Bernhard May
(Summary:
The author looks at Europe's perception of Asia and the role think tanks can play in improving the Europe-Asia relationship. Europe's interest in Southeast Asia hat significantly declined in the last decade of the twentieth century. Think tanks should engage themselves much more actively and constructively trying to create a new momentum in the relations between the European Union and East Asia.)
Over the last couple of years, the momentum in the ASEM-Process has dramatically slowed down. Europe's interest in Southeast Asia has significantly declined in the last decade of this century. The reasons are known: The end of the cold war has turned Europe's attention to Central and Eastern Europe as well as to Russia. The Asian Crisis in 1997 and 1998 changed the perception of many Europeans of Asia and especially of Southeast Asia. The image of always successful Asian countries - Asian Miracle - was substantially destroyed and Asian countries are now seen as "human entities" after all, countries that are not protected against failures, crises, and severe downturns. The somewhat too emotional discussion about the importance of Asian values did not help in that respect either. Furthermore, since APEC is no longer producing success-stories, the political pressure on Europe to move forward with the ASEM process is getting weaker.
Those three important developments in the 90s have to be seen in connection with major new challenges for Europe and the ASEM and especially ASEAN countries - in fact, new challenges for the whole world. It could be argued that one of the major and most profound challenge of the coming years will be the challenge of globalisation. It is regrettable that at a time when ASEAN-EU relations should be strengthened, and at a time when Europe and Southeast Asia have to cope with the new challenge of globalisation, ASEAN-EU relations are getting weaker.
It is encouraging, however, that the heads of states and governments at the G8 Summit in Cologne in June of 1999 focussed on the new challenge of globalisation and concluded that "globalisation ... has cast us together as never before". Globalisaton, they continued, would create opportunities and risks. And it would be important that governments get actively involved to help people to cope with the risks and make sure that opportunities of globalisation are granted to the people.
In the G8 Communiqué of the Cologne Summit, June 18-20, 1999, the following agreed upon statement was included. And this is one of the challenges for the ASEAN-EU relations as well. The G8 Communiqué states:
"Globalisation, a complex process involving rapid and increasing flows of ideas, capital, technology, goods and services around the world, has already brought profound change to our societies. It has cast us together as never before. Greater openness and dynamism have contributed to the widespread improvement of living standards and a significant reduction in poverty. Integration has helped to create jobs by stimulating efficiency, opportunity and growth. The information revolution and greater exposure to each others' cultures and values have strengthened the democratic impulse and the fight for human rights and fundamental freedoms while spurring creativity and innovation. At the same time, however, globalisation has been accompanied by a greater risk of dislocation and financial uncertainty for some workers, families and communities across the world.
The challenge is to seize the opportunities globalisation affords while addressing its risks to respond to concerns about a lack of control over its effects. We must work to sustain and increase the benefits of globalisation and ensure that its positive effects are widely shared by people all over the world. We therefore call on governments and international institutions, business and labour, civil society and the individual to work together to meet this challenge and realise the full potential of globalisation for raising prosperity and promoting social progress while preserving the environment."
Some critics are describing and analysing the challenge of globalisation in much more stronger words. To mention just one example: Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith believe that the global economy that is evolving will bring about profound changes like the industrial revolution. Of course, the industrial revolution was called a revolution after it had happened. Maybe in the year 2020 or 2030 analysts and historians will write about a "globalisation revolution" and people will use this phrase like we use nowadays the word industrial revolution. In the words of Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, this is what is emerging on a global level and everybody will somehow be involved:
"A great political debate is emerging over the many unexpected and profound consequences of the rush toward the global economy and its effects on jobs, human rights, cultural diversity, democracy, and the natural world. The world's political and corporate leaders are restructuring the planet's economic and political arrangements in ways that directly affect humans and the environment more than anything since the Industrial Revolution." (Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.), The Case Against the Global Economy, San Franisco 1997)
We are facing a double-edged problem: On the one hand, ASEAN-EU relations are weakening; on the other hand, ASEAN-EU relations are facing new and profound challenges. It is against this background that I will try in my presentation to answer the question what role think tanks could and should play in an effort to strengthen ASEAN-EU relations. I am looking at the problem from a European perspective.
Before I talk about the role of think tanks in ASEAN-EU relations, I would like to thank the organisers for doing all the hard work to bring all of us together for the First ASEAN-EU Think Tanks Dialogue. I think this is a very important and timely conference. Let me, therefore, say a special word thanks to Prof. Carolina Hernandez, President of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies in Manila, and to Wolfgang Mûllers, Regional Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Manila. Thank you very much, both of you!
There is still a lot of confusion about what think tanks are, what they are doing, what they are supposed to do - and especially about the question: do we need think tanks? Of course, all those questions depend on the country and society we are talking about. A think tank in Washington, D.C. is quite likely different from a think tank in Berlin or Paris or from a think tank in Manila, Jakarta or Phnom Penh. In everyday life, think tanks are quite different, but they are all facing the same challenges.
