What should be done by states, civil society and international organisations to create a society minimising the risk of terrorism?

Richard Williams

 Research Fellow, London

'Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory - the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.' - Robert Taber

Whilst international terrorism is not co-terminus with guerrilla warfare, the analogy holds true for international society in the post-September 11^th world. The challenge to those who would seek to maintain and develop an open, global system predicated on liberal democracy and those principles enshrined in the UN Charter and associated conventions, is that of the 'dog'. The steps taken to minimise the risk of terrorism must be successful, but can not afford to exhaust or induce anaemia thereby inducing destabilisation and fulfilling terrorist aims. Moving away from the analogy, the use of 'teeth' and 'claws', i.e. military solutions, must be integrated into a wider framework of dialogue, political action and economic change. It is perhaps most redolent of the challenge that international society faces that there are actions that 'should' (perhaps even 'must') be done, rather than simply 'could' be done. Therein lies the enormity of the problem.

The international relations theorists, Lacquer and Wilkinson in the late 1970s and 1980s warned that terrorism would move beyond the 'nuisance' stage, increasingly becoming a threat to international peace and stability, with greater likelihood of terrorists acquiring the means of mass destruction. It is therefore perhaps apposite to accuse international society, and the actors within it, of having failed to fully heed these warnings. Reactions to terror have either been too submissive, such as Western governments ransoming hostages held in Lebanon without wider political engagement or they have been lacking in nuances, such as the US air strikes on Libya in 1986, which formed a blunt and un-constructive response to the problem of terror. Thus individual states sought ad-hoc strategies to meet individual events with only very limited frameworks of concerted international response being developed.

At this early stage in the discourse, an aside on the complex nature of 'terrorism' is appropriate. Semantics matter. The hackneyed statement 'one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter' is a trite and perhaps repugnant one, given the history of its usage as a tool of equivocation. Yet, it encapsulates truth that must shape discussions of international co-operation. Terrorism at heart is about the political use of systematic violence (that is political in the widest sense of being about power and its subsidiary relationships) and therefore will be a politically charged matter. Thus, countries and non-state actors within the international system will disagree about what amounts to terrorism. Given that this essay is particularly about the response to the attacks on the USA, any wider discussion of some of the other parts of international terror, state-sponsored terror or more conventional guerrilla organisations is mute. Therefore, the following deals primarily with terrorism, as the threat or use of systematic organised violence against liberal democratic states, or their interests within an international context. This is a convoluted definition, but seeks to create a basis applicable to whatever groups might seek to adopt the mantle of al-Qaida at some future juncture, whether narco-terrorists, organised crime or other fundamentalist religious terrorists. A number of digressions however, will seek to create a more rounded approach.

In proposing steps to minimise the risk of terror within international society two strands are worthy of consideration. Firstly, terrorists require three prime inputs to operate, logistical and weapon supplies, sanctuaries from which to base themselves and financial support. Secondly, whilst terror has an important military / force outcome, its incubating environment is that of the interplay of political, economic, social and cultural tensions and grievances. An integrated, multi-track approach is therefore required. Thus within the short-term context, a military response by international society to eliminate the most overt manifestations of terrorist groups is appropriate. This however should not be lightly resorted to, and through the required political aspects should lead into the longer-term stabilisation strategies that are required. Within the political sphere, this must see much greater engagement with, and interest of the major powers in, what have previously been seen as merely localised problems. A more robust, active interpretation of international law and conventions is also needed. This then links back to the matter of eliminating safe havens and sanctuaries for the perpetrators of international terror. With respect to economic aspects, as the global trading system continues to develop it must do so in a manner, which is just and equitable, and does not simply serve as a new form of protectionism for 'developed' states. The economic dynamic is also of relevance to the matter of terrorist finance. The issue of international social and cultural engagement is perhaps the most nebulous area of action, but realistic and achievable steps can be taken to defuse its tensions. A 'clash of civilisations' is not inevitable.

Experiences of terrorism

Before discussing a range of short and long term steps that can be taken by international society, a number of past examples can give some guidance as to successful strategies. Firstly, the United Kingdom's experience of Irish Republican and Loyalist terrorism related to Northern Ireland and the subsequent 'Good Friday' agreement, gives some guidance on possible solutions. Secondly, the example of terrorist groups that now provide little or no threat to international society, because they no longer operate, gives a further case study of successful means of minimising the risk of terrorism.

Northern Ireland has constituted an uncomfortable domestic source of disorder and terrorism to the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent the Irish Republic, for some thirty years. A range of solutions have been attempted over those three decades seeking to end 'The Troubles'. These have witnessed differing balances of military, political and other approaches. The initially attempted military solutions of internment and widespread troop deployments failed. A range of political initiatives, such as power-sharing, cross-border bodies and direct rule from London also failed to provide a conclusive means of ending the violence. The situation did however stabilise over time through various means.

The eventual 'Good Friday' agreement and process has served to integrate elements of political, economic, cultural and security strands. The agreement provided for the appeasement of many of the grievances held by Republicans. In turn it sought to offer confidence measures to both sides of the sectarian divide. Whilst the agreement provided a concrete set of political models to which groups within the community could subscribe, and therefore gave terrorist groups a basis on which to disarm, it was also the culmination of wider processes. In economic terms, Northern Ireland has received higher per capita government spending than other regions of the UK and a range of other investment and similar special programmes. Over the past decade steps have also been taken to cushion the wider economy from terror through the introduction of such initiatives as a government secured re-insurance pool. This is in part a useful demonstration of how terrorism can be treated as an aberration and thereby distanced from normal discourse. In the social and cultural spheres, much greater dialogue between the different communities has developed. These have served to create a more affluent, tolerant society, and Belfast has seen significant urban regeneration.

The United Kingdom still experiences terrorist incidents both in Northern Ireland and on the mainland. The problem has not been eliminated but the risk of terrorism to some extent has been minimised. Security organisations have also focused on those smaller terrorist groups not committed to the agreement so as to marginalise them. There will continue to be grievances, and significant areas of economic disparity and deprivation remain, but overall a workable solution appears to have been achieved.

Whilst the 'Good Friday' process in the United Kingdom has yet to reach its completion and may take many more decades to do so, there have been a number of terrorist organisations in other areas of the world which have ceased to operate in any significant manner. The Red Brigades and associated groups in Europe and Japan provide the main example. In 1978 at their height it was estimated that some 3,000 or more people were members, or active sympathisers of these groups. Through a robust security response and also partly a changing political and economic climate in the countries where the groups operated, they died out. Recent events in Italy would however indicate that these groups are perhaps not now wholly historical in nature. The experience of Moluccan terrorists in Holland was similar, although in part their resort to terror attacks served to undermine and emaciate the wider political aspects of the Moluccan independence campaign. The terrorists who operated in the UK in 1980 in favour of the autonomy of Arabistan from Iran are also now little more than a minor footnote in history. As with Northern Ireland, in these cases, the integration of military, political, economic and cultural responses defused the terrorist threat.

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