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Fortsetzung: The Case for Deterrence in the Anti-terror Campaign

Weston S. Konishi

Reviewing Previous Responses to Terrorism

A review of major terrorist acts against the United States since 1983 underscores the trend in the past U.S. responses to terrorism (see Appendix).

As the review shows, the U.S. military response to past terrorist attacks against U.S. targets has been minimal at best. Indeed, in most cases, the United States only took legal measures to arrest and prosecute those who were responsible.

A number of observations can be drawn from the chart of terrorist incidents:

- The United States, both under the Republican and the Democratic administrations, responded to acts of terrorism predominantly with law enforcement options.

- Although the United States had some success arresting and convicting terrorists, this approach failed to deter further terrorist activities.

- Despite terrorist attacksthat were launched fairly regularly against U.S. between 1983 and 2001, corresponding military responses—when taken—involved only minor use of U.S. military assets.

- Although Washington considered regimes in Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iran and Iraq to be either behind terrorist attacks or providing safe havens for terrorist groups with global reach, it never sought the removal the regimes in these countries.

In sum, the U.S. response to past terrorist attacks was predominantly legal in nature and rarely incorporated overt military action. When military action was taken, it involved only limited military assets. Furthermore, the United States did not make a consistent attempt to unseat regimes supporting terrorist groups that targeted the United States. Libya was the only nation that the United States directly punished in retaliation for terrorist incidents. In contrast, the missile strikes against Afghanistan and the Sudan were primarily targeted at terrorists and their facilities and did not signify a major threat to the survival of the regimes in power.[4]

By mainly prosecuting individuals that were responsible for each incident, the United States essentially abandoned any attempt to deter terrorists and their supporters. More importantly, such a legal-oriented response signaled to terrorist groups that the United States would not attempt to eliminate them, and thereby might have emboldened groups like Al Qaeda. The arrest of terrorists might have caused operational disruptions but terrorists had little reason to fear military reprisals for their actions. Nor would terrorists have had much reason to fear states on the basis of their superpower status. The success of the Mujahedeen in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan is likely to have convinced Osama bin Laden and his followers that superpowers were not invincible—in fact, far from it.

A New U.S. Response to Terror

The terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland on September 11 last year fundamentally changed the U.S. response to terrorism. Today, terrorism is no longer considered a threat that is best handled by law enforcement.[5] In fact, the U.S. government and public now regard terrorism as a clear and present threat against the Unites States. Homeland security has become the top priority in the national security agenda, as illustrated by the creation of the Office of Homeland Security and the recently proposed Department of Homeland Security.

As a result, the future U.S. response to terrorist attacks is likely to include large-scale military action. Law enforcement will still have a large role to play in counterterrorism activities, but it will not be the sole approach to the terrorist problem. In fact, the law enforcement community, in particular the FBI, will also shift its focus from criminal investigation to the prevention of future terrorist attacks.

Not only has the approach to counterterrorism changed, but also the resources devoted to defeating terrorism have dramatically increased. Throughout the campaign in Afghanistan, the United States, along with its allies, has deployed a full range of ground, sea, and air forces to the Central Asia region. Most notably, the United States has been willing to deploy vast numbers of troops, peaking at about 60,000 U.S. troops, to engage Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani border.[6] Such a significant deployment of force is unprecedented in previous U.S. responses to terrorism and represents a concerted effort to deter potential terrorist threats in the future.[7] The campaign in Afghanistan also represents the implementation of an ongoing initiative by the Bush administration to develop new forms of deterrence to counter asymmetrical security concerns.[8] The success of applying overwhelming military force to deter terrorist activities will depend on the corresponding response from both terrorist groups and states that support or harbor terrorists.

Will Deterrence Work Against Terrorists?

The United States has never attempted to deter terrorists through military force and there is no track record to measure the success (or failure) of the current deterrence strategy. Another complicating matter is the fact that, as the Bush administration has repeatedly cautioned, success against terrorists will not be as obvious as conventional military confrontations nor the victories as definitive as in the past.

Still, some may argue that the absence of another terrorist attack, as of this writing, against the U.S. homeland indicates that the deterrence strategy is working. Others may also argue that terrorists are ultimately undeterred, despite military action that has severely disrupted and damaged terrorist networks and facilities.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons that suggest that the deterrence strategy may provide positive results in the long term.

First, terrorists are now experiencing an unprecedented existential threat from the United States. In the past, terrorists functioned with the assumptionthat U.S. legal measures might disrupt their activities, but not pose a serious threat to their very existence. The ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia demonstrates a clear U.S. commitment to completely eliminate Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups with global reach. Just as the threat of terrorism has never been as dangerous as it is today, so too has it never been as dangerous to be a terrorist.

