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Fortsetzung: What should be done by states, civil society and international organisations to create a society minimising the risk of terrorism?

Richard Williams

Democratic Values

There is a further key component to the democratic imperative. Firstly, there must be a realisation that democracies can and will on occasion behave in aggressive and terroristic manners; the Kantian proposition that democracies do not go to war is weak, de Toqueville's warnings on the slowness and over reaction of the democratic mode of foreign policy making holds. Secondly, to reflect and minimise this and to balance the hegemony of developed states, the international system must embody 'democratic' values. An international civil society predicated on protection of minority rights and the rule of law must emerge. Within this context grievances can be aired and resolved without the frustration, which might cause a resort to force. The International Criminal Court and a greater emphasis on the enforcement of existing treaties and conventions would serve to provide a useful basis from which to develop these stronger frameworks. Much as the more powerful states can influence and guide weaker states, an emergent framework of more enforceable international law would serve to do likewise for the powerful states. Through creating a more just and equitable international society, grievances can be defused.

Development goals

The 'development' imperative must be closely integrated into this political approach. International trade and economic policies having increasingly taken on a global form, through the ubiquitous process of 'globalisation'. Economic models over the last half century, such as the Rostow model of 1960s have lamentably failed to solve many of the disparities that generate grievances. Recent trends have also ominously seen faltering economic growth in regions such as the Middle-East and South-East Asia from where, when combined with existing grievances further terror attacks could emerge. Firstly, the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation, which has unfortunately now lost much of its momentum, must be used to re-think how tariffs and protection can foster development. Developed states have been able to seek out less overt forms of subsidy, particularly for agriculture. Indeed, states such as Ghana, formerly with a productive agricultural sector, have seen it eroded by cheaper Western imports. States such as India and China have been able to mobilise investment capital through productive agriculture making it a route to development and exemplar of wider issues. If the EU and Japan can argue the social benefits of agricultural subsidy how much more should developing states be able to retain wider tariffs on imports on the grounds of much greater social benefits.

Secondly, a key underpinning element to economic growth is the creation of infrastructure, such as education, healthcare and transport. Developed states should focus on enabling the development of these factors, providing debt relief and aid as appropriate. That said, these factors should not be viewed as ends in themselves. Whilst welfare structures can do much to pacify grievances, increasing affluence through economic growth must follow. The third element of the development imperative, is the vexed issue of aid, both from states and NGOs. Aid is a potent and vital means of global wealth redistribution. Developed states should seek to meet or exceed the United Nations target for international aid provision. This aid should not be tied, in the traditional manner, to particular contracts or support in particular political forums, but to the political frameworks already outlined. In addition, whilst the proposed 'Tobin tax' on international financial transactions is not the holy grail that the anti-globalisation lobby would argue, being more useful for smoothing short term market fluctuations, similar levies would provide a useful and relatively unobtrusive means of raising finance for aid purposes. NGOs, whilst continuing their important impartial work must also become more aware, after the failings of Rwanda and Bosnia, that they exist within wider contexts of international civic society and its aims. Too often these organisations have acted, without any form of accountability, at cross-purposes to those of the wider international community.

Dialogue

The 'dialogue' imperative is perhaps the most nebulous of the three. Much has been made of the social and cultural aspects of recent terrorist attacks, leading some to adopt 'the clash of civilisations' thesis. As has already been discussed, whilst social and cultural elements are important many terrorist spawning grievances have concrete political or economic causes. That said, efforts must be made to reduce tension and misunderstanding between differing groups. A sense of collective grievance does exist within the Islamic world against Western, especially US policies, much as similar mis-understandings have developed in the opposite direction. Notions of 'otherness' will be used as conceptual tools to define problems. The rise of the global media system has perhaps worsened this, as a regrettable 'Anglo-Saxon' sound-bite culture has reduced depths of understanding and created bastardised and simplistic representations of differing systems and cultures. Efforts must be made to defuse cultural tensions through an active realisation that real depths of mutual understanding must be created. As states seek to develop internal democratic 'public spheres', international society must seek to create a 'public sphere' built on cultural understanding. Education and attempts to bridge these cultural and racial gulfs can over time bring alleviation of tension; recent statistics for the United Kingdom show that some 50% of those of Afro-Caribbean descent marry partners of European extraction, something unthinkable only two or three decades ago.

