Fortsetzung: Prospects for Further Constraints in the Conventional Field: Regional and Global Approaches

Pál Dunay

2. The Prospects of European Arms Control

2.1 The Perspectives of the CFE Process

Since the limitation of conventional armed forces took on importance for European security, through the conclusion and implementation of the CFE Treaty of 19 November 1990, it has had to adapt itself to rapidly changing circumstances. An instrument that was negotiated at the very end of the East-West conflict and reflects the logic of the previous era between hostile blocs might have been regarded on the very day of its signature as a relic of the past. Nevertheless, the CFE Treaty has a number of valuable accomplishments to its credit. First, by eliminating 58,000 weapons systems, it contributed to a lessening of the level of armaments in the area of application. Second, it brought a significant increase in transparency as a result of by now about 3,000 on-site inspections and an intrusive exchange of information. Third, the Treaty’s forums and mechanisms made a major contribution to one of the
traditional objectives of arms control - helping to smooth communication between the states parties on questions of European security.

One can, of course, put the CFE Treaty in a different light. Little is known about how the armed forces of the states parties would have evolved without the conclusion of the Treaty. The question remains whether the observation of Lawrence Freedman, made in the 1980s, that the finance ministers have become the best controllers of arms, retains its relevance for the 1990s. If answered in the affirmative, then the reason for reductions according to the Treaty could be regarded as partly irrelevant. The importance attributed to transparency is not entirely convincing either. The extensive exchange of information and the knowledge accumulated from numerous inspections have been of diminishing importance. The information gathered has had political and strategic relevance for a few countries only. In most cases, when the security interests of the countries have been sub-regional and have had limited analytical capabilities, they were stockpiled. The situation is similarly ambivalent with respect to communication under the CFE regime. Following the end of the East-West conflict many other channels have opened, the zero-sum game bilateral structure has vanished. When exchanges have become intensive at several multilateral forums, the relative importance of the particular channels established to manage the CFE regime diminished unavoidably. In sum, it is difficult to assess clearly the importance of the CFE regime following the end of the East-West conflict. Its future, as its past, will be dependent upon its ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.

As is known, the parties of the Treaty did their utmost to flexibly adapt it to fast changing circumstances without revising it formally: decisions were taken by the parties in the Joint Consultative Group; parties were replaced by their successor states; and holdings were reallocated in the so-called Budapest-Tashkent group. It was politically understandable that the parties wanted to avoid modifications that would have required ratification. This tactic has proved successful for more than five years after treaty signature. The strategic changes that have had a direct bearing upon the security of some parties made formal treaty modification necessary. The two most important of them were the change of the strategic role and importance of the Caucasus area due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the mounting instability on the southern border of Russia, and the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance extending to three former Warsaw Treaty countries and possibly to other countries of East Central Europe later. As these two factors will have a decisive impact on the outcome of the CFE adaptation talks, I will focus on them.

2.1.1 CFE Adaptation and the NATO Enlargement Process

The treaty structure currently in force is based on the existence of two groups of states parties which are identical, as far as their composition is concerned, with the members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty - or the European successor states of the latter. Even with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the semblance of balance remained; there continues to be two, more or less, cohesive groups and therefore a balance is maintained between them. When the NATO enlargement process took place an experienced negotiator stated: "If countries that join NATO can keep their membership in the other group the result is a kind of political science fiction." It was apparent when the adaptation talks started, after the Lisbon OSCE summit, that the group structure had to be revised. The position of the NATO group and its clientele was unanimous that the group structure had to be eliminated and replaced by a system of national commitments, though it offered certain "concessions" to avoid giving the impression that it was the objective of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty to gain unilateral advantage vis-à-vis Russia. Russia, in its turn, was of the view that the constraints on groups of states parties had to be retained. The category would in the future cover "... two or more States Parties that, in accordance with agreements concluded between them, have joint military command structures." The proposed definition makes it clear that Russia has given up hopes of a deeper military integration in the CIS and has created the term so that it could not be applied to any other group than to the Atlantic Alliance. It was obvious that under the original conditions offered by the parties, no solution to this fundamental difference could be found. The only question remaining was what sort of compensation could be found for any major concession.

