Fortsetzung: South Africa: An Assessment of South African Response to September 11 and the Resulting War on Terrorism

Sally Matthews

4. An Assessment Of The Responses

The responses of the members of the South African government, the three members of the ruling alliance, the DA and the IFP reflect the interests and perspectives of each of these political entities.  Their responses also reflect the South African context and the divisions between and within the various groupings.

The ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance completely dominates the South African government with just under two-thirds of the seats in parliament being taken by members of the tripartite allaince, and with almost all cabinet members coming from this alliance.  This alliance is made up of three groups with strong historical ties, but the alliance is dominated by the ANC.  This ANC dominance is clearly reflected by the official statements released by the government with regard to the events of September 11, which more closely reflect the ANC's position than that of COSATU and the SACP. 

In responding to these attacks the South African government is in a difficult position.  This position is summed up by DA leader, Tony Leon (2001a) who says, '[The ANC government's policy towards the West] involves wanting simultaneously to join with the "western club" for the resources and status this would confer, while berating it and spurning its values whenver such behaviour finds favour with its "non-aligned" friends'.   While Leon's comment is rather unsympathetic to the government's predicament, it sums up a problem that the South African government faces.  The government would like to encourage increased investment and development assistance from the West, but at the same time does not want to alienate its non-Western allies.  This means that the response to the events of September 11 had to be unequivocal in their condemnation of these acts of violence, but cautious in giving unconditional support for the subsequent actions of the United States government.  The statements made by the South African government  were thus carefully constructed to portray a message that would hopefully satisfy the United States but not antagonise non-Western allies of the South African government. The responses given by COSATU and the SACP are perhaps a better indication of the true feelings of the alliance with regard to the events surrounding September 11.  These feelings are of dismay at the loss of life that occurred on September 11, but caution with regard to support of US actions in Afghanistan, and, indeed, US policy in general. 

The two largest South African opposition groupings, the DA and the IFP, are both avowedly pro-America and American-style democracy.  This is reflected in their responses to the events of September 11.  Both parties were keen to align themselves on the United States' side in the 'war' against terrorism, and neither party was willing to tolerate ambiguity in responding to the attacks.  The DA and the IFP appeared to endorse Bush's (2001a) comments that 'Around the world, the nations must choose. They are with us, or they're with the terrorists'.  The DA and IFP clearly would like to be on the United States' side in a war Buthelezi (2001) described as being 'between any established, organised and civilised society operating under the rule of law, and forces which are inimical to the values of civilisation, progress, and law and order'.

The events of September 11 have fundamentally altered the way we see the world.  The end of the Cold War saw the end of the polarisation of the world into two distinctive camps based on ideology, but it appears that a new polarisation is emerging - between those committing or supporting terrorism, and those opposing it.  United States President George W. Bush has tried to create a clear dividing line between these two camps, arguing that the choice is between being on the side of the United States or of being on the side of the terrorists.  The former camp is constructed as being good and noble and right, while the latter is evil and depraved.  For example, Bush (2001b,  2001c) describes the war against terrorism as being 'a monumental struggle of good versus evil' and says that 'Freedom and fear are at war'.  Bush (2001c) assures the American people that victory is certain because 'Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them'.  The world is told to choose between 'the path of peace or the path of terror' (Bush 2001d).  The Americans and their allies are described as 'freedom's home' (Bush 2001e) and the 'civilised world' while their opponents are 'ruthless enemies' and 'killers' (Bush 2001d).

How can South Africa respond to this dichotomy?  South Africa's history makes most South Africans aware that it is not always easy to distinguish between two opposing sides, and also that it is very easy for the powerful to begin naming all their enemies 'terrorists'. This historical context is likely to have made members of the South African government cautious about endorsing Bush's dichotomous thinking.  In addition, South Africa has many allies who are not so keen to position themselves on the side of the United States.  Such allies may feel alienated if South Africa was to repeatedly and absolutely support the United States' attempt to divide the world into terrorist killers and brave warriors of freedom.  Despite the above, the South African government is also very aware of how important it is for South Africa to have the support of the United States government and its allies.  South Africa is one of the countries at the forefront of an attempt to ignite the process of African renewal through a programme known as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).  This programme depends on the support of the industrialised world, and thus South Africa cannot afford to antagonise Western countries by being unwilling to clearly align themselves on the side of the United States in this war.  The South African government's cautious and tempered support for the United States is thus an attempt to reconcile these conflicting demands. 

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by Sally Matthews
Assistant Lecturer, Department of Political Sciences,
University of Pretoria, South Africa

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