EU defence policy: Beyond the Balkans, beyond peacekeeping?

Daniel Keohane

2003 is a landmark year for the EU’s security and defence policy (ESDP). EU policemen are already deployed in Bosnia, and the EU sent 350 soldiers to Macedonia on March 31st – the Union’s first military mission, named “Operation Concordia”. Plans are afoot for the EU to take over NATO’s military role in Bosnia during 2004 as well. Thus, the EU’s much-derided defence policy has finally moved from the drawing board into action.

But what types of military missions should the EU be able to perform in the future? And what could new security tasks mean for the EU’s crucial relationship with NATO? The EU’s mission list already ranges from humanitarian relief to ending regional conflicts, and in principle the EU is not restricted by geography. However, in practice – at least until the recent decision to send EU troops to Congo – most of the attention paid to ESDP by defence planners focused on conducting peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

The EU, NATO, and the Balkans

Since the birth of the EU’s defence policy, out of Franco-British parentage at St. Malo in 1998, the general assumption amongst many – especially British and American – defence analysts has been that NATO would have ‘the right of first refusal’ over prospective missions, leaving the EU to pick-up NATO’s leftovers. As Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, put it in 2000: “The EU only envisages applying a military response to a crisis if the NATO alliance as a whole is not engaged…But if the US does not engage…someone else may need to, and it is better for our overall security if we can do so effectively.”[1]

And most observers have expected the EU to depend on NATO assets – such as the expertise of its military planners – to run its missions. For example, EU peacekeepers in Macedonia depend on NATO’s help to conduct their operation there. EU military missions in the Balkans are possible because of the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement signed at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. This long-awaited EU-NATO agreement, which came after months of political wrangling, allows the EU to use NATO resources to overcome its own capability shortfalls.

In addition, the overwhelming geographical focus of EU military efforts thus far has been on the Balkan region. The Bush administration has already indicated that it would probably pull its forces out of Bosnia sometime in 2004, leaving the way open for the EU to take over that mission. If the US – for its own strategic reasons – eventually pulled out of Kosovo as well, the EU would probably have to fill that vacuum, putting it in charge of all Balkan military missions. But should the EU act beyond the Balkans?

The EU goes out of area

Solana argued in 2000 that the EU should be able to conduct “a global crisis management strategy.”[2] Such a global strategy would aim to assist the UN in coping with security crises in places other than Europe. Solana’s June 2003 security strategy (of which more later) includes “effective multilateralism” as one of three strategic priorities for the Union – the others are confronting old and new threats, and stabilising Europe’s neighbourhood. Solana’s document states that the EU should be ready to act on behalf of the UN (and other international organisations) when “their rules are broken”.[3]

In other words, the EU could give the UN the rapid reaction capability it needs. The UN can usually raise enough peacekeepers for forces in places such as Eritrea. What it cannot easily do is find the troops for an intervention force, such as that which was required to stop the bloodshed in East Timor.

The US is certainly not going to want to provide such forces to the UN. The EU, however, might be able to provide high-intensity forces, if it has access to adequate lift capability and command structures (perhaps requiring NATO’s help). After the initial intervention, other forces could replace those provided by the EU. But, apart from Britain and France, not many EU governments have shown much appetite for the EU to act beyond Europe. When asked if EU military forces would act in Africa former-German defence minister Volker Ruehe (in)famously remarked that: “the EU should not try to re-invent the Afrikakorps.”

However, in June 2003 – at the request of the United Nations – the EU deployed 1,800 troops to Congo (the mission is called “Operation Artemis”). They will protect the area around Bunia until September 1^st and then be replaced by troops from Bangladesh. Although small in size and limited in scope, the Congo mission is significant for two reasons: it is the first autonomous EU mission – without relying on NATO’s help; and it is the EU’s first military operation outside of Europe. Moreover, since the US showed no great enthusiasm to participate, NATO was not even asked if it wished to conduct the mission. This is important because it establishes the precedent that NATO would not always have the ‘right of first refusal’ over EU missions.

However, in other respects the Congo mission – a peacekeeping operation – is not so new. European countries already have a large number of troops deployed internationally on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and the Middle East. The EU has gone out of area, but can the Union do more than peacekeeping?

A more ambitious EU

European leaders recognise the need to re-assess the suitability of the EU’s military doctrine and institutions for the challenges it faces. The so-called Petersberg tasks set the parameters for EU military missions, which range from humanitarian relief to ending regional conflicts. But in years to come the EU should develop the organisation and capabilities to combat threats like terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which are not covered by the Petersberg tasks.

Javier Solana presented the first version of a “security strategy” to EU leaders at the Thessalonika summit in June 2003 – the document will be finalised in December 2003. This document will provide a framework for EU governments to reconcile their differences on key questions such as the use of force. At the moment EU foreign policy is divided between those countries who wish to pursue an activist and global foreign policy (the UK and France), and those that prefer the staus quo or have a regional outlook (Germany and the non-aligned countries).

A significant section of the document focuses on WMD proliferation and international terrorism. This is not only to please Washington – albeit the Bush administration welcomed the forthright text – but also because Europeans have never before seriously discussed WMD proliferation amongst themselves at the EU level. Nor does it mean that Europeans will move closer to the Bush administration’s thinking on these issues. The EU’s policy mix will be different from Washington in the balance between strengthening international treaties, beefing up inspection and verification mechanisms, implementing sanctions, and using military force. But at the very least, instead of only thinking about peacekeeping, EU leaders should start to focus more on other global security threats, such as WMD proliferation, that have long been a priority in Washington.

