Fortsetzung: The Case for Deterrence in the Anti-terror Campaign

Weston S. Konishi

The Future of an Anti-terror Deterrence Strategy

Absent a track record of deterrence against terrorism, it may take years to assess the success or failure of such a strategy. That said, some observers suggest that the military campaign in Afghanistan has already elicited positive developments among a handful of states that have supported terrorism in the past.[11] For instance, top officials in Yemen and Sudan have signaled a willingness to cooperate in the anti-terror campaign. Sudan has followed through with this commitment by arresting Al Qaeda members and closing down terrorist training camps on its soil.

However, a deterrence strategy may also change over time, incorporating new methods and approaches that may or may not be effective. The Bush administration, for instance, is believed to be in the midst of developing a strategy of preemptive strikes against belligerent nations, as reported by the Washington Post on June 10, 2002. It is uncertain whether preemptive strikes will add to the credibility of deterrence by enhancing the risks of being a potential adversary, or if such moves will undermine deterrence by pressuring states into taking extreme and irrational actions. A further question that remains unanswered is whether preemptive U.S. attacks would compromise the nation’s moral authority in the international community, particularly if the strikes involved the use of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction.

The line distinguishing a reasonable deterrence strategy and excessive use of force may in fact become increasingly difficult to determine as the war on terrorism evolves. This will be made all the more difficult as new defense concepts arise in the face of ever-increasing asymmetrical threats. The United States must at all cost avoid crossing over such a line. Yet critics must also recognize that undo restraint of military options will allow terrorist violence to grow exponentially. For if restraint failed to provide sufficient security against increasingly ambitious terrorist threats in the past, the United States and other nations have little choice but to seek a more reliable mode of deterrence for the future.

Works Cited

Best, Richard A. “Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.” CRS Report for Congress. The Library of Congress. December 3, 2001.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Michele A. Flourney. To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism. CSIS: Washington, DC. 2001.

Katzman, Kenneth. “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002.” CRS Report for Congress. The Library of Congress. February 13, 2002.

Lee, Rensselaer and Raphael Perl. “Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” CRS Report for Congress. The Library of Congress. May 30, 2002.

O’Hanlon, Michael E. “A Flawed Masterpiece” Foreign Affairs. May/June 2002. 47-63.

Weston S. Konishi is a program associate at the Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Mansfield Center.

Appendix: Chart of Terrorist Attacks and U.S. Responses (1983-2000)

Sources: The Brookings Institution. Major International Terrorist Attacks. http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/terrorism/ background_major.htm

The Center for Defense Information. Chronology of Major Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Targets. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/chronology.cfm

Frontline: Target America. Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ target/etc/cron.html

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