For Russia, Belarus, and to some extent Ukraine, (the three western-most post-Soviet states which have not applied for NATO membership), the compensation should stem from the conciliatory attitude of the Alliance that could result in a combination of symbolic and concrete concessions. The attitude should be based on the fact that the eastern enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance is a political process that should not increase the perceived threat of countries further to the East. Thus the arsenal of NATO taken together should not increase force concentration in the new member states. It should be limited both as far as the amount of armaments and equipment, and the time of stationing. This was reflected in a couple of Alliance proposals. The Atlantic Alliance announced that the aggregate level of national ceilings of the 16 NATO states in the three categories of land forces would be "significantly" lower than the current group ceiling. The political purpose of announcing this unilateral reduction was to make the Russian demand for a so-called ‘alliance sufficiency’ superfluous by offering in quantitative terms what the demand seeks to achieve structurally. Another point in the NATO proposal is relevant in this connection; designated permanent storage sites may be either maintained or eliminated - in the latter case, 80 percent of the depot quota would lapse and the other 20 percent could be applied to active forces. In addition, the NATO proposal provided for specific stabilising measures for the so-called Visegrad countries - Belarus, the region of Kaliningrad, and the territory of Ukraine, without the flank portion of the latter’s territory. These measures would consist mainly of the provision that the territorial ceilings of these units would not exceed the present maximum levels of holdings for the three categories of ground treaty-limited armaments. However, this would by no means rule out the stationing of forces from NATO countries in the new member states. If the latter were to reduce their national ceilings below the territorial ceilings that apply to them, space would be created for such stationing.

Russia did not find the offer of the West far-reaching enough. In its proposal, presented the same day when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed, it took a conciliatory attitude on some issues. First, in harmony with the Founding Act, Russia emphasised that the Treaty was to be based on the establishment of national ceilings. Russia declared, although still somewhat vaguely, its willingness to "examine the possibility of introducing a web of territorial ceilings as an alternative to the zonal limitations ..." Russia also announced that it was prepared "to consider the possibility of a strictly limited stationing of forces on those territories where they are not present today". Russia agreed to specify "conciliatory flexibility mechanisms to deal with changes in the ceilings and with cases where they are temporarily exceeded".

Between the summer of 1997 and late 1998 not much happened in relation to the pending issues of a post NATO enlargement adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Major differences of opinion remained. Russia understandably objected to a system which, at the expense of the treaty-limited armament holdings of the respective new member, would permit major deployments of foreign (allied) armaments. Originally, Russia wanted to restrain the deployment of stationed forces to five percent of the national holding, but later seems to have dropped the idea, presumably with a view to its own interest in the Caucasus. The problem reappeared in late 1997, early 1998, on two levels. First, there was no agreement on the matter within the western alliance, the difference of positions was most apparent between Germany and the US; the former has been of the view that under the current conditions, stationing can be strictly limited, say to the armament of a German brigade, similarly to the Russian request, whereas the US would like to retain a much higher level of strategic flexibility. With reference to "preventive deployment" the US wants NATO to be able to deploy the armaments of two divisions on the territory of any other CFE state party without any limit on simultaneous deployment in the number of CFE states. This would result in a situation where in each new NATO member state there would be maximum 460 battle tanks, 770 armoured combat vehicles and 325 artillery systems stationed above the national holdings. Furthermore, the US was reluctant to extend the territorial limitation to combat aircraft and attack helicopters with reference to the fact that no territorial limitations have applied to those categories under the Treaty of November 1990 either. Russia was insistent upon the Kaliningrad area remaining exempt from the stringent limitations of the NATO initiated stability zone. Russia’s argument was based on the approach that the current CFE adaptation talks should provide compensation for the enlargement of NATO as such. Hence, such a zone should introduce supplementary limitations on the new (and prospective) NATO members, but not on Russia. Russia seems to have already come to the conclusion, and not without reason, that the current approach of some western states to the adaptation talks does not serve Moscow’s security interests.

One can conclude that under the current, largely "threat-free", situation in Europe, there is more room to assert separate national security interests. As the parties to the Treaty are affected by the adaptation talks, and by their eventual result, it has been very difficult to keep the cohesion of the NATO member states and the former candidates for membership in the CFE process. For the United States, the global player, it is essential to retain strategic flexibility on the European theatre. The adapted CFE Treaty can be a means to that; the primary reason why Washington had insisted on retaining strategic flexibility during the talks. For some western European members the whole adaptation of the CFE Treaty is less a strategic matter, and more a means of keeping Russia on track as a co-operative, relatively benign, non-threatening partner. They could live without an adapted Treaty and keep the November 1990 CFE in force. For them the exercise is about accommodating Russia under reasonable terms without undermining any country’s security. Some countries are affected specifically by an eventual adaptation. The flank states of NATO adjacent to the former Soviet (or to the current Russian) border, Norway and Turkey, belong to this category. The new NATO member countries had their own threat perception: among the strongest, Poland, whereas the Czech Republic, which is the furthest away from the CIS of the three candidates, and Hungary, where the population does not attribute particular importance to military security, feel both more relaxed - which has been reflected in their attitude at the CFE adaptation talks. Even though the Polish threat perception has deep historic roots, it has become clear that Warsaw, with its position and also with its rhetoric, could be a very troubling party to CFE adaptation. With its rigid attitude on some issues, like the geographical scope of the zone of stability, it represented something special at the negotiations and has already started to play its high-profile game at NATO forums. As a "front-line state" of NATO it is only a question of time until some other NATO member put Poland under pressure to relinquish its excessive demands or, to put it differently, for how long will other members be ready to accept Polish threat perception based exclusively on its reading of a however tragic history. Last but not least, the Russian Federation expects that it will get compensation for NATO enlargement in the framework of the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. This should reduce the threat it perceives as a consequence of the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance. Russia must not feel hindered in trying to express its security concerns related to CFE adaptation as its threat perception is unique, except for some similarities to that of Ukraine.

