domestic solutions that had been promised for migration were evidently unsuccessful. Even so, the permanence of the nationalistic, revolutionary rhetoric was still used to legitimize government programs, which tacitly assumed migration as a “necessary evil” to guarantee economic and political stability. In the government’s discourse, independence from the U.S. and defense of national sovereignty were greatly emphasized. Paradoxically, at the same time Mexico began a process of economic liberalization in the 1980’s relying on the U.S.’s support and guidance. These changes were the antecedents of the process that led to NAFTA. Throughout this process the nationalist discourse began to change in order to justify economic integration with the U.S., but it still limited the government’s domestic and international actions (Mabire 1994). Migration issues remained at the periphery, while the negative costs and consequences of the policies implemented kept accumulating silently at the core of the Mexican system.

The domestic conditions and circumstances generally described here reveal the political connotations that the migration issue entails and the fact that they are deeply embedded in both governments’ responses. In the U.S., the influence of pressure groups such as employers or labor unions, and the existence of nativist or anti-immigrant reactions to economic or political crises are major explanatory factors for migration policy outcomes. Mexico’s limitations for pressuring changes in the status quo are its vulnerability in any negotiation of a migration agreement with the U.S., and its interest in maintaining good relations and economic cooperation. Furthermore, the need for maintaining this “safety valve” open and avoid domestic pressures also determined its passivity. The asymmetry of power was the context in which these policies were framed and developed.

NAFTA reflected both governments’ domestic and international restrictions for achieving a common definition and a shared policy for migration. Even so, the agreement entailed intrinsic changes in the bilateral relationship, which meant confronting the challenges posed by migration in new ways. The extent to which they can lead to formal bilateral cooperation will now be examined.

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