For my presentation I define think tanks like this:
Think tanks are the bridge between the academic community and political decision makers. In terms of their substance, think tanks can be defined as non-profit organisations with the purpose to study and analyze problems that are relevant for the government, for the society, and for the common cause in a broader sense.
There are three types of think tanks: First, there are the independent, non-partisan and non-profit think tanks like the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Germany, or the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London or the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Second, think tanks that are getting most or all of their money from the government and, therefore, are working first of all for the government. In Germany that would be the case for the Foundation for Science and Politics in Munich. Third, think tanks that are closely linked to political parties and that are getting most of their money from those parties or from the taxpayer linked to the strength of the specific political party. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation is such a think tank in Germany but this foundation is doing much more than the work of a think tank; it is the other way around: the think tank is part of a foundation with a broader set of goals. In Germany, all political parties in the meantime got their own foundation with most of them supporting a think tank as part of the foundation.
Think tanks have basically three major tasks or jobs to fulfil. The first task of a think tank is the "early-warning-job". This means that think tanks have to focus on objective analysis of important issues. Think tanks can not and should not try to cover all relevant subjects but they should concentrate on new political, economic and societal trends that could become problems in the near future and they should warn the political community and society about those problems that are lying ahead. In that respect, there are sometimes quite substantial differences to research work being conducted in universities for example.
The second task of a think tank is the "produce-solutions-job". Think tanks should not only analyse new problems lying ahead, but they should work out scenarios, different ways of how to solve such a new problem to give decision-makers specific solutions for the problems. The third and most difficult task of a think tank is the "produce-results-job". Think tanks are not just offering analyses and solutions for new problems, but they are supposed to influence the decision-making process creating better circumstances to produce political results.
From the three major tasks think tanks should fulfil, the third one - produce results - is the most difficult one. To understand why that is the case, one has to go into the decision-making process of a specific country and political system to understand how think tanks can play a role to improve the very specific decision-making process of a given political system.
The decision-making process in a democratic political system is a complex and ever more difficult task. It is a complex challenge, because many groups, institutions, important politicians or influential people from outside are taking part. Most of the time, there are rules and procedures agreed upon, but quite often, the real decision-making process looks more like a muddling-through exercise. This is especially true when important decisions have to be taken. The situation is different when we are talking about bureaucratic routine decisions.
At the same time, the decision-making process in democracies is getting ever more difficult. There a three major reasons for that. First, democracies change and, therefore, more people and more groups, lobby-groups and NGOs included, are taking part in that decision-making process. And because those groups have different interests, the process gets more complex and more difficult. Second, more and more Western democracies are becoming "TV-societies" and, therefore, the famous "CNN-factor" is becoming more powerful in respect to the political decision-making. Third, profound changes are changing the political landscape in many democracies. One of the most important is the change that is called "glo-calisation". That is the combination of two problems or challenges: The challenge of globalisation - that I mentioned earlier - and the challenge of "localisation" meaning that more and more political decisions are taking on a lower political level in democracies. All of those changes are creating a more difficult political and societal environment for any decision-making process.
European think tanks are facing more and more problems in getting the necessary funds for their activities concerning ASEAN-EU relations. This is particularly true for German think tanks. There are several reasons to explain why it is getting more difficult. First, the funds of foundations are not growing as fast as the demand from universities and think tanks is growing. Second, after the end of the cold war there was a shift towards Eastern Europe. And because the total amount of money available is not growing, more money is spent on projects dealing with Eastern Europe and the other regions are getting less money. Third, after the Asian crisis a re-evaluation of the Southeast Asian region let to a situation that even knowledgeable people are less interested in Asian projects than before the crisis. All of those developments make it more difficult for think tanks to get the necessary funds for activities linked to ASEAN-EU relations.
Just before I left my institute in Berlin to come to Manila for this conference, I found an article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung with the headline: "The Swiss Asia Foundation is dead" (NZZ, November 19, 1999, p.10). The story behind this headline is a sad one: Less then five years after the Swiss Asia Foundation was founded, this think tank with its special focus on Asia has to be closed down because of lack of interest and because of lack of money. When the Swiss Asia Foundation was founded in April 1995, nobody would have expected that such an Asian oriented think tank would face difficulties in getting the necessary funds. But that this think tank will be closed down in rich Switzerland shows the kind of profound change that took place in some - not in all - European countries in terms of weaker support for Asian-European relations.
If we go through the three major tasks of think tanks and ask ourselves: Did think tanks fulfil their three tasks in ASEAN-EU relations? - the answer is a clear but puzzling "yes-yes-no". Yes, there was a lot of early warning in terms of new problems and possible crises that will break out in the near term. Yes, there was a lot of early warning in respect to the Asian financial crisis. Yes, there was a lot of early warning in terms of necessary political and economic reforms in several countries. Yes, there was a lot of early warning in respect to the East Timor crisis. And yes, there was a lot of early warning in terms of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia to take another example from another region.