Rather than outline the course of negotiations between the 23 July 1997 agreement on "Certain Basic Elements" for Treaty Adaptation and the 30 March 1999 "Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on CFE Treaty Adaptation", it is more important to analyse how the parties have arrived at a preliminary solution that brought their differences to bridgeable distance. The decision may serve as a sound basis to agree upon the text of the adapted Treaty by the time set forth in the Oslo declaration of the OSCE Council. It is probable that the treaty can be signed at the November 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit meeting. (According to my assumption), treaty signature can at this stage be prevented only if events of major political significance, not related to the Treaty, have a bearing upon the process. One can suggest that the accord is the reflection of a compromise that does not fully satisfy the interests of any of the states parties. Diplomats usually conclude that a good compromise is when none of the parties is fully satisfied with the result.

It has been certain since 1997 that the adapted CFE Treaty will be based on a combination of national and territorial ceilings. National ceilings are identical with the holdings of the state party on its own territory whereas territorial ceilings are composed of national ceilings and stationed treaty-limited armaments and equipment. This means that the adapted Treaty will not contain limitations on the collective holdings of existing or future alliances. For those countries which have territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, in the area of application of the CFE Treaty, national ceiling may not exceed its territorial ceiling. This means that a state party has to decide whether it is willing to reach its limits on the national ceiling by its national forces or keep a smaller amount of treaty-limited armaments and equipment in the hope that it can host foreign forces on its territory. Smaller countries which belong to an alliance, like NATO, would certainly opt for the latter whereas others may opt for self-reliance. In order to gain the consent of the Russian Federation, and also of some other post-Soviet states, to such a solution, NATO member countries made a series of official statements where they announced further reductions in their national ceilings and made predictions for their territorial ceilings. They are subject to the entry into force of the adapted Treaty.

During the decade that has passed since the fall of the Berlin wall force levels have generally been reduced without interruption in most European countries. They had reached levels in many cases when their further reduction may endanger national, and in some cases international, security. It is thus essential to agree upon mechanisms which make the revision of ceilings possible. Further unilateral reductions are, of course, less of a problem as they usually do not jeopardise any country’s security interests. The increase of ceilings, however, whether lasting or temporary, is more troubling for parties to an arms limitation treaty.

For some time, Russia insisted upon a system that would have made the change of ceilings, particularly their upward modification, impossible without the consent of other states parties. Russia wanted ceilings that could be revised only by consensus whereas NATO aimed for a more flexible mechanism to review ceilings. The common revision of the parties’ force levels by consensus would have given veto power to any state party to the Treaty on the change of the force level of every other party. This was regarded as totally unacceptable to the Atlantic Alliance. Russia has become ready for compromise and NATO has been ready to limit its flexibility as far as temporary and extraordinary deployments have been concerned. The solution, which will in all likelihood be codified in the adapted Treaty, is based on the following. States parties will declare their initial national holdings upon the signature of the adapted CFE treaty. In order to guarantee that no increase of holdings threaten military stability in Europe, the initial national ceilings cannot be higher than the national maximum levels. It is interesting to note that military stability has been identified by negotiators with certain force levels, or the freeze of the status quo of conventional forces in Europe. The unilateral reduction of national ceilings is not complicated by any requirement other than a 90 day advance notification. Similarly, to the regulation of the current Treaty, it is declared further that a unilateral decrease of national ceiling "does not confer the right on any other State Party to increase its" national ceiling. The upwards revision of national ceilings is confined to a maximum 20 percent increase in each category of ground treaty-limited armaments (battle tanks, artillery pieces and armoured combat vehicles /ACVs). The interests of small states parties is protected by a specific minimum increase; for example, the 20 percent rule must not be less than 40 battle tanks, 60 ACVs, 20 artillery pieces. In addition, a specific maximum prevents military great powers from significantly modifying their military force ratios. Accordingly, the amount must not exceed 150 battle tanks, 250 ACVs and 100 artillery pieces irrespective of whether the 20 percent rule mentioned above would entitle a state party to a bigger increase or not. Similarly, strict rules would apply for the revision of territorial ceilings. This means that no state party should worry about a major unexpected increase of foreign forces on the territory of another state party. As such, Russia need not worry about a significant reinforcement of U.S. forces on the territory of the new members of the Atlantic Alliance close to Russian borders, e.g. in the north of Poland adjacent to Kaliningrad. The constraints concerning the upward revision of the ceiling on combat aircraft and attack helicopters, bearing in mind their utility in modern warfare, are stricter than those on ground forces armaments. There is no percentage rule in those two categories. The maximum increase permitted would equal 30 combat aircraft and 25 attack helicopters.

