Fortsetzung: What should be done by states, civil society and international organisations to create a society minimising the risk of terrorism?

Richard Williams

Short-term responses

The short-term response to the issue of international terrorism will primarily be a military and security based one. Steps must be taken to disrupt and disjoint terrorist organisations through targeting their logistical / weapon supply and areas of sanctuary. Of course this does not simply mean the use of armed force, but that of intelligence and domestic law-enforcement as appropriate. Within the Clauswitzian conception, military force or the threat of its use is a political tool. As such, whilst military power will carry a distinct bearing and influence, it exists within the policy makers wider arsenal. It is not a fungible tool, where it carries value is in its immediate impact and the signals it carries.  

International society can use military force in three main ways to minimise the likelihood of future terrorist attacks. Firstly, as has been done in Afghanistan it can be used to attack the most overt symbols of terrorist organisations. This will be most appropriate where the local state is unwilling or unable to act accordingly. The changed political climate since September 11^th, with seemingly both a greater, at least vocal, willingness shown by a range of states to co-operate with the international community against terrorist groups, and the tensions created by the Afghan operations, makes further operations of this type unlikely, although in future they may again occur. 

The American 'axis of evil' rhetoric whilst raising the spectre of further military action, particularly in respect of Iraq, has perhaps had the opposite effect. By generating much debate on the nature of the terror threat and crystallising discomfort of US 'hyper-power' and fears of possible uni-lateralism, amongst allies, alternatives have evolved and been given momentum. Certainly whilst the Middle East remains a significant problem, new consensus has begun to appear on issues such as the Iraqi sanctions regime and development in the Caspian basin.

This then leads on to the second use of armed forces, to support local allied forces through direct intervention or training and logistical support. The break down of law and order is often a key component in the collapse of state institutions and the rise of the 'failed state' phenomena. Whilst preventing a state from collapsing is primarily a matter of diplomacy, political support and economic support, military support can create greater time for these aspects to take affect. The OSCE monitoring force in Macedonia during the Bosnian war was an unheralded example of how a pre-emptive international commitment could stabilise a tense environment; albeit a force withdrawn too early. The deployment of US forces to Basilan in the southern Philippines has been on a similar, yet more combat orientated basis. Greater efforts, through the provision of personnel, equipment and training, should be made to support democratic states such as Nepal, which find themselves with clear and present threats to their stability which external military support would assist with.

The third use of military forces, touches on the second but extends it further. Greater use needs to be made of multi-national UN stabilisation forces either to pre-empt conflicts or to create post-conflict environments which prevent the institutions of emergent or re-emergent states from being stifled at birth by internal or indeed external pressures. Experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and now with Afghanistan have created a useful corpus which should be developed and drawn upon. The responsible UN bodies need to be strengthened and troops sought from as wide a cross section of member states as possible to strengthen the multi-national dynamic.

Whilst it would be impolitic to suggest that this multi-national approach should lead to less developed states providing manpower whilst others provide command and control facilities, reaction force capability and logistical support, there is perhaps scope for greater specialisation. Three core areas are worthy of focused development by the international community. Firstly, training both for line and commissioned personnel committed to forces under UN auspices or mandates needs to be strengthened and based upon certain common principals. The Pearson Centre in Canada provides an example of a useful facility for shaping thought in this area. Certainly a UN centre of best practice, coupled to the use of a range of centres such as Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, the main centre for British officer basic training, which accommodates many overseas personnel, for shorter taster courses, should be considered. The creation or enhancement of training teams at national level amongst troop providing countries, either made up of experienced local personnel or foreign trainers would be useful for giving force wide training in the tasks associated with, and the skills required for, peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations.

Secondly in the realm of logistical support there is scope for reform. Albeit under immediate and real threat, NATO created simple frameworks of, for example, commonality in radio interoperability, small arms ammunition, fuel labelling and other basic elements enabling greater force integration. Admittedly, the search for commonality was often the bane of NATO policy makers, but there must be scope for the UN Department of Peacekeeping operations to lay down, after appropriate discussion,certain basic guides. In addition, with missions such as UNAMIR or UNPROFOR, troop commitment by some countries has been partially dependent on the provision of equipment by other states. This has led, for example, to undignified haggling over the price and shipping arrangements for second-hand armoured personnel carriers, which has only served to delay deployments and handicap operations. These arrangements need to be formalised and strengthened, so that the allegation that some states use UN operations as the means of equipping their forces at the expense of others, whilst other states can off-load unwanted or obsolescent equipment at marked up prices, must finally be put to rest. Creating a central listing of forces declared by states to the UN, with their readiness states, would allow for swifter deployment and a greater appreciation of the steps and time needed to bring troops into action.

