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Fortsetzung: Looking Back at Rwanda and Ahead at Burundi: Regional Links and the Current United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Lara Romaniuk

The UN Missions in Rwanda: UNOMUR (1993-1994) and UNAMIR (1993-1996)

UNOMUR - UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (June 1993 - September 1994)

Fighting between the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) of the dominantly Hutu Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Forces Patriotiques Rwandaises (RPF) broke out across the Rwanda-Uganda border in the autumn of 1990. The deployment of eighty-one UN military observers along the common border three years later, in June 1993, marked the UN's active involvement in the region. The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had a specific mandate - to verify that no military assistance was reaching the RPF from Uganda.

UNOMUR was a response to an existing cross-border incident between Rwanda and its northern neighbour. While UNOMUR sought to stave off the means of conflict from penetrating one country from another, it was hardly comprehensive or forward looking and did not seek to take preventative measures on a broad regional scale. The UN Security Council did not extend its mandate to include mechanisms that might thwart the Rwandan war - or elements of that war - from bleeding into neighbouring countries. Most notably, while military observers were deployed along the Rwanda-Uganda border (a response to an existing, localised problem), none were deployed along the borders Rwanda shares with Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania (a "regional" response - anticipating events and enacting preventative measures on a regional scale). Thus, with the Rwanda-Uganda border effectively sealed off to the north (either by the large RPF presence on the Rwandan side of the border or by the UN presence on the Ugandan side), Rwanda's other borders became increasingly vulnerable to cross-border traffic - significantly, the mass exodus of Rwandans.

During the Rwandan genocide of April 1994 - June 1994 the UNHCR estimates that over 2 million refugees crossed the border into neighbouring countries. The unmonitored cross-border exodus of Rwandans created a security dilemma individually for Rwanda and each of its neighbouring countries. The number that penetrated eastern Zaire was especially alarming. Refugee camps in eastern Zaire counted some 1.5 million Rwandans, including 50,000 Hutu Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) and 10,000 Interahamwe militia - the two groups identified by the UN as having carried out the genocide in Rwanda. In addition, about 250 Rwandan political leaders and military officials found refuge in Zaire.

The take over of Rwanda by the Tutsi Forces Patriotiques Rwandaises (RPF) in July 1994 officially ended the Rwandan civil war; however, it only consolidated the regional security dilemma created by the UN's failure to screen refugees for disruptive elements and, subsequently, to see to security and disarmament in the camps. As the Rwandan refugee camps filled, they fell under the control of the Hutu extremists responsible for the genocide in Rwanda. The camps became a security risk for both Rwanda and Zaire. The Rwandan extremists forcibly prevented the population in the camps from being repatriated; they used the "safe havens" to regroup and rearm and as a springboard for cross-border attacks in Rwanda. At the same time, the situation in the camps strained relations between the new Tutsi government in Rwanda and the Mobutu government, following reports that Zaire was arming the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Finally, in Zaire, ethnic conflict alighted when Hutu militia and the Zairean forces - Forces Armées Zairiennes (FAZ) - attacked the local Tutsi people, the Banyamulenge. The "Banyamulenge rebellion" in September 1996 in response to the assaults marked the beginning of the civil war in Zaire: heavily backed by Rwanda, Laurent-Desire Kabila united the Banyamulenge and other guerrilla groups into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and ousted Mobutu in a swift seven months.

The irony of UNOMUR was that it was established to stop outside interference in the Rwandan war - but did not anticipate or take measures that would prevent the Rwandan conflict from spilling beyond its borders into neighbouring countries. Instead, within fourteen months of UNOMUR's implementation, the ethnic hatred at the source of the Rwandan civil war had all but transposed itself in neighbouring Zaire - a situation the UN is currently grappling with. Only after the rise of the regional security dilemma and humanitarian crisis did the UN Security-Council admit the irony of monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. Consequently, the mission was closed. The last military observers were pulled out in September 1994. Regional myopia - not the Rwandan genocide per se - brought UNOMUR to its premature end. The first six months alone of the 15-month mission cost the UN an estimated $4 million.

UNAMIR - UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (October 1993 - March 1996)

Though it would be erroneous to suggest that UN interference in Rwanda caused any war, it could be argued that the UN's failure, first, to screen the refugees crossing into Zaire, second, to provide security in the camps, and third, to stop the arming of the former Rwandan armed forces and the Rwandan militia in Zaire factored heavily in the creation of a regional security dilemma. Although the civil war in the DRC is complex, both in its numerous causes and players, Rwanda's decision to intervene in Zaire/DRC, first on behalf of Kabila (1996) and then against him (1998), was a direct response to the security threat that the UN took no measures to prevent or correct during its presence in Rwanda between 1993 and 1996. Although "Africa's first world war" is often used to describe the conflict in the DRC after 1998, the seeds of a multinational conflict were germinating, at least, as of 1994 with the mass influx of Rwandan refugees, ex-FAR and militia, on the one hand, and the take over of Rwanda by the RPF, on the other. Like UNOMUR, the parallel UN mission in Rwanda - UNAMIR - was no more successful at anticipating events and taking action on a regional scale.