Solana also proposes that the EU must take more responsibility for its neighbourhood, and not just the Balkans. After enlargement in 2004, an ‘arc of instability’ will surround the Union, stretching from Belarus, via the Caucusus and the Middle-East, through to Morocco. For example, the EU could work with Russia to help stabilise Moldova, perhaps even through joint peacekeeping operations.[4]

The most difficult issue to resolve will be when the EU should (or should not) use force. The security strategy says that “with the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad”, and the EU should “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when neccessary, robust intervention”.[5]

On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine robust EU interventions out-of-area, especially to counter WMD proliferation in the Middle East. The likelihood is that the US would lead such missions. If the Americans chose to be supported by an international military coaliton, NATO would be the lead institution. On the other hand, if the US were preoccupied with other security concerns elsewhere in the globe (like North Korea), and if they were faced with a compelling terrorist or WMD threat in an area such as North Africa, the Europeans might have no other option but to act alone. In addition, a more ambitious EU, that aims to perform higher-level military intervention tasks – with appropriate military capabilties – would also help to re-invent NATO.

Two rapid response forces for the price of one?

In the long term much of what happens to ESDP depends on NATO. The Americans will not use NATO for a serious conflict unless the Europeans offer them better military capabilities. Without beefed-up military assets NATO (and the EU) will be consigned to the role of post-conflict peacekeeping, such as helping to run a post-Saddam Iraq. Not only would this confirm that NATO is now a global actor instead of a regional one, but its primary task would be cleaning up after the Americans. And Europeans would probably provide most of the money and the troops. NATO as America’s global “cleaning lady” may not prove acceptable to Europeans in the long term.[6]

One way of countering the charge that NATO is nothing more than America’s “cleaning lady”, would be for that organisation to conduct missions in places other than those where the US has already intervened militarily. For example, both Europeans and Americans could contribute to a NATO-led peacekeeping force in the West Bank and the Gaza strip to monitor an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.[7]

The Americans have also pushed the Europeans to ensure that NATO offers something useful to them, especially by way of intervention forces – resources the Europeans are sorely lacking. At the Prague summit in November 2002, President Bush called on the Europeans to beef up their military prowess by creating a NATO response force of 20,000 elite troops with supporting air and sea components. The idea behind this force is to make NATO’s military organisation more useful for dealing with today’s security environment.[8] But some, in particular the French, feared that a NATO response force (NRF) would undermine the EU’s rapid reaction force (ERRF) of 60,000 soldiers.

In theory many of the same troops could be used both for the NRF and the ERRF. Moreover, the more ambitious NRF could help raise the military bar for the ERRF. At the Le Touquet summit in February 2003, the British and French governments agreed that the EU should be able to deploy air, sea, and land forces within 5-10 days – a huge improvement on the present arrangements for the ERRF, which is supposed to be ready within 60 days. The British and the French also agreed that this smaller, more rapid EU force should “strengthen the European contribution to the establishment of a NATO Response Force and ensure compatibility between the two”.[9] In a similar vein, at their meeting on May 19^th, EU defence ministers agreed to beef up the number of “special operations forces” available for EU missions – an aim compatible with meeting NRF requirements as well.

However, as Barry Posen has argued, Europeans should not expect to get two forces for the price of one. Defence resources are scarce and European governments may have to choose between the NRF and the ERRF. The NATO force is financially costly – perhaps up to 4.5 billion euro a year – and requires up to three times its official number of soldiers (60,000). This is because different rotating sets of troops prepare for operations, are deployed in the field, and rest after missions. And using the same troops for both the NRF and the ERRF is risky, because if one force is deployed the other suffers.

Moreover, the ERRF is currently intended for use more on peacekeeping operations than combat missions. The types of troops required for the EU and NATO forces are similar but not always identical. Unless the EU focuses more on conducting high-level military tasks, and without extra defence money, it will be difficult for European governments to meet both their NATO and EU force goals.[10]

Sink or swim together

A more global role for NATO suggests that the EU would be left to focus on conflicts and threats in places where NATO would not go, such as Africa, the post-EU enlargement “borderlands”, and the Caucasus. The EU also distinguishes itself from NATO through its more “holistic approach” to security, combining military, civilian, diplomatic and economic policy tools.[11] In military terms, the combination of different transatlantic budgetary priorities, geographical focuses and contingency planning, may lead the Europeans to start thinking about their own “way of warfare”.[12] The challenge ahead for the Europeans and the Americans, therefore, is to marry the ongoing development of ESDP with the re-invention of NATO as a global security actor.

NATO and the EU are not in competition with each other. In the years to come they will sink or swim together. Many conceivable EU military missions will need to draw upon NATO assets such as the expertise of its military planners. And if the Europeans succeeded in boosting their military capabilities, American respect for NATO would grow; and the EU would benefit too since it would rely on the same military assets. If they fail both NATO and the EU will suffer as a result.

Daniel Keohane is the Research Fellow for Security & Defence Policy at the Centre for European Reform (CER) in London. He was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris; and a Research Associate at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in Washington DC. He also worked at the Aspen Institute in Berlin. He holds an MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS Bologna/Washington), and a BA in History from Trinity College Dublin. He also studied at the University of Heidelberg.

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