Whereas it was relatively easy to achieve an agreement on the lasting modification of force levels, how to agree upon the temporary change of force levels has remained one of the most controversial. There was no doubt that there may be legitimate reasons for a temporary increase of force levels. The most obvious examples are peace-keeping operations and military exercises. No state objected to the temporary increase of force levels for the purpose of carrying out a UN or OSCE mandated peace-keeping operation where the force levels and the duration of their presence is guided by the appropriate mandate. The text of the accord means that there is no room for temporary increase on the basis of a non-UN or non-OSCE approved peace operation. Therefore neither NATO, nor the CIS, can serve as such an umbrella. It was also logical to accept that military exercises may make a temporary increase necessary. Three questions emerged in that respect: What amount of battle tanks, ACVs and artillery pieces may be introduced in a country for an exercise? What type of transparency measures shall accompany such an increase? How can one prevent such an exercise from being used to circumvent the limitation of the Treaty regarding lasting increase of territorial ceilings? As was mentioned above, some parties felt the need to retain strategic flexibility whereas others sought to constrain it. Flexibility should not undermine predictability however. No national ceiling may be exceeded due to a military exercise. This means that the national ceilings cannot increase temporarily in addition to hosting forces temporarily. The transparency measures to be adopted in the adapted Treaty require a 42 day advance notification of a military exercise that involves a temporary increase of force levels. The non-circumvention rule consists of two elements: no exercise can last longer than 42 days, if it does, the increase for the exercise will fall into another category and be regarded as a temporary deployment; and, successive exercises cannot serve as a means to circumvent the duration limit for exercises.

The two rules mentioned above are fairly specific and unobjectionable. There might be, however, other reasons to deploy forces and treaty-limited armaments on the territory of other countries. As the grounds of such deployments are less specific, the concerns that they can be abused are stronger. Consequently, the number of pieces of armaments must be limited by the upcoming adapted Treaty. According to the accord achieved, it must not exceed 153 battle tanks, 241 ACVs, and 140 artillery pieces. It is a strict limit that is intended to not put any country’s security at risk. The issue of flexibility regarding temporary deployment was one of the most divisive of the talks. Russia, which is inferior in conventional arms in Europe vis-à-vis the West and is relying exclusively on its own forces, wanted to constrain flexibility as much as possible. Thus Russia was reluctant to accept any kind of exceptional temporary deployment going beyond the one mentioned above. First, Russia recommended that NATO "renounce the very possibility of so-called exceptional temporary deployment. We do not see real security threats either in Central Europe or in the rear area, the neutralisation of which would require ... large scale deployments of forces above territorial ceilings." Not much later, in reaction to the determination of the West to press the issue of exceptional temporary deployments with reference to an unidentified threat, Russia was of the view that such deployments can "take place on the basis of the consensus of all participating States". Consensus would have provided Russia, and any other party to the Treaty, with veto power on exceptional temporary deployment. One has reason to assume that Russia knew clearly that such temporary deployment is deemed necessary by the West to face a well-defined threat, and not a highly uncertain one. It seemed impossible to bridge the gap between the different positions. In the end, the solution was provided by a compromise proposal which makes such exceptional temporary deployments possible under specific conditions; specifically, it may not exceed the territorial ceiling by more than 459 battle tanks, 723 ACVs and 420 artillery pieces. Furthermore, such exceptional deployments, when they exceed a territorial ceiling or a sub-limit, will be subject to specific transparency and verification measures. While such measures have not yet been agreed upon, their thrust is clear. The decision arrived at by the JCG in the end of March 1999 gives a good idea what the negotiators had in mind.

"Where, in exceptional circumstances, a temporary deployment exceeds a territorial ceiling by more than 153 tanks, 241 ACVs, or 140 artillery pieces ... on receipt of an appropriate notification a conference of the States Parties shall be convened by the Depository at which the hosting and deploying States Parties will explain the nature of the exceptional circumstances which have given rise to the Temporary Deployment. The conference shall be convened without delay but not later than seven days after the notification of a Temporary Deployment..."

In excess of the above mentioned number of ground armament. On the one hand, Russia was not in the position to prevent exceptional temporary deployments, on the other, the liberty of the West to rely on it has been curtailed significantly and the accompanying measures make the unnecessary reliance on such a measure a risky exercise.