Rogue States

Thus, three key areas give pointers on how international society can seek to minimise the grievances which breed international terrorism. Two immediate case studies give some guidance of how in practice these would develop in the medium to long term. Firstly, there is the issue of 'rogue' states, those countries unwilling to engage with the international system and focused on pursuing stances often opposed to those of Western states. Therein lies part of the problem, any international action will cause accusations of neo-colonialism (often partly justifiable) to abound, creating grievances it itself. The Afghan experience has demonstrated that abandoning these states to their own devices in a globalised international system is unsustainable. States such as Iraq, Myanmar, North Korea (a state already with a particular history of international terrorism) and Zimbabwe cannot be allowed to be international disturbers of the peace and yet then expect to remain integrated elements of the international system in bodies from the UN to FIFA. The EU's, seemingly insignificant decisions to sponsor Burmese membership of the International Hydrological Organisation and allow entry to France for an Interpol meeting of a dubious senior Zimbabwean police officer, carried the wrong messages to those regimes, and were failures by the EU to maintain coherent disapproval. As a brief aside, having mentioned FIFA, given the Blatter debacle, there is also much scope to increase accountability and reduce the democratic deficit within the plethora of organisations, such as sporting organisations, which exist on the fringes of the formal structures of the international community.

Having therefore urged censure of these states, the paradox of both engaging with and isolating them remains. 'No fly' zones and indiscriminate sanctions have been neither productive nor successful, and international society needs to be more intelligent and rounded in its approaches, focusing more on censuring governments and not populations. Hence a focus on exclusion from international organisations which grant respectability must not be at the expense of continuing informal relations. Whilst loans and grants to governments by other states or the IMF etc. must be with-held, scope for developmental aid should be retained. This would constitute an element of wider packages of 'smart sanctions', which must be targeted, enforceable and justifiable, internationally mandated and with a focus on severely penalising any company or firm suspected of breaching them. Behaviour such as that alleged of Belorussians in exporting air-defence equipment to Iraq over the last year, must be treated as a wholly unacceptable flouting of the rule of international law. States that would fail to take action against their citizens in such circumstances should be viewed as co-conspirators and treated internationally as such.

Many in the world would regard the Israeli state as falling into the 'rogue' state category. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a festering wound which has served to create significant grievances against the United States and to a lesser extent her allies, for their support of the Jewish state. The creation of an independent Palestinian state and the return of the Golan to Syria, with appropriate de-militarised buffer zones are now imperative. The eventual Palestine state must be pursued on the basis of the 'democratic' imperative, shaping embryonic institutions and a civic society able to internalise and control grievances. Developmental aid on the basis outlined above would also have to constitute an important component of international strategy. Thus, the United States and importantly other states, such as the Arab League and EU, should place increasing pressure primarily on Israel and but also on the Palestinians to enter substantive final settlement negotiations on the Taba basis. Of course, the breakdown of trust engendered by the Al Aqsa Intifada and Operation Defensive Wall has reached almost terminal levels for any negotiated settlement. At the same time the Israeli state, a strong democracy in internal terms, can be shaped and guided in its policy by developed states and developing international 'democratic' institutions. The Israeli state will continue to exist and that in itself is likely to remain a source of grievance worthy of international terror attacks for some. That said, some form of agreement with the Palestinians would substantially defuse tensions. It would also open the door to settlements with the Syrians and Lebanese. Both states have faced accusations of sponsoring or at least tolerating international terrorist organisations, and a removal of the Arab-Israeli irritant would serve to allow them to normalise their circumstances. Lebanon for example would be able to seek the disbanding of the Hezbollah armed militias, completing the translation of that group into a political party, which indeed already has MPs in the Lebanese Parliament.

