Fortsetzung: The Case for Deterrence in the Anti-terror Campaign
Weston S. Konishi
Deterrence at the State Level
If deterrence against terrorists themselves proves implausible, it is more likely that the United States and its allies will find greater success in deterring states that harbor or support terrorists. Such a conventional state-to-state deterrence strategy was practiced by the United States throughout the Cold War and is significantly less complex than attempting to deter groups and individuals who are difficult to trace and identify. Yet, over time, this deterrence may prove to reign in terrorists and limit their ability to carry out large-scale activities around the world.
Deterrence at the state-level has long been a foundation of international relations. In the broadest sense, deterrence is meant to convince a potential foe that belligerent behavior will be met with a response that makes the costs of such behavior outweigh the benefits. In the context of counterterrorism, a deterrence strategy must include the option of removing from power a regime that either directly or indirectly supports terrorist groups.[10] In the face of this strategy, the regimes that once relied on alliances with terror groups for survival may begin to see these groups as liabilities that they cannot afford to sustain. States may then be compelled to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism, much like the case of Yemen and Sudan.
There are manifold benefits of employing a state-level deterrence strategy in the war on terrorism. Of immediate value is that deterrence pressures states to cooperate in counterterrorism measures, such as incarcerating known terrorists and restricting their movement across borders. Further, states can destroy terror-training camps that are critical for planning and launching large-scale attacks in other nations. States also have enhanced surveillance abilities to monitor terrorist groups within their borders, and can do so in ways that are less intrusive than covert U.S. activities.
Perhaps most importantly, focusing a deterrence strategy on states prevents the war on terrorism from developing into an entirely unconventional and asymmetrical conflict, pitting states against groups and individuals. Such a conflict provides opportunities for terrorists to seek shelter under sovereign states and makes the task of identifying and targeting terrorists extremely complex. The United States has historically been least effective when it tried to directly punish terrorists instead of the states that harbored terrorists, such as when the United States launched missile strikes against Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998.
It is therefore critical for the success of a state-oriented deterrence strategy that the United States establish an indisputable link between terrorists and states that support or willingly harbor terrorists. From the outset of the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has claimed such a link and has used it as justification for the invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban regime. Had the Taliban not been so eager to protect Osama bin Laden and his group, the United States would have likely found it more difficult to justify military operations in Afghanistan.
Similarly, a dilemma will arise if states wish to hand over terrorists but are not capable of doing so alone. In such cases, the United States will find it difficult to launch military strikes against terrorist groups without damaging the sovereign integrity of friendly states and inflaming anti-American sentiment. The current situation in the Philippines is a case in point. In order to assist the Philippine government’s campaign against the Islamic separatist group Abu Sayyaf, the United States has had to send military advisors to train Philippine troops in counterinsurgency measures—as opposed to deploying U.S. forces for direct combat against Abu Sayyaf elements.
Ensuring a Successful Deterrence Strategy
Although a deterrence strategy is only credible when backed up by force, a successful deterrence strategy must be carefully and prudently implemented. The following are key factors that must be considered in order to sustain a credible and effective deterrence strategy in the anti-terror campaign:
- Regard terrorism as a national security problem, not simply a law enforcement issue. Terrorists are increasingly capable of inflicting damage at a level that was previously only seen in interstate warfare. The United States and its allies must regard terrorism as a serious threat to national security rather than merely a form ofcriminal activity.
- Maintain the will to use force. A deterrence strategy cannot maintain credibility if states lose the will to implement military power. For example, terrorists will be emboldened if they perceive significant fractures in the U.S. will to fight.
- Provide ampleresources. Restricting resources in the anti-terror campaign is equally damaging to the credibility of deterrence as losing the will to fight. Terrorists and their supporters must see that no expense will be spared in the effort to eliminate terrorism.
- Maintain international support. It bears repeating that the United States cannot combat terrorism alone. The United States must rely on allies and coalitions of nations to deter terrorists. Although the United States has unparalleled force projection capabilities, it cannot deploy forces without the cooperation of allies. Further, other nations should be able to apply their own unique assets to the anti-terror campaign.
- Establish and maintain indisputable link between terrorists and states that harbor terrorists. Unconventional warfare augments the advantages of asymmetrical threats. By linking terrorists with states, the war on terrorism can be fought on a conventional level.
- A comprehensive deterrence strategy. Overwhelming military retaliation against certain terror groups, such as Al Qaeda, should not be an exception. Deterrence will only succeed if other terror groups are convinced that they will suffer equally severe consequences for their actions.
By the same token, a deterrence strategy will fail or backfire under the following circumstances:
- Military power is applied indiscriminately and excessively. The United States must provide a reasonable burden of proof to justify military action against suspected terrorists and their supporters. Once action is taken, the United States must ensure that the degree of firepower is overwhelming but not beyond reasonable parameters.
- The United States loses moral ground in the fight against terrorism. Indiscriminate and/or excessive use of force will undermine the legitimacy of U.S. actions. In such a case, the United States would likely lose international support for its campaign and undermine the foundations of preexisting alliances.
- Allies are unduly coerced. Washington should avoid coercing allies to gain support for certain contingencies. Such coercion will create resentment and can fracture international coalitions.
- Regime-change leads to failed states and chaos. If the United States forces a belligerent regime out of power, it must do all that is necessary to ensure that a successive regime is an improvement over the last. Further, the United States must take responsibility for the development and functioning of the newly administered state and bear its due share in reconstruction efforts.
- Foregoing carrots for sticks. The United States should combine deterrence with engagement, providing incentives to groups and states that cooperate in the effort to defeat terrorism. Engagement can in fact supplement deterrence by emphasizing the benefits of curbing aggressive actions.
[10] This approach is outlined in the Bush administration’s 2001 QDR. The QDR recommends a force structure that would allow for two major conflicts: one in which U.S. forces would replace a regime and occupy its capital; and another in which U.S. forces would repel and defeat adversaries (but not necessarily depose the regime in power). Wolfowitz explains that: “Since neither aggressor would know in which conflict the President might choose to occupy a capital—and where we might choose to simply repel and defeat an act of aggression—the prospect of a total defeat would remain a strong deterrent.”
Fortsetzung: The Case for Deterrence in the Anti-terror Campaign
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