Russia was not worried about the extensive reliance on such temporary deployments per se but about two other factors. First, it did not want to accept that different "flexibilities" be accumulated or used simultaneously by the Atlantic Alliance. Second, it must not be forgotten that such "temporary reinforcement" may occur simultaneously in a number of countries in each other’s vicinity. For example, the U.S. could decide to reinforce Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary at the same time due to exceptional circumstances. In this case Russia’s objection was accepted. Six states took the commitment "not to make use of the Treaty mechanism for upward revision of Territorial Ceilings...". They are the four Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as well as Belarus and Ukraine. It has been a request of the Russian Federation since the beginning of the CFE Treaty adaptation talks to establish a so-called zone of stability extending to the eastern-most members of the Atlantic Alliance as a confidence-building measure where stringent limitations will apply on national ceilings and on temporary deployments. It was hotly debated which parts of the former Soviet Union would form part of this zone in order to create a highly artificial and symbolic balance between the East and the "new West". Russia, as noted, was insistent that no part of the Russian Federation would belong to that zone, as it perceived the establishment of such a zone as part of compensation for the eastern expansion of NATO. For Poland, understandably, the inclusion of the Kaliningrad area was an essential precondition to the reduction of Polish military flexibility. The decision of the JCG acknowledges that the zone of stability constrains flexibility in East Central Europe in order to increase military stability. The zone will extend to the six countries mentioned above, but not to the Kaliningrad area. This is a major concession from the West, or more specifically from Poland, at the negotiations. Those countries which belong to the stability zone "have agreed not to make use of the Treaty mechanisms for upward revision of Territorial Ceilings...". Formally the Russian Federation has taken a somewhat weaker, though similar, commitment. It stated that it will not "host more than 153 battle tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces in excess of Territorial Ceilings and to reflect this agreement in the adapted Treaty". This means that Russia will not invoke the right to have exceptional temporary deployment and will confine itself to the form of temporary deployment which is subject to more stringent numerical constraints. One could therefore say that a major restraint was accepted by Russia as well, however, such a conclusion is premature, if not unfounded. The strategic situation of Russia is fundamentally different from those smaller countries of East Central Europe which have recently joined NATO, e.g., the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, or plan to join in the future, e.g., Slovakia. Russia, despite its declining military strength, is self-reliant militarily and will remain so. Consequently, when Russia declares it will not rely on exceptional temporary deployment, it does not give up anything it wanted to use. Kaliningrad is not included in the zone of stability and the Russian Federation will at best make a declaration upon treaty signature that it will practice self-constraint and not increase its forces in the area beyond their current level.

It can be regarded a further stabilising measure that the parties will limit their armament in transit. The time of transit is limited to 42 days, of which no more than 21 days can be spent in one territorial unit, and it "will not be used as a substitute for Temporary Deployments or military exercises". Transparency measures will be developed at a later stage of the talks in order that no treaty limitation could be circumvented by transit. Only one of them has been indicated preliminarily by the decision of the Joint Consultative Group. According to it, should questions arise as to the status of treaty-limited armament in transit, any State Party will have the right to seek prompt clarification in the JCG.

2.1.2 CFE Adaptation and the Flank Problem

It is easy to get the impression that the CFE adaptation talks are conducted only in order to reflect upon the changed situation in light of NATO enlargement. A sort of a new East-West conflict seems to have taken place at the negotiating table with some major differences. The most important one, beyond the apparent change in the composition of the "groups", is that Russia is now in the position of the "demandeur". The West has been gaining conventional superiority - if this term has any relevance any longer - and it is Russia that could begin to expect concessions.

There is one reason that has significantly modified the above picture. Namely, the so-called "flank issue". Suffice it to mention that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the strategic situation of two successor states changed significantly in light of the fact that areas of secondary importance gained strategic significance. Ukraine was obliged to defend vast territory with few pieces of armaments on its flank and Russia had difficulties accepting that it could not station more armament in the North Caucasus adjacent to the three newly independent former Soviet republics.

Even though Western readiness to accommodate the Russian and Ukrainian request to revise the flank rule had been present abstractly, the operational change was carried out under the pressure of a number of factors. Russia, faced with imminent NATO enlargement, failed to conform to the flank ceilings prescribed by the CFE Treaty which it ought to have reached by the end of the reduction period (November 1995). This put NATO in a difficult situation. If the Alliance, as it had always claimed, really wanted to combine its enlargement goal with the maintenance, and even strengthening, of a co-operative relationship with Russia, then it too was dependent on finding a solution for the two related problems. A solution to the flank problem was found at the first CFE Review Conference in May 1996. The agreement reduced the size of the flank zone and permitted Russia to station 8,716 pieces of treaty-limited armament in the previous flank territory until 31 May 1999, after which 7,900 systems will be allowed - this in lieu of the 4,360 pieces originally permitted.