Thirdly, greater integration of support functions needs to be considered. Headquarters units for UN operations are at present created on an ad hoc basis. The UN already has a permanent military staff and within this should be created embryonic deployable headquarters teams. Whilst many slots would have to remain open for specific personnel from contributing states, this greater familiarity would lead to greater efficiency in the command structure.  This would also enable particular assets such as US airlift capabilities, European logistical support or particular regional knowledge, such as using Nigerian personnel in regard to West Africa, to be linked, and perhaps therefore more often committed, through permanent liaison staff in both New York and within the Headquarters teams.

Having outlined the manner in which military forces should serve as a means of international stabilisation, some words of warning are necessary. Firstly, the growing technological advantage enjoyed by the United States has made it increasingly difficult for allied armed forces to operate alongside their forces. Already a division of labour is beginning to appear with US forces launching the attacks on terrorist targets and other forces serving in support or follow-up capacities. This has political consequences for the manner in which military operations are planned and carried out. Unless other major states take steps to narrow the opening gulf in capabilities brought about by the increasing movement by the US to 'information lead warfare', the US will increasingly launch operations without the need, incentive or indeed ability, to involve allies. Certainly, allies cannot be critical of the US for failing to take action or of not involving them in action, when they themselves have made conscious policy decisions to deny themselves the ability to act likewise. European states in particular, may not wish to raise their defence spending to US levels, but must coherently ponder how increased spending may better create a synergy of military capabilities with political rhetoric. 'Burden sharing' is a charged demand but certainly in areas such strategic airlift, European states cannot continue to avoid the implications of negating monetary cost by a reliance on US capabilities. This can only have detrimental implications to any attempts to create a concerted international response to terrorism.

Secondly, as discussed earlier, military force is a political tool and cannot be viewed as a solution in itself. The application of military force can achieve limited success against certain aspects of terrorist organisations. In most circumstances it can only act as an adjunct to wider, longer term, solutions. Other short term solutions such as greater control of the international banking system, through perhaps an extended oversight role for the proposed 'Basle 2' capital requirement regulatory system should also be considered. Certainly all major states should bring forward rapid ratification of existing UN conventions on terrorism particularly the 1999 Convention on financial transactions. A concerted international effort to minimise the risk of terrorism must focus on its wider aspects and causes, something military force is ill able to do.

Short-term economic steps

The short term economic steps that can be taken would also extend into the longer term solutions to the problem. The United States has already looked to place economic sanctions on states it regards as sponsoring terrorism and indeed these are automatically mandated by Congress when a state is added by the State Department to its listing. Unfortunately the arbitrary inclusion of the marginal case of Cuba for political purposes more related to the electoral balance of Florida than the balance of evidence, weakens this system. However, its controls on private business between the US and listed states provides a useful model that could be adopted at international level. Particularly useful would be the mandating of greater transparency in international business, through additional disclosure rules for those wishing to list on American or European bourses or raise finance in international capital markets. A wider code of conduct, bringing about some agreed global standards of best practice overarching what weaker jurisdictions may demand, amongst financial and professional services firms, which operate at an international level, would also make it easier to monitor those companies trading with or working in dubious states or with questionable companies.  

The current international system is heavily state centric and the Westphalian paradigm that lies at its core has been little changed for over 350 years. Thus in seeking long-term solutions to the threat of international terrorism the question of how far the established system is as fault and flawed must be raised. Certainly the rise of international organisations and non-state actors has started to break down elements of the paradigm. Current international law, whilst embodying supranational authority remains based on the concepts of state actors. The implications of the rise of al-Qaida for the international order are mixed. Whilst the destruction caused was a cogent demonstration of the growing power of non-state groups, the terrorists regarding themselves as members of a wider non-state Islamic polity, the immediate US response has seemed to reinforce the pre-eminence of states in their ability to mobilise resources and military power. Thus accepting that the existing state system must be the basis for a response to September 11^th some regard to the evolving international order must be taken into account.

