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South Africa: An Assessment of South African Response to September 11 and the Resulting War on Terrorism

Sally Matthews

by Sally Matthews

1. Introduction

The events of the 11^th of September 2001 shocked the world. Leaders from all corners of the world felt the need to comment upon the attacks on the United States. In the months that followed September 11, world leaders also found it necessary to comment on the way the United States chose to respond to these attacks. The term 'terrorism' was suddenly on everyone's lips, and varying interpretations of what constitutes 'terrorism' and how best to combat this phenomenon were discussed all over the world. South Africa was no exception. The South African government leaders and the leaders of the various political groupings in South Africa were quick to comment on the September 11 attacks and the subsequent actions of the United States. In considering these responses it is important to examine the South African historical context and how it affects contemporary South African thought regarding terrorism, and also to look at South African political dynamics and the way these responses are influenced by and contribute to these dynamics.

2. South Africa's Historical Context Regarding Terrorism

The use of violent tactics to achieve a political goal is very familiar to South Africans who have quite recently emerged from an era where violence was used both by the government to maintain the status quo and by forces antagonistic to the government in attempts to end apartheid. As a result, the term 'terrorism' is certainly not unfamiliar to South Africans. During the apartheid regime, newsreaders frequently reported on the activities of 'terrorists', government officials defended their actions as necessary in order to combat 'terrorists', and the so-called 'terrorists' fought to have their activities recognised as guerilla warfare rather than terrorism. Under the apartheid regime several anti-apartheid movements, including the African National Congress (ANC), its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were banned. The subsequent underground activities of these parties were frequently described by the government as 'terrorist activities'.

This labelling of the members of banned organisations as 'terrorists' was also common practice among conservative South African academics. Consider for example Clifford-Vaughan (1987:271) who in an article entitled Terrorism and Insurgency in South Africa says, 'Terrorism is included among the tactics being used to force the surrender of the present government … The terror campaign in South Africa is carried out, by their own claim, by the African National Congress (ANC) through its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe … Its stated strategy is to destory the existing political, economic and social structure of South Africa by means of (a) political subversion and propoganda; and (b) sabotage and terrorism'. Clifford-Vaughan refers to the ANC's 1969 Strategy and Tactics document in support of his statement that terrorism is a stated strategy of the ANC. However, this document does not describe Umkhonto we Sizwe's strategy as 'terrorism', but rather as guerilla warfare (ANC 1969).

When on trial for sabotage in 1964, Nelson Mandela (1964) repeatedly emphasised that the members of the ANC did not use terrorism in order to try to achieve their goals. Rather, he described their chosen strategies as those of sabotage and guerilla warfare. Furthermore, Mandela (1964) argued that the adoption of such strategies was a result of the apartheid government's frustration of all legitimate peaceful protest, and was in fact an attempt to prevent terrorism, rather than to organise it. At his trial, Mandela said, 'we [those who had initiated the creation of Umkhonto we Sizwe] believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism'.

South Africa's history demonstrates the problems associated with the term 'terrorism'. Because the word is generally understood to have negative connotations, few groups are likely to describe their activities as terrorist activities. As Brewer (1986:106) indicates, governments are often quick to label groups opposing them 'terrorist', while these groups prefer to refer to their tactics as guerilla warfare. This is evident in South Africa's history, where the ANC repeatedly described their activities as guerilla warfare, but the apartheid government preferred to refer to them as 'terrorist activities'.

To further complicate the discussion on terrorism in South Africa's past, the activities of the apartheid state have been referred to as 'state terrorism' (Abel 1995:211-258). The apartheid state's activities included the torture of detainess arrested on various politically related charges, and the murder of people, including children, who were involved in demonstrations against the apartheid state. These and other actions which can be described as 'state terrorism' continued for decades in South Africa.

The discussion above does not provide anything close to a comprehensive discussion of the use of the term 'terrorism' to refer to activities occuring during the apartheid era, but it does introduce two important points with regard to this article. Firstly, it demonstrates the ambiguities and subjectivities that complicate the use of the term 'terrorism'. While many definitions of terrorism have been attempted, it is impossible to define terrorism in such a way that activities and groups can easily be sorted into 'terrorist' and 'not terrorist' categories. Secondly, South Africa's history informs the way that contemporary South African politicians respond to so-called terrorist activities. Many of South Africa's contemporary politicians are members of political organisations which were described by the apartheid government as being 'terrorist' organisations. This makes such politicians cautious with regard to the labelling of groups or activities as 'terrorist'.