Second, since terrorists function in the world of power and have an acute understanding of its capabilities, it is possible that terrorist groups could develop a renewed respect for the military superiority of the United States. That is not to say that terrorists will completely abandon their causes, but they may be forced to accept the futility of objectives such as creating a fundamentalist Islam that dominates the West. It is one thing to be aware of the military superiority of a nation; it is quite another to be the target of such a military force.

Third, terrorist leaders may not be able to sustain followers after they suffer repeated setbacks and defeats. Al Qaeda, for instance, has long known only success, not failure. The fall of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the destruction of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11 symbolize dramatic victories that lent credibility to Osama bin Laden’s leadership. However, it is uncertain whether Al Qaeda can remain robust in the face of humiliating defeats at the hands of allied forces in Afghanistan. If bin Laden is alive, it is also possible that Al Qaeda rank-and-file will lose faith in a once charismatic leader who is now all but emasculated.

On the other hand, there are several reasons that suggest that deterrence can never be effectively implemented against terrorists themselves. Indeed, the bombing of U.S. consulate in Karachi on June 14, 2002 may suggest that even a full-scale military operation may have barely dampened the terrorists' zeal for indiscriminate destruction.

Deterrence only works if potential enemies are fearful of death or other severe consequences—the suicidal nature of many terrorists demonstrates a willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice (death) for their cause. Militant Islamic groups make little distinction between the present and the afterlife and are therefore spiritually prepared to accept death as an inevitable outcome of their activities. In fact, death for their cause is glorified, as those who die “in action” are considered martyrs.

The almost fanatic religious devotion of terrorists to their cause may also prevent a rational assessment of deterrent factors. Militant Islamic groups, for instance, see their fight as one of holy jihad against the Judeo-Christian Western world. Such a religious devotion to violence overrides rational calculations and thus makes it virtually impossible to persuade terrorists to abandon their cause, even in the face of overwhelming firepower.

Finally, by amassing overwhelming force against terrorists, the United States and its allies may actually be feeding into an embattled mentality of the terrorists by intensifying their hatred.[9] Such a mentality may actually augment a sense of mission and camaraderie—both important factors in the will to fight despite overwhelming odds.

[4] Kenneth Katzman writes: “The August 20, 1998 cruise missile strikes against the bin Laden network in Afghanistan represented a U.S. strike against a group, not a state sponsor. The related strike on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan could have been intended as a signal to Sudan to sever any remaining ties to bin Laden” (37).
[5] According to Katzman: “Legal action against terrorist groups and state sponsors had become an increasingly large component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, although the September 11 attacks and U.S. military response has, to some extent, diminished support among observers for this option” (42). See also Richard A. Best, Jr., who writes that: “The use of law enforcement mechanisms against international threats may also imply that non-legal instruments, such as military force or a covert action by an intelligence agency, are less important and can be deemphasized. Questioning this assumption, observers argue that some important international outcomes are utterly unobtainable through judicial processes” (3).
[6] As Michael E. O’Hanlon writes: “At their peak, the U.S. forces involved in the war effort numbered no more than 60,000 (about half of which were in the Persian Gulf), and Western allies added no more than 15,000” (48).
[7] See “Campaign Against Terrorism: A Coalition Update” on the White House website. The report states that the international coalition against terrorism has two long-term objectives: “to do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism; [and] to deter states from supporting, harbouring or acting complicity with international terrorist groups.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/campaignagainstterrorism.pdf
[8] See the senate testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on October 4, 2001 explaining the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a review of security threats and U.S. force capabilities. Wolfowitz states: “To contend with surprise and the challenge of asymmetric threats, we also need a new approach to deterrence. The threats we face in the 21^st Century will be multifaceted—our deterrence strategy must be as well. Just as we intend to build “layered defenses” to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of “layered deterrence” in which we develop a mix of capabilities—both offensive and defensive—which can dissuade and deter a variety of emerging threats at different stages.” http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/ terror/01100414.htm
[9] According to Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, critics of military action “. . . argue that such action inflates terrorists’ sense of importance and facilitates their recruitment efforts. A 1999 U.S. study of the sociology and psychology of terrorism states that ‘counterterrorist military attacks against elusive terrorists may serve only to radicalize large sectors of the Muslim population and damage the U.S. image worldwide’” (12).

Fortsetzung: The Case for Deterrence in the Anti-terror Campaign