Having accepted that a revolutionary re-thinking of the international system is not a valid basis upon which to proceed, several possible avenues of approach are open. The status quo is unsustainable. Whilst short term, primarily military solutions, without wider change, may appear tempting, these will do little to deal with the grievances, economic and political which lie at the heart of international terror. These grievances are about distributions of political and economic power and the disparities which exist as a result. Whilst these may adopt religious, ethnic and other insinuations, and can be intensified and animated by such factors, the core causations hold true. The al-Qaida demands, post-September 11^th, regarding Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the composition of the Saudi regime, whilst coloured and shaped by the motivations of Islamic fundamentalism, are issues of political control and freedom from external political influence. ETA in Spain and the LTTE in Sri Lanka (admittedly most elements of the Tigers' campaign constitute conventional and guerrilla warfare rather than actions that could be classified as terrorism) both campaign from grievances related to political control of ethnic space, and the Shining Path in Peru has launched urban terror attacks related to the political and economic concerns of disenchanted peasantry. Given that the existing system has created and continues to sustain these disparities, some degree of change is necessary.

The global leadership role adopted by an axis based upon, the democratic members of the UN Permanent Five, Group of Seven and EU provides a key reason for the grievances being focused upon these states, as by implication they must bear responsibility for the failings of the system. And therein lies the crux of the matter. It is the political and other policies of these states which stimulates grievances from other international actors. A danger therefore is that of recoiling and reducing engagement with world issues. Leading developed states could increase trade amongst themselves, reduce dependency upon oil and other raw material imports, end international aid, bring military and technical assistance missions home and generally develop a benign ignorance in respect of much of Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. In its articulation this course of action betrays its untenable nature. The history of the international system has been predicated upon increasing engagement and increasingly globalised attitudes to problems. In addition this process would do little to placate existing grievances. It would end some political controversies such as the presence of Western forces in the Gulf, but would serve only to crystallise the existing economic order and remove from lesser-developed states the opportunity to reach developed state levels.       

Therefore greater international engagement must be the basis of securing an international society able to minimise the impact and possibility of terrorism. This must be based upon the creation of the means of safely venting political and economic grievances both within and between states, and formal frameworks that make these developments sustainable. The much maligned post-Cold War, 'Clinton' doctrine's underpinning principles remain valid; the liberal democratic values of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and the securing of individual freedoms. That is not to say that local circumstance, history or culture is inappropriate, a Single Transferable Vote, constituency based electoral system is unlikely to be the best solution for post-conflict Afghanistan. President Museveni of Uganda has described the immediate post Cold-war Western policies as 'not only meddling but meddling on the basis of ignorance and, of course, some arrogance also.' Thus as the United States engages with non-aligned and Third World states it should be robust and aggressively proactive in defence of the values it would espouse but also humble and willing to learn. Cultural sensitivity and understanding must be key. The same holds true for states such as the United Kingdom and other EU members who would espouse similar values and means of diffusing grievances.

There are three imperatives which must shape the long-term response of international society to terrorism, those of development and dialogue, but firstly that of democracy. This is within the context of both intra-state and inter-state institutional systems. Regimes without systematic guarantees of democracy and associated guarantees of political and civic rights will serve as fertile soil for the nurturing of grievances. Where the support of these regimes, such as some Gulf and Central Asian states by the United States has occurred it has only served to give these grievances a potent international dynamic directed at the United States. Thus developed states must be unrepentant in challenging states to secure systems of government based upon popular representation with checks and balances, such as protection for minority rights and functioning legal systems. This can be achieved both through semi-coercive pressure but also through the establishment of programmes to foster and assist embryonic institutions. Developed states must be willing to provide timely aid to emergent states, supporting their words and ideals with strident action. The creation of institutions can however only be representative of the creation of wider civil societies able to absorb and reshape destructive tendencies that might emerge from them. The situation in Kashmir, as Sumit Ganguly from the University of Texas, has persuasively argued, is exemplar of heightened democratic appetites not being matched by the development of these associated institutions and civic society.

The practical implications of a greater emphasis on democratisation and protection of rights and values are challenging and not a little overwhelming. Certainly in the short term it would be likely to increase international instability and create more grievances than it would solve. However the underpinning principles can be disentangled from the dangers of accusations of political and cultural imperialism. Iran is a state that is no friend of the United States, yet it has a developing parliamentary system, whilst the Arab al-Jazeera satellite TV station is a strong example of freedom of speech in action. It is likely to be a slow and Fabian process to establish these values.

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