In its birth, in 1999-2000, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was as much an expression of the desire of EU Member States to strengthen the ability of the EU to act during external crises and by so doing project its power regionally and globally, as it was an attempt to reforge the transatlantic security relationship.[1] Following the launch of Operation Concordia, the EU’s first military mission, what is the likely impact of the operation on the development of the ESDP?

At the end of March 2003, when the mission was launched, the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw described Concordia as ‘the start of a new strategic partnership between the EU and NATO’.[2] NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson echoed this view. At an official ceremony for the launching of Operation Concordia he stated that “as NATO hands over the mission to the European Union, a new chapter in European security has opened. By taking on its first military mission, the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defence Policy has come to an age”.[3]

The perspective that Operation Concordia marks the beginning of a new transatlantic strategic partnership implicitly is built upon two assumptions: first that the operation will prepare the ground for the EU to become an equal partner to the USA in external security and second that it will contribute to the strengthening of ESDP and Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).

In support of this perspective is the fact that the operation would not have been possible without the agreementreached at the EU Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 to allow the EU to have political and military arrangements in place to access NATO assets and operational planning capabilities, the so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements. This had been a thorny issue in the transatlantic security relationship since 1999.[4] Moreover, although Concordia is relatively small (it is composed of just 350 military personnel), in March 2003, the Operation was perceived on both sides of the Atlantic as a test for future ESDP military engagements that could involve the EU taking over NATO-led S-FOR and KFOR missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

It could also be argued that through Operation Concordia some EU leaders have gained confidence in their ability to handle external crises. It is remarkable that less than six months since the mission was launched, the EU has agreed to undertake another peacekeeping operation in Congo, Operation Artemi.[5] This is taking place outside of Europe’s borders and it signals a willingness to become involved in an extremely complex conflict in which fighting is raging.

But are Jack Straw and Lord Robertson perhaps over-exuberant in their evaluation of the impact of Concordia on the transatlantic security relationship. Could both assumptions implicit in their arguments be wide off the mark?

An evaluation of the impact of Operation Concordia on the development of the ESDP has to take into account the complex international and regional dynamics that are shaping European security. The negotiations for the mission took place at a time when the US government was embarking on a confrontation with Iraq and while the EU was undertaking a major reform, expressed in the European Convention’s work. By taking into account these factors, we can see that EU policymakers are still caught in a dilemma over the nature of their own external ‘power’. The aim of sections of the US government, along with those of Britain and some other EU countries, is perhaps less to strengthen the coherence of the EU’s approach to external security.

The ‘division of labour’ between the EU and NATO that is being established through Concordia is not one of equality. As explained elsewhere on this web site, Concordia involves close co-ordination at the political and military levels between the two security organisations.[6] Although the EU’s Political Security Committee exercises overall political and strategic direction for the operation, under the advice of the European Council, it works closely with NATO.[7] If we look in details at this working relationship, it is apparent that NATO is in overall charge of the operation if the situation on the grounds deteriorates. This is because the EU has as yet insufficient military capabilities under the direct command of its Military Staff to engage in ‘peace-enforcement’ type of operations and because there is no full-consensus within the EU whether such tasks should become integral to the ESDP.

Most importantly, Operation Concordia is strongly influenced by NATO/US military and political thinking. This has the potential to prevent the emergence of unified approach within the EU, based on an independent assessment of external security challenges. It is in fact important to remember that Concordia came about at a time when the United States was rethinking its strategy towards Europe. The US government conceded to operation Concordia partly because it estimated that it needed to re-deploy a certain number of soldiers currently engaged in the Balkans to fight the war on terrorism in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

The Bush Administration wants to ‘re-invent’ NATO into a ‘tool-box of services’ in order to allow the Alliance’s integrated military structure to form ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing to pursue its ‘war on terrorism’. Certain leading figures within the Bush administration want cooperation with the EU to be based on a pick and choose basis. This is to allow them to have access to the peacekeeping, humanitarian and financial resources available within the organization and amongst its Member States. The ‘strategic relationship’ that prominent US officials have in mind is one in which the United States, together with other selected European allies such as Britain, will undertake the high-level fighting in external military engagements, whilst other nations will undertake the lower-end peacekeeping aspects of external military operations and the post-war reconstruction efforts. This is precisely what has happened in Afghanistan. The EU has provided financial resources for the reconstruction of the country and has taken the lead in making available most of the troops for the peacekeeping efforts, the International Stabilisation and Assistance Force (ISAF).[8] The current command and control functions of ISAF will be taken over by NATO in August this year.[9] The US government is hoping that this type of ‘division of labour’ can be repeated in other parts of the world, for example in Iraq.[10]

The application of this type of NATO/US military thinking is reflected in Concordia. The operation is an ‘ad-hoc coalition of the willing’ (fourteen non-EU countries and 13 EU Member States participate in it). In it, the EU and NATO act as political legitimisers and coordinators of the operational planning and command and control facilities required for the operation. France is the lead nation. EU member states involved in the operation are undertaking low-end peacekeeping tasks and NATO retains its mandate to carry out ‘peace-enforcement operations’. In other words, the EU is not acting a single coherent organization in the security field in Macedonia. Rather it has given the mandate to a group of willing EU/NATO member states to undertake security tasks on its behalf.

