Implications for ESDP from the unfolding of operation "Concordia"

Radoslava Stefanova

On 21 July 2003, following a positive review of the on-going operation “Concordia”, the EU Council agreed to extend the 350-strong European military mission by 2 ½ additional months, until 15 December 2003, “in order to further contribute to the stability of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.[1] Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1371, the decision was preceded by a request by Macedonia’s President Boris Trajkovski to the EU on June 26 2003, as well as by an authorization on the part of the North Atlantic Council regarding the continued use of NATO assets for the mission on 16 July 2003.[2] However, France signaled that it no longer wishes to bear the responsibilities of the lead Framework Nation at the Force Headquarter level after the expiration of the initial six-month mandate of “Concordia”. As a result, the framework responsibilities are to be transferred to EUROFOR after the end of September.

While the deployment of the first ESDP military mission and its smooth unfolding so far have undoubtedly reinforced trust in the EU’s role as a security actor, several types of problems still persist. These relate mainly to the EU’s actual operational capacities, which de facto have not been tested yet, given the relative stability in Macedonia. As explained in detail in Bono’s article on this site, it is NATO and not the EU which is likely to intervene in Macedonia should ethnic tensions rise again, which points to the continued lack of consensus among the European countries concerning the deployment of EU-led peace-enforcing operations as opposed to peace-keeping ones. However, while justified, this complex debate undermines the EU’s current credibility as an effective military actor, which in turn weakens its political influence in the areas of engagement.. In this regard, four critical aspects of the first ESDP initiatives emerge.

First, the fact that the EU sought to inaugurate ESDP military operations in a situation where direct security challenges have subsided was probably a cautious wise step, given the general awareness that the Union’s nascent military role might be compromised by possible failures in more challenging crisis areas. However, this first step is not completely risk-free. Despite the relative stabilization of Macedonia over the last year and a half, tensions are latent[3], and the flaring up of another conflict in the country cannot be ruled out.. An eventual NATO intervention in such case would undermine the ESDP mission’s perceived role as a peace guarantor. It should also be noted that as compared to “Allied Harmony”, NATO’s last mission in Macedonia, which numbered roughly 700 soldiers (of who 150 Americans), “Concordia” has half the manpower, deployment size which appears inadequate even for its current mandate, and needs to be reinforced, if only to assume a semblance of credibility.[4]

Second, the EU still needs to build its reputation as a security actor in the Balkans. Specifically, the EU should act so as to overcome the recent history of its maladroit military-diplomatic minuets during the major Balkan conflicts of 1990s, which undoubtedly left the US as the only credible security provider from the viewpoint of the regional policy-makers.[5] While the Europeans provide the bulk of the peacekeeping troops (as well of the reconstruction aid) to the region, the EU is viewed as militarily untrustworthy by the local élites in the Balkans. According to the Macedonian Parliament speaker, Nikola Popovski, “Macedonia currently depends much more on the United States from political, military and security standpoint than on the EU”[6]. Leading Macedonian policy-makers publicly refer to the extension of “Concordia” as a favor to the EU, which, accordingly, needs to use the opportunity to assert its lingering institutions, rather than as a necessity for Macedonia’s stability.[7]

Third, while just extended by 2 ½ months, “Concordia” is likely to be concluded in December 2003. Speculations about lessons learned from ESDP’s first military mission thus naturally arise. The possibility of a EU takeover of SFOR in Bosnia in 2004 is being considered, as are even missions in Moldova and the Caucasus. A European mission replacing SFOR would undoubtedly be a more demanding task, as compared to “Concordia”, or even to the newly launched, but limited in scope operation “Artemis” in Congo. However, violent upsurge in Bosnia is also increasingly less likely—one of the major reasons why the EU has been contemplating the take-over of SFOR, and not, for example, of KFOR. Lingering doubts about EU’s operational capacities thus remain due to the fact that the EU has so far deliberately engaged in relatively stable areas or with rather limited mandates. (“Artemis” is to last three months and its terms of engagement are restricted to the area of Bunia). If the EU plans to become a major security provider, at least in its immediate vicinity, it would need to finalize the on-going political debate in favor of peace-enforcement, rather than of limited peacekeeping, and start assuming more challenging tasks. The Balkans are still the most appropriate area for more demanding engagements, while out-of-area operations might be considered once ESDP capabilities have been consolidated

Finally, despite the fact that the institutional agreement (the so-called Berlin+), which allowed the EU to avail of NATO assets for some ESDP operations, was finally reached in December 2002 after much (Greek-Turkish) bickering,[8] the recent souring of EU-US relations might cause new institutional blockages at the level of NATO. Consequently, the ESDP has to overcome the heavy burden of being perceived not only as operationally untested, but also as subject to being hostage to institutional rivalries and conflicting national interests.

In conclusion, while the deployment of “Concordia” certainly represents a tangible expression of ESDP, significant steps still need to be taken to consolidate it. Positive developments would comprise providing the current mission with enough manpower so as not to undermine its credibility as a military operation, committing to more challenging missions in the Balkans, such as KFOR, as well as working to overcome the possible institutional obstacles to deployment. Such steps would also contribute to the local élites’ perceptions of the EU as an effective security provider in the Balkans, and, more generally, to the EU’s credibility as a military actor in other crisis areas.

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