The so-called GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) have repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with certain provisions of the flank agreement. This impression is closely related to the issue of the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of these four countries. In the view of the GUAM states, the flank agreement allows Russia to station treaty-limited equipment in the flank zone of the former Soviet Union without the agreement of the affected countries. The four countries want the document to be revised in such a way as to make clear that the rights of Russia do not extend beyond its borders. For this reason, the four originally did not want to ratify the flank agreement. They finally capitulated when NATO member states argued that there is nothing in the modified flank rule which says that foreign troops and treaty-limited armaments can be stationed without the agreement of the affected state. In spite of the exchanges on the matter, Russian troops were, in fact, stationed on the territory of those countries.

Russia used this issue to pursue its long sought objective of eliminating the flank rule by making the following proposal:

"In this connection the Russian Party expresses its readiness to consider a possibility to ensure restraint in relation to the present levels of its conventional armed forces in the flank area ... The scope, status and duration of such provision on restraint will correspond to the scope, status and duration of provisions on limitation on overall ceilings for military alliances and on limitation and additional permanent stationing of conventional armed forces of the States Parties beyond their territories."

Since Russia knew that the second part of the deal would be unacceptable to NATO, the first would have to be so as well - the flank rule would be invalidated in a compromise. Russia would have regained its freedom to act in the flank zone vis-à-vis the GUAM countries. Russia’s assumption in connection with its proposal was that NATO enlargement was the West’s primary objective and that the West would be prepared to make concessions on other issues, among them ones in which the sovereignty of some countries of second-rate strategic importance might be affected. It was interesting to see that the course of development of the talks during the 40 months has demonstrated the contrary. The West, starting out from a realistic threat assessment, was more willing to compromise on arms limitation related to the eastern enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance than on the flank issue. It had every reason for it. Namely, it was aware that a higher level of military stability has been achieved in the centre of Europe than on its south-eastern periphery. Moreover the danger that a dissatisfied east-central European country fails to ratify the adapted Treaty is not realistic. Although it is a real danger that, for example, a Transcaucasian country which does not find the adapted Treaty reassuring may block its entry into force. If nothing else the process of bringing the flank rule into force modified at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996 set a worrying example in this respect.

The West, primarily the US, tried to avoid giving the impression that it was ready to see Russia with a free hand in the CIS. The US Secretary of State, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, said that Western CFE policy would have to be based on two principles: "First, we must not take any step in CFE that would undermine NATO’s ability to fulfil its future commitments, prejudice its political evolution, or relegate any future members to second class status. Second, any CFE agreement must take into account the interests not just of NATO’s 16 allies or any individual country, but of all 30 CFE states." Here, Albright formulated the central dilemma facing the Alliance and, in particular, the United States, with regard to the CFE process: on the one hand, to ensure the effective functioning of NATO as a collective defence organisation; on the other, to improve the general security situation in Europe.

The decision of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty reached on 23 July 1997, concerning certain basic elements for treaty adaptation, stipulated that the Parties agree that the substance of Article V of the Treaty, as modified by the first CFE Treaty review conference, will be maintained - but reconciled with the structure of the adapted treaty. It was the Western interpretation of this rule that the territorial scope and the numerical limits will not be revised in the adaptation process. Russia, on the other hand, concerning "the security of each State Party is not affected adversely at any stage" has been determined to reopen the debate on the flank. It is known that Russia, at best, wanted to drop the flank rule in order to regain flexibility. This might be acceptable to some western countries but certainly not to the flank states of NATO: Turkey, Greece and Norway. Furthermore, it has always been highly unlikely that some GUAM states would sign an adapted treaty without the flank rule.

The fact that Russia put a clear emphasis on the flank issue during the recent phase of the talks is a clear indication that Russian strategic planners have made a realistic assessment of the international security environment. Despite anti-NATO enlargement rhetoric, they are well aware that the threat does not stem from East-Central Europe. Instability in the south of Russia, adjacent to the three newly-independent former Soviet republics in the Caucasus, should be much more worrying militarily. In the end, Russia argued for military flexibility in order to provide for its national security and territorial integrity. It seems impossible to attain this goal either under the current or an adapted CFE Treaty. No revision of the Treaty, acceptable to all of the 30 parties, was possible under the conditions required by Moscow.

The negotiations on the flank rule faced a stalemate for a long while. There existed too many perceived mutually-exclusive vital interests at stake on the southern flank. The compromise eventually achieved changes the modified flank rule cosmetically only. The flank rule is thus not dropped, and the only Russian pieces of armaments which have been exempted are in one of two repair facilities in the flank area. The suspicion of the West that the significant number of pieces of armaments at those facilities might be used for circumvention disappeared overnight after Russia extended an invitation to the negotiating partners to visit the facilities. Following the visit, Western inspectors no longer suspected that the pieces of armaments at those facilities represented any military value.

The stalemate was solved in a deal agreed upon by Turkey and Russia. According to the agreement there will continue to be one single sub-limit for the flank zone of Russia, i.e. the "cap" on the southern and the northern flank remains combined. Russia may retain 2140 ACVs on its territory in the revised flank zone, less than agreed upon in the flank rule as modified at the 1996 review conference, whereas the number of its battle tanks and artillery pieces remain unchanged (1300 and 1680 pieces, respectively). No extraordinary temporary deployments will be permitted on the flank in order to avoid an increase in the ability of any state party to prepare for offensive operations leading to potentially threatening or broader and concurrent build-up of forces within the framework of the Treaty.

The so-called GUAM states could declare victory; deployment of Russian forces on their territory can take place only with the free consent of the host states. The fundamental principle of stationing is the consent of the host State to the size, location and duration of foreign military presence. Thus, agreement is to be achieved on the configuration and consequent reduction of Russian forces in Georgia and of the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova. Even though no agreement has been achieved concerning the unaccounted for pieces of armaments (most notably present in Armenia) there is reason to assume that the flank rule will no longer block progress towards an adapted Treaty.

2.1.3 Prospects of the CFE Process and Its Possible Extension

The CFE Treaty and the talks on its adaptation are important, although not core, elements of the post Cold War European security order. They have no decisive bearing upon Europe as most problems of the continent are not affected by conventional arms control. The adaptation talks and the implementation of the Treaty in force may serve as a barometer of the political climate in Europe and are important as such. Following the first post Cold War enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to the east, it would have been impossible to maintain the former structure of the CFE Treaty without the prospect that it will be replaced by a new arrangement in the foreseeable future. Russia thus had reasons, or at least pretexts, to urge the other parties to the Treaty to conclude the talks at least by a politically binding commitment before the accession of three states to NATO in March 1999. According to Moscow, the enlargement of the Alliance

"endangers the present CFE Treaty built on the principles of maintaining balance of forces between the two groups of States Parties. If the new members of NATO do not declare their accession to the group of ... (NATO) countries, and exceed this group’s quotas on armaments and equipment, the whole system of balances, which makes the basis of the CFE Treaty, will be disrupted and its group mechanisms will be undermined. Because of the specifics of the Treaty provisions the Russian side’s right to conduct inspections on the territory of the new members of NATO to the same extent as on the territory of the other members of the Alliance, will be impaired. All this will put under question the very existence of the present CFE Treaty. This kind of developments bear a threat to the security interests of Russia, because it undermined the viability of the CFE Treaty. Given the fact that the key problems of the adaptation are not resolved, the Russian side will be obliged to take appropriate measures to secure its interests ..."

This Russian statement contains a mix of fiction and reality. The CFE Treaty codifying parity of two groups has been inadequate since the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and that of the Soviet Union. Those two developments ended the "balance" of conventional forces in Europe irrevocably. The category of balance cannot be interpreted among the current European state actors. This situation has no doubt been further complicated with the enlargement of NATO. As the Treaty has functioned relatively well for several years in an environment fundamentally different from the time it had been concluded there was no reason to tie its fundamental revision with the entry into force of the NATO accession protocols on 12 March 1999. The political accord of the parties agreed upon in the end of March 1999 is a timely answer to the need to modernise the Treaty. It reflects a reasonable compromise and serves as solid ground for an agreement on an adapted Treaty. It is a precondition paving the way for further arms control measures in Europe. These broader repercussions, including possibly future NATO enlargement, make the Treaty adaptation process an asset of European security.

The most severe problems were caused by those parties to the Treaty whose security interests are not confined to one theatre of military operations but act on "multiple chessboards". The United States seems to be willing to accept that in case a sudden major deterioration of relations between Moscow and the "new" NATO takes place, the new members, and later the members joining in the second and the third waves, could be appropriately defended by allied, and overwhelmingly U.S., reinforcements, or at least any threats could be deterred. The possible massive reinforcement of land forces, supplemented by a largely unlimited reinforcement of air force, has understandably upset Russia which has "accepted" NATO enlargement in political terms but does not want it to be followed by a massive military build-up close to its borders. The U.S. may have adapted a tough attitude at the talks in order to have enough room for concessions later.

The compromise that demonstrates the success of all the 30 parties involved in the adaptation process, is important in two respects: first, the opening of the CFE regime to countries which did not belong to either alliance in 1990 when the treaty was signed; and second, the continuation of arms control under the Dayton agreement extending to countries adjacent to those three former republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia) which are directly affected by the limitations. These wide ranging repercussions underline the centrality of the CFE Treaty for the future of arms control in Europe.