Can Operation Concordia form the model for the ESDP’s future? There are many signs that, in the short term, it will not. Although Concordia has demonstrated how a “partnership” might work, the NATO-EU accord underpinning the operation was negotiated in such a way so to allow the maximum flexibility for both organizations. This is why the agreement stipulates that the modalities of EU-NATO cooperation in the launching of military missions are to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.

The compromise reached has been affected by the transatlantic fall-out over the Iraq war. The rift has given impetus to a group of EU member states to ‘deepen’ their level of co-operation in ESDP. This was evident in the ‘mini’ summit held in Brussels on 29 April between the French, German and Belgian governments. They called for other member states to go ahead and reinforce their level of cooperation in the military and security field. This could be compared to an attempt to achieve a ‘deepening’ process as it was pursued to create the ‘eurozone’. Their ambitions are reflected in two proposals made in the European Convention’s Draft Treaty for the reform of the EU. The first proposal is to be found in the following statement under the section dealing with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): “the Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to maintain the Union’s values and serve its interests..”.[11] The second provision is included in an article that gives the opportunity to some member states to establish “structured cooperation”. In that case, it is argued that the Council may ask the Member States participating in such cooperation to carry out tasks as envisaged under the ESDP.[12]

Although this ‘core group’ is determined to demonstrate that the EU can lead on international security issues, the countries making up the group are not in full agreement on many aspects of the ESDP. Their differences range from allowing the Commission to become more involved in ESDP issues to assessments of whether peace-enforcement tasks can easily be part of conflict prevention tools. French government official hold on to a traditional approach to security and would prefer if the level of co-ordination of military operations remain firmly under national or ad-hoc multilateral European-led arrangements. The Belgian and German governments, with the support of other Nordic countries, would prefer to support solutions to the security issues that rely on prioritising the use of financial, economic and humanitarian aid, as seen in the Balkans. Because of these differences, it is at present unclear whether the ‘deepening process’ in ESDP/CESDP will be based on the notion of ‘counter-balancing’ of US power or on alternative concepts of security that seek to rebuild multilateral security frameworks by emphasizing conflict prevention and place strict limits on the use of military force to resolve external conflicts.

Taking into account that the international security situation remains very fluid (the US government is still on a path of war), it is too early to see in Operation Concordia the beginning of a new strategic relationship between the EU and NATO or the emergence of the EU as a coherent international security actor.

Nevertheless, two trends, shaping in the short-term the evolution of the ESDP, can be identified. One points to a less equal transatlantic security relationship. This is because for leading politicians and officials in the United States and Britain, the key aspect of the ESDP-NATO relationship is about allowing ad-hoc coalitions of the willing to undertake external military engagements by relying, whenever possible, on the EU to provide the civilian, peacekeeping and humanitarian capabilities for such operation. If this trend, as seen in Afghanistan and in Macedonia, were to continue and be applied to Iraq, the EU’s role in external security engagements will remain subordinate to the international requirements of Anglo-American military strategists.

There is a second trend that is expressed in the emergence of a core group of EU member states leading on CFSP and ESDP issues. This core could have two types of impact on the evolution of the ESDP. It could contribute to strengthening the emergence of a stronger EU in the external security area and simultaneously while restoring the functions of the UN as the leading international security organization. Or it could undermine further the already fragmented nature of the European and international security system.

The first impact is more likely if the member states that constitute the core are successful in pursuing an agenda that help clarify the foreign and security doctrines that should shape the EU’s responses to external security challenges. At the same time, the trend is more likely if the current core group refrains from undertaking peace-enforcement operations. It is also more likely if it pursues a reform of the EU and the UN that gives powers to parliamentary bodies to scrutinize and shape the policy-making process.

The second outcome could become a reality if the ‘core group’ becomes a forum that allows some traditional military powers, such as Britain and France for example, to undertake military tasks on behalf of the EU and UN without the latter institutions having undertaken an internal reform that give them, - along with parliamentary institutions at the national and EU levels- the powers to scrutinize and control the activities undertaken by leading military powers.