3. An Overview Of South African Responses To September 11

The first official government statement on the September 11 attacks described them as 'terror attacks'. This statement says that President Mbeki learnt 'with shock and dismay' of the attacks and that the South African government 'joins the world in unreservedly denouncing these senseless and horrific attacks' (The Presidency, South Africa 2001). Furthermore, the South African government expressed 'its confidence that the United States' authorities will ensure the perpetrators face the full might of the law'. The response by the ANC-dominated South African government, was echoed by the ANC's official response which was also one of absolute condemnation (ANC 2001). The South African government and the ANC both clearly aligned themselves with the United States with regard to seeing the attacks as the illegitimate and atrocious acts of terrorists. However, the government had some reservations with regard to the way in which the United States chose to respond to the attacks. On the United States' military actions in Afghanistan, the government reaffirmed 'its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks on various cities of the USA' and recognised the right of the United States to 'seek out those responsible for those acts of terror', but spoke of the need for 'hard evidence' to precede harsh actions, and of the importance of caution to prevent the deaths of civilians (Department of Foreign Affairs 2001). Thus the South African government's official response to the September 11 attacks can be said to be one of outright condemnation of these attacks, but not one of absolute support for the actions of the United States government in response.

While this was the official response of the government, certain government officials appeared to be a little ambiguous and uncertain in commenting on these attacks. Eastern Cape Premier, Makhenkesi Stofile's comments were the most controversial. When asked how he felt about the attacks, he responded: 'I do not know for sure that these are acts of terror. They could be guerrilla tactics fighting for something. In that case, guerrillas use small units as a tactic not as an act of cowardice. These are the same tactics the ANC used and we too were labelled as terrorists' (Stofile 2001) Speaker of Parliament, Frene Ginwala's comments also sparked controversy. She was reported as having said that the attackers were driven by despair as a result of America's unwillingness to engage in dialogue with regard to various issues (Leon 2001a).

The majority political grouping in the South African government is an alliance between the ANC, the SACP and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). While the ANC's official response to the attacks was much the same as the government's response, the SACP and COSATU were more reluctant to pledge support for the United States. The SACP's response was one of condemnation for both the attacks and the United States' response to these attacks. Commenting on the bombing of Afghanistan by the United States, the SACP said: 'No matter what the provocation of the September 11 attacks was, there is no justification for launching a war against Afghanistan or any other country' (SACP 2001). COSATU condemed the attacks on the United States, but warned that '[j]ustice, not vengeance, should be applied to deal with terrorism' (COSATU 2001). COSATU's position on the United States' response to these attacks, was that a military response was not prudent and that the United States was arrogant in its unwillingness to allow a response to be co-ordinated by the United Nations.

While, COSATU and the SACP can be considered to be less supportive of the United States than the government as a whole, several opposition parties felt that the South African government did not show enough sympathy and support for the United States. Leading the criticism of the South African government's response was the Democratic Alliance, South Africa's largest opposition grouping. In commenting on the events of September, Democratic Alliance Chief Whip Douglas Gibson (2001) described the perpetrators of the attacks as terrorists and fanatics. He called on President Mbeki to ensure that South Africa's response showed no equivocation and no ambivalence. Gibson went on to praise the government's official statements issued after the attacks, but called on the government to further show solidarity with the United States by flying the South African flag at half-mast. The government did not heed this request, saying that the government's formal convention was not to do so, and pointing out that the flag had not been flown at half mast after several other tragedies in other states (such as the devastating floods in Mozambique), and so the precedent was not to do so.

In a later speech on these attacks, Democratic Alliance leader Tony Leon (2001a) criticised comments made by some ANC politicians and said that these comments were the result of a 'pervasive anti-Americanism that is often accompanied by a cloaked anti-semitism'. Leon, who is often criticised for manipulating any situation into an opportunity to criticise the government, went on to describe the government's policy towards the United States as being 'fickle, self-serving and contradictory'. Leon called the attacks on the United States attacks on the liberal values which the United States, the West, and his own Democratic Alliance hold dear. In another speech on how South Africa should respond to September 11, Leon (2001b) called on South Africa 'to rally to the global coalition against terrorism'. He said that South Africa should 'use every weapon - military, diplomatic, economic and political' in fighting this battle and argued that South Africa should take the lead in co-ordinating the response within the southern African region. He added that 'it is impossible to be both against terrorism and for communion with international rogues' and called on the ANC to cut amicable ties with Muammer Gaddafi, Gerry Adams and Robert Mugabe. Leon concluded by saying that terrorism cannot be appeased or negotiated with, but must be eliminated.

Another South African opposition party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) also argued for greater support for the United States. The IFP's first statement on the attacks condemned 'in the strongest possible terms these cold-blooded murderous deeds' (IFP 2001). Speaking later, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi (2001) described that attacks as being an attack on 'all of us'. Buthelezi expressed complete support for the United States, including support for their quest for 'rightful retaliation'.

Fortsetzung: South Africa: An Assessment of South African Response to September 11 and the Resulting War on Terrorism