Did think tanks fulfil their "produce-solutions-job" in ASEAN-EU relations, the answer is: yes, most of them did. One could go through the list of analyses and look for policy options and solutions suggested. There was no shortage on policy options. The problem really is: how to do the next step - how to produce results, how to influence the decision-making process in such a way that new problems are taken seriously, that policy options are discussed, and - most importantly - that decisions are being taken and that decisions are being implemented. And, therefore, one has to admit that think tanks did not fulfil their "produce-results-job" in ASEAN-EU relations. It is not entirely their fault. Some of them tried harder than others to influence the decision-making process to improve the ASEAN-EU relations. But after all, the results are not very good - and much more work needs to be done.
Think tanks should engage themselves much more actively and constructively trying to create a new momentum in the relations between the European Union and East Asia. That momentum got somehow lost over the last couple of years. Think tanks working on ASEAN-EU relations should, therefore, work harder to create a new momentum in ASEAN-EU relations. To do that, they should give ASEAN-EU relations and the ASEM process a higher priority. Secondly, think tanks should work harder to help to overcome the backlash against improved relations with East Asia in several European countries after the Asian crisis. Thirdly, think tanks should work out proposals about "confidence-building measures" in ASEAN-EU relations - and they should try to put them high up on the agenda of the political decision-making process in European as well as ASEAN capitals.
Those activities of think tanks to create a new momentum in ASEAN-EU relations should be worked out, co-ordinated, closely linked and simultaneously implemented on four different levels. First, there is the level of activities between ASEAN and the European Union. The second level is the decision-making level within the EU as well as within ASEAN. The third level is the national decision-making process. Last but not least, think tanks should also work harder on a society-level to prepare the groundwork for improved ASEAN-EU relations. That would mean, for example, that think tanks would accept a bigger share of responsibility to "manage a public discussion" about ASEAN-EU relations including specifically special interest groups and non-government organisations.
Concluding my presentation, I highly recommend a second meeting of the ASEAN-EU Think Tanks Dialogue. I would suggest that further activities on that think tanks level should be targeted on two common challenges East Asia and Europe are facing: the challenge of the end of the cold war combined with the challenge of globalisation. Furthermore I would like to recommend to organise a second meeting with a kind of structured process of activities to produce continuity. A well prepared second meeting of the ASEAN-EU Think Tanks Dialogue that would focus on the common challenges of globalisation and post-cold war could produce an input and could create a kind of new momentum that is urgently needed in ASEAN-EU relations. The group should be small - like in Manila. One could think about inviting some journalists to write about it.
A second type of activity on an ASEAN-EU level is already in place: In 1998, the German Society for Foreign Affairs organised the First ASEF Summer School supported by the Asia Europe Foundation. Forty students from EU countries and from ASEF countries took part in a two-week programme in Reutlingen, Germany. The Second ASEF Summer School took place in Beijing in August of 1999.
Those are two examples of how to improve the relations between ASEAN countries and the European Union. Those activities have to be seen as part of a larger picture - as a pointed out earlier. Taking into consideration the state of affairs in ASEAN-EU relations, more work has to be done on all four levels of activities. The different activities on the four levels should be linked to produce a more steady, a more coherent, and a more effective result in terms of setting the agenda - and in terms of preparing the societies for the problems and difficult decisions that are lying ahead.
To prepare the groundwork for improved relations between Europe and East Asia is essential for both regions. In a globalised world, we are all depending much more on each other and should try harder to seize the opportunities while taking care of the challenges. As General Jose T. Almonte (former national security adviser of the government of the Philippines) said yesterday evening in his after dinner speech: "All our countries are being integrated in a rapidly expanding global economic and political system. And rules are being set by which every country must play - or suffer the consequences. There is much about the East Asian condition that raises anxiety and merits concern. But I count myself among the East Asian optimists. I believe the economic and political changes taking place in this region will in the long run result in more open economies - more accountable governments - more democratic states - and more empowered peoples - who will make splendid partners for our friends in these ASEAN-European Union Dialogues."
At the beginning of the new century - and indeed the new Millennium - one has to admit that mankind is facing tremendous challenges, but the future looks better for many more people and countries than during most of the last century. Globalisation is creating a "new ball game": it is now a "win-win-situation" and no longer a "zero-sum-game". Bilateral and regional relations will become less important at least in economic terms. But this global process will also see winners and losers of globalisation. At the same time national borders will become less important. Globalisation will lead to a redistribution of wealth and power within societies as well as among countries. We are witnessing, therefore, a global process with fundamental changes and profound opportunities. Europe and East Asia should actively try to manage that process of globalisation.
(This is an updated and extended paper that was presented at the "First ASEAN-EU Think Tanks Dialogue, Asia-Europe: Redefining the Partnership in the Next Millennium", 27-28 November 1999, Manila, The Philippines, organized by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Regional Office in Manila.)
Dr. Bernhard May
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Forschungsinstitut der DGAP, Berlin
(Beitrag ist veröffentlicht in: PANORAMA, Heft 1, 2000, S. 37-44.)
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