The British Experience

Having already drawn upon the British experience of Northern Ireland, some brief discussion in closing of the current nature of British foreign policy in relation to the 'war on terror' in perhaps worthwhile. British policy at present is rather quixotic, particularly in regard to support for the US. The much-vaunted 'special relationship' has often been accused of being a notion grounded more in the yearnings of British policy makers for global influence than any reciprocal trans-Atlantic reality. That said, linguistic and cultural affinities together with historical closeness have moulded a perhaps more charitable and supportive attitude to working alongside the United States than other states may hold. This has led to the very active British role in the first phase of the war in Afghanistan, together with the subsequent troop commitments both to ISAF and the US led combat effort. Strong misgivings exist, particularly on the political left (where it manifests itself as more vocal discontent) and amongst those in the liberal centre, about working so closely and publicly with the United States, carrying as it does a perceived countenancing of the wider ideological positions of the Bush administration. However, certainly at present, the United Kingdom would regard a close relationship with the United States as overwhelmingly more favourable than detrimental to her interests in combating the threat of terrorism. There is an awareness, and perhaps even fear, that this risks a subsummation, either real or perceived, of a distinct British foreign policy identity and agenda into that of United States. British policy makers would dispute the danger of this pointing toward a 'supportive friend' relational model as giving benefits to both parties, whilst maintaining the ability to remain distinct.

This must therefore beg the question as to what this means for wider international co-operation. If, as has often been opined, much as there could be no European single currency without Germany, there can be no European single foreign policy without the United Kingdom, the European Union will continue to wield less political influence than could be expected from its economic power. The Euro-sceptic right in the United Kingdom, argues that a stronger European Union dynamic to foreign policy making would inevitably be at the expense of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Indeed, Will Hutton, an intellectual at the root of Blaritie thought, although now somewhat outside New Labour, has recently argued that greater European co-operation is the needed counter to American conservatism. The Commission proposals of 22^nd May 2002, seeking, as Romano Prodi has argued, an EU that speaks 'with one voice on all aspects of external relations', by proposing, Will Hutton perhaps aside, what is anathema to mainstream British political thought, strengthens the Euro-sceptic hand. Despite this, the creation of a consensus on the issue of terrorism between the United States, the United Kingdom and other EU member states is surely a prerequisite to creating any wider international consensus and therefore the inherent difficulties must be surmounted. Petty, petulant anti-Americanism in Europe is as unhelpful as the accusation that all Europeans are closet anti-Semites. Despite Kyoto, steel tariffs and fears about the unilateralist tendencies of the 'hyper-power', on issues such as democracy and the principles of international trade, and many security issues there is much core agreement. In the context of the current magnitude of threat posed by terrorism there must be scope for greater trans-Atlantic co-operation. Britain is well placed to demonstrate that she is not being pulled in differing directions but acting as a bridge between friends whose common beliefs must surmount their differences.

Thus, as outlined, through a range of concerted actions, policy changes and stronger co-operation, states, civil society and international organisations can seek to create a society minimising the risk of terrorism. This will require short term steps, primarily military and political in form. But more importantly it will require the longer term use of 'democratic', 'development' and 'dialogue' imperatives to establish an international order able to assuage grievances and prevent them manifesting themselves as terrorist acts. The actions required will overwhelmingly focus on states, mostly requiring the 'Western' states to act. These actions will seek a concerted system, but must be culturally sensitive and aware of the short-term tensions and difficulties they may create.

It is however a painful truth that there will always be the dispossessed and disenchanted who will resort to terrorism. International society can only minimise the risk, not eliminate it. Eliminating grievances assists in emaciating the three prerequisites for terrorist groups to function, indeed as the examples above have shown terrorism can be successfully minimised. A more just, open and equitable international order would be a major step forward but the human capacity for destruction and terror may prove unfortunately more durable than we would care to admit.

'It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say. It can happen, and it can happen everywhere.' - Primo Levi

Richard Williams,
Research Fellow, London