As NATO, at its Madrid summit of July 1997, invited (only) three former members of the Warsaw Treaty to join the Alliance, there was no urgency to deal with the status of any future NATO member which has not been party to the CFE Treaty. Had any country which was not party to the CFE treaty (e.g. Slovenia or any of the three Baltic states) been invited to join the Atlantic Alliance, the question of accession would have been much more pressing. As the first invitations will not be followed by a second wave of NATO enlargement any time soon, there is no urgency to address this matter. According to the December 1996 Lisbon mandate, the adaptation talks have to result in a Treaty that makes accession of other European states possible. An adapted Treaty based on a combination of national and territorial ceilings may be conducive to accessions later, even if the participating states were too heavily loaded by their current adaptation problems to pay attention to longer term issues. Some countries, like the Baltic states, have already indicated their readiness to join the Treaty, whereas others, like Austria, have not found any reason to revise their status of non-participation. There is not much added strategic value in the accession of some of these militarily weak countries. It may be more important to involve them in an evolving European arms control regime. The situation would of course be different if the CFE regime could be extended to countries with significant conventional armed forces, like Serbia and Croatia. For the time being, a special arms control regime extends to those countries which, through the reductions agreed, may help the later integration into the adapted CFE. This will mean that the "technical" conditions will have to be created for the opening, as well as redrafting the system of on-site inspections. This will be a demanding task of the negotiators in the months to come.

It is reassuring that the political basis for an adapted Treaty could be approved at a time when the tension between Russia and the West had increased due to the Kosovo crisis and NATO’s involvement and "unilateralism". The Russian legislature has tended to postpone ratification of pending arms control agreements when it is dissatisfied with conflict resolution. The crisis around Iraq became the main reason, or pretext, to postpone the ratification of START II by the Duma. The Kosovo crisis, with its lasting repercussions, may mean the same for CFE adaptation. Thus, the fate of the adapted Treaty will not be decided by the success of the drafting exercise alone, it will also depend on the broader developments in Europe.

2.2 The Fragmented System of Arms Reductions in Europe

During the last summit meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki in 1992, the participating states had certain illusions concerning the establishment of a collective security arrangement. Accordingly, they took the ambitious objective to harmonise arms control commitments in Europe. In our particular case, this process seems not to have taken shape yet and there are grounds to argue that if it does take place it will remain a formality. Extending the limitations of the CFE Treaty to former neutral and non-aligned countries will only affect the arsenal of those countries which are already subject to conventional arms limitations.

An important question is what type of conflicts will emerge in Europe in the coming years. The experience of the first decade of the post East-West conflict era has clearly demonstrated that the primary danger is not a major war with the participation of several European countries but rather domestic conflicts based on ethnic clashes or the desire to exercise the right to self-determination. If these types of conflicts continue in the future, then consideration must be given to the type of arms control measures which can make a relevant contribution to reducing the dangers of such conflicts. The further reduction of major categories of conventional armaments limited by the CFE Treaty does not affect these conflicts since they are not primarily fought with such weapons. Furthermore, even when heavy armaments are employed they are used in limited amounts which number reductions would not affect. The limitation and reduction of such categories of armaments, which are used in civil wars, cannot be adequately verified.

Arms control predominantly deals with the limitation of arms in interstate relations. The question remains therefore, can its means affect domestic conflicts. If severe constraints are introduced on the calling of reservists and if ammunition and weapon storage facilities are monitored by an international accord, the impact on domestic conflict is marginal. However, if a government has to choose whether to honour such constraints or maintain the unity of the country at the price of violating them, the leadership will opt for the latter. This means that as long as a conflict remains limited to the territory of one country, arms control has little relevance. It is more important that the international community has a set of options that can influence a government involved in a domestic conflict. Nevertheless, arms control can be instrumental in preventing the escalation of domestic conflicts to neighbouring
countries.

A number of conflicts in Europe and elsewhere demonstrate that arms control may have a relevant contribution to make in post conflict situations. It can help to stabilise the regional balance among the parties and limit the means of conflict if the parties return to violence. Such post conflict arms control measures are understandably tailored to the conflict region but may lead to the fragmentation of European conventional arms control. However, one has to take a fresh look at the problem. Even a fragmented arms control structure provides better service to European security than the ideal of a harmonised, though largely irrelevant, pattern of arms control.

Under the Dayton agreement two arms control accords were agreed upon. The first, a confidence-building measure, which is a fairly weak non-innovative remake of the Vienna CSBM document; the second, a somewhat later-adopted agreement on the limitation of conventional forces that extends to the five weapon categories which are also subject to the CFE Treaty. The objective is to create a balance of forces; first, among the former warring parties both inside and around Bosnia, and later, with the neighbouring countries. The successful implementation of the first phase of the accord, in spite of the implementation irregularities on the side of Republika Srpska, is to be followed by the second phase that should extend to the neighbouring countries. Some of them are parties to the CFE Treaty and will certainly be reluctant to accept reductions beyond their commitments under the CFE. This is one way how the pending Treaty adaptation may have direct relevance for related arms control regimes.

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