UNAMIR's mandate was narrowly defined to deal with events in Rwanda, not the region. Its initial mandate was two-fold: to ensure the security of Kigali, the seat of Hutu power since Rwanda was proclaimed a republic in 1961, and to monitor the Arusha ceasefire agreement, signed by the warring Rwandan parties in August 1993. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council was unable to keep up even with events in Rwanda (UNAMIR's mandate was changed eight times during its term) let alone anticipate regional outcomes. However, at least two historical and geopolitical factors beckoned the need for preventative regional measures: first, the historical precedent of ethnic war in the region and the ensuing mass, cross-border flight of refugees[1]; second, the similar ethnic composition - Tutsi/Hutu - that exists in the region.[2] These two elements in combination with the fact that the 1990-1994 Rwandan civil war was being fought along ethnic lines strongly suggest that preventative action - such as monitoring Rwanda's other borders - should have been an obvious component of the UN mandate in Rwanda.

Having failed to anticipate regional outcomes in the formulation of its mandate, UNAMIR subsequently failed to take counteractive regional measures - that is to extend its mandate to encompass the crises that were developing beyond Rwanda's borders. In essence, the UN operation which began in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1999, should have been initiated as early as 1994 when the Hutu milita took control of refugee camps in eastern Zaire. Not oblivious to the camps' threat to regional stability, the UN did in fact envisage at the time an extension of UNAMIR's mandate beyond Rwanda. In December 1994 the UN Secretary-General explored the possibility of deploying security forces in the Rwandan camps in eastern Zaire where the security situation was most critical. However, nothing came of the proposition, and the UN effectively stayed out of Zaire until 1999 when civil war was raging and the causes of, and multinational interests in, the war had compounded.

The decision of the UN to stay out of eastern Zaire in 1994 marked the beginning of the end of UNAMIR. Failing to address the new Rwandan government's prime, realist concern - national security - the Rwandan government finally requested the UN to leave in 1996. In the two years between the take over of Rwanda by the RPF and the close of UNAMIR, the issue of security had became all-important, dictating the new government's relationship with the UN. Early in 1995, with the perception that no effective UN limitations were being placed on the rearming of Hutu militia either in Zaire or in the UN protected zone in Rwanda, the RPF stopped recognising UNAMIR's legitimacy, going so far as attacking UNAMIR personnel.

UNAMIR, like UNOMUR, was terminated prematurely because of "regional myopia". Not extending UNOMUR's mandate beyond the Rwanda-Uganda border allowed the development of a regional security dilemma in the form of militia-controlled refugee camps; not extending UNAMIR's mandate beyond Rwanda allowed the escalation of that threat, leaving it to the Rwandan government and the RPF to solve. The RPF's April 1995 response to the vast "humanitarian protected zone," established in the south-western region of Rwanda by the UN sanctioned French military operation "Turquoise," was a harbinger of the Rwandan government's future actions in response to the cross-border threat in Zaire: while official talks were being conducted between the Rwandan government and the UN on a strategy that would eventually close the "Turquoise" zone and reintegrate the refugees, government forces invaded and shut down the camps, without warning, in effect scorning the UN and its principles. The "realist" response of the Government of Rwanda suggested it would place its national interest above any international or humanitarian laws, and military action above discourse. In Zaire, Rwanda's response to the security threat was a covert international war in support of Kabila. However this was not anticipated by the UN who, together with various international donors, pledged over $617 million to the Rwandan government ("for the reconstruction of Rwanda") before withdrawing in 1996. In reality, the UN left Rwanda with a free ticket to address the cross-border security dilemma. Later that year Rwanda intervened militarily in Zaire, attacking Hutu militia-dominated camps. As such, the end of UNAMIR coincided with the beginning of civil war in Zaire/DRC.

The UN's failure to fulfil its mandate of peace in Rwanda - most disturbingly demonstrated in the UN's impotence in face of the Rwandan genocide that claimed up to one million victims - is normally the criteria that justifies characterising UNOMUR and UNAMIR as failed missions. This analysis has introduced an additional criteria: namely, the establishment of regional stability. Not only can the UN missions in Rwanda be considered "failed" because they did not fulfil their immediate mandates, but because their mandates did not extend beyond Rwanda to encompass vulnerable regions, ultimately allowing the development of regional disorder.

[1] Tension between Hutu and Tutsi is an important factor in the region?s history. The Hutu pogroms of the 1950s in Rwanda, that sent hundreds of thousand of Tutsi fleeing into neighbouring Uganda and Burundi, inaugurated the region?s modern history. The cross-border flow of refugees - both Tutsi and Hutu - escaping ethnic violence peaked in the 1990s.
[2] Though not restricted to these two groups, the Tutsi/Hutu dominate certain regions. Rwanda and Burundi are both composed of about 85% Tutsi and 14% Hutu. Ethnic Hutu and Tutsi also live in eastern DRC. There are over two hundred ethnic groups in the DRC.

Fortsetzung: Looking Back at Rwanda and Ahead at Burundi: Regional Links and the Current United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo