Contemporary German Defense Policy

Laura Gardner

Although it has in recent times often suited politicians and reporters to lump Germany and France together for rhetorical purposes, the two countries, despite their many common interests, have different policies and attitudes on a wide range of security issues. The common Europe security policy, while it offers a satisfactory explanation for many security policies, does not fully represent Germany’s security interests, which deserve a closer look. Germany acts as a rational actor on a realist stage, but not in the sense of the traditional power-seeker. Its particular tactic of power attainment requires the constraint of its own power. Germany has thereby become a powerful actor through the act of subsuming its individual power to other powerful institutions or countries. This seems at first to be at odds with the prediction of Hobbesian state of war of all against all, but Germany’s actions have in fact been aligned with their self-interest and are a rational response to the constraints that were put upon them during the post-war period. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was forcibly restrained from developing its own military force after WWII, and it came to rely on the US security umbrella. On the other side of the wall, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) acted as a showpiece for USSR policies, both military and political. Once the constraints were lifted, a united Germany could have chosen to go it alone, but instead invested its efforts to strengthening the European Union and its common security abilities. This was a rational choice for Germany, as its own security interests fall in line with those of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The interests of Germany are, by and large, in line with the interests of these organizations, so there is little reason for Germany to go it alone, thereby alienating and alarming some of its allies and putting itself at a higher level of security risk and increasing its own expenses. Most security risks that Germany faces also threaten other members of the EU or of NATO, and can thus be effectively dealt with through these multilateral forces. Whence Germany is very interested in the further development of the security abilities of these multilateral organizations.

As a vital member of these organizations, Germany is an influential player on the world stage. An understanding of its unique set of security concerns can help in understanding in what way Germany shapes the organizations it belongs to, as well as what German responses to various issues will be. Some general aspects of German security policy, including multilateral organizations, pacifism, and transatlantic relationships will be discussed here, as well as more specific issues of importance to German policy, such as its attitude towards Turkey, Eastern European states, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Multilateral organizations

Germany’s ability to subsume its specific security interests to these multilateral organization, as well as its desire to do so, is a result of the frequent intersection of common European security interests and German security interests. Germany has three primary security interests, under which each individual security or defense initiative can be categorized. These interests are: coordination with the “West,” primarily achieved through EU, NATO, and a continuing alliance with the US; preserving stability in Europe; and preventing conflicts outside of Europe from becoming large enough to involve Europe^[1]. This coordination with western powers, particularly other European countries, brings other common interests to German attention, those interests being: preventing the proliferation of mass weapons of destruction, protecting human rights, and protecting the environment. These interests are important in shaping German domestic and foreign policy, but can only be called security interests in exceptional circumstances. Although they may at times create a need for a security initiative, these secondary interests generally have little to no impact on military planning.

Nonetheless, these secondary security interests can become of primary importance when they become intertwined with Germany’s desire to preserve its strong alliances. If there is a common European initiative to take military action on behalf of one of these secondary interests, Germany must participate and lend its support to this action in order to demonstrate its continued support and willingness to contribute to these multilateral organizations. The Yugoslav crisis was the first real test of Germany’s commitment to European military initiatives. The German constitution limits the Bundeswehr’s role to that of defense, but it also states that Germany is subordinate to NATO’s goals and aims. The German troops were eventually allowed to take part in the peacekeeping mission, but it was decided that any military initiatives must first receive parliamentary approval.^[2] Although Germany finds it in its own best security interest to cooperate with multilateral security initiatives, this does not ensure complete compliance on every issue.

Germany, while seeking to expand the power of multilateral organizations over sovereign states, specifically itself, has had to choose which organizations it will support and help to grow. Although it might at first glance appear that the more memberships Germany has, the better, there is no guarantee that different multilateral organizations will consistently have the same security interests and goals. NATO and the EU, the two organizations to which Germany is most closely allied, share many interests and members. However, the organizations grew out of different objectives: the EU to create increasing economic bonds between European economies, and NATO to serve as a common defense against the Cold War threat that Russia posed. NATO includes the US, while the EU does not, and NATO does not claim to have any economic goals, while the EU’s security interests arguably grew out of its economic pursuits. However, some have argued that despite these differences, the two organizations are complementary, as the EU provides the framework for stability which NATO then protects in traditional (i.e. military) ways^[3]. Germany has specifically stated its military support of NATO; in its most recent military restructuring, the changes were announced as being in line with specific NATO strategies^[4]. Germany, then, is seeking a particular balance between these multilateral organizations and its more specific interests, in regards to unique country-specific policy as well as more broad differences in attitude.

Pacifism

Europe is sometimes regarded as a model for the rest of the world, as a group of countries who have reached the end of history and are no longer involved in a power struggle but are interested in improving universal human conditions. The lack of belligerence in these countries is cited as an example of a turning away from traditional realist politics. However, Germany’s pacificism may be better understood as a natural response to the set of constraints that were placed upon it in the post-war period rather than a turning away from power politics. Immediately after WWII, Germany was put under a number of constraints, in military, political, and economic arenas, both in the FRG and the GDR, all of which had the effect of making Germany’s military dependent on others’ capabilities and not self-sufficient. These constraints had the effect of defanging Germany. Although it might have been expected that Germany would seek to regain its former military power once these constraints were lifted, it quickly became evident that these constraints had been internalized by a large portion of the German public, and there was very little interest, and in fact a great deal of opposition, to building up military power. German public attitudes have led Germany to take an extremely pacifist stance, and they have often been unwilling to contribute militarily in international conflicts, looking instead for economic solutions to a variety of problems^[5]. The FRG has been pursuing multilateral solutions to problems for the past several decades, but East Germans are generally uneasy about German involvement in so-called power politics.^[6] Although pacifist attitudes are fairly widespread in Europe, surveys have shown that Germany is more attached to these policies than other European countries. The Germans, in comparison to the French or the British, believe that the EU should take a regional role as opposed to a global one, avoiding becoming a superpower or competing with the US. They are also more interested in using economic aid as a coercive force than in building up their military capabilities and defense budget^[7]. These feelings are reflected in Germany’s Bundeswehr, which is weak and has a small budget. A combination of lack of military capabilities and a general disinterest in using those capabilities has resulted in a strengthening of elements of economic coercion. In the EU, for example, the common economic policy is backed by strong common institutions, while the security policy lacks strong institutional support and must rely on each country’s voluntary contributions to security initiatives. Although the difference between these countries regarding their willingness to use force is generally not enough to prevent common security strategies, on some issues, it can become a point of tension (for example in regards to the recent situation regarding the war in Iraq [2003]). This difference in attitude regarding the use of force is not the only difference between Germany and other EU member states. Although many of Germany’s security and defense concerns are shared by other members of the EU, there are some differences on specific issues which could begin to cause rifts in the future.

Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship is a key strategic point for the EU and its member states, and this relationship has recently become increasingly strained due to the Iraq crisis. This relationship has been one of friendly engagement and cooperation in the post-war period, but it is nonetheless complex. Immediately after WWII, the U.S. was the major factor in helping to rebuild European states, and shaped Germany into the power it is today. The rebuilding of Germany was dependent on continued American support, and it continued to rely on this support after it began to have the capability to support itself. The members of the EU have not developed their defense capabilities, in part because during the Cold War period they were supported by American defense capabilities. Development energy (and budgetary allotments) were instead focused on creating an European community, an effort which has been largely successful. Currently, the European community is nominally independent from the U.S. and probably has the capability for greater independence, but prefers to continue to depend on the U.S. in certain areas (most notably those involving defense capabilities).

Bundeswehr

Germany, though its international troop commitment is second in size only to the United States, is constrained in its ability to act militarily. The Bundeswehr is limited by its own soldiers, in that the Bundeswehr is made up primarily of conscripted forces serving for a limited time. A conscripted army and the broad base of reserves provided by the conscription system is effective for the purposes of homeland defense, which is what the army was originally intended for. However, despite Germany’s unwillingness to engage in non-defensive military endeavors, it is obligated to the organizations it belongs to. In order to fulfill its obligations to the EU and NATO, Germany must be capable of being viable contributor to any common military endeavors .

Eastern States

Germany has traditionally marked a meeting point between East and West Europe. During the Cold War this boundary status became more apparent with the building of the Berlin Wall, and Germany became not just a cultural boundary but the site of a very clearly demarcated physical one, as well. After 1989, Germany was the European country most involved with the development and stabilization of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS). Germany contributed 38.3 percent of the total amount of Western help to the CIS^[8]. While Germans (and other Europeans) are interested broadly in the stabilization of this region, Germany has a number of economic interests invested in these states. It is in Germany’s interest to promote the free development of this neighboring region, which would in all likelihood create new markets for German industries^[9]. Although other members of the EU are also interested in the stabilization of the CIS countries, they do not stand to gain as much economically, as they do not share the same proximity and therefore do not stand to gain as much as Germany does in this region. This offers some explanation of the wide variation in the amount of financial contributions made to these countries. Although all European countries are interested in seeing the stabilization of these CIS countries, it is unclear how best this should be achieved. The CIS countries themselves put forth membership in the EU or NATO as a goal, but the eastward expansion of these organizations could have the unintended effect of weakening the organization by including too many voices and disparate interests^[10]. Each state must be considered carefully as a separate case. The disparate interests of these Eastern Europes, as opposed to their Western neighbors, were recently demonstrated in various policy decisions made in Eastern Europe regarding Iraq. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous statement indicating that those who did not support military action in Iraq were the “old Europe.”^[11] for example Poland’s cooperation with and contributions to U.S. and British military offensives in the area.

In addition to the CIS states, Germany also has a special, closer relationship with Russia than do most other European countries. Although no crises or incidents have occurred, a reemergence of power could have a large impact on the CIS countries, and, in turn, Germany as well. The main security strategy is engagement (and some degree of containment), but this goal is shared by most other European countries as well, though it may not be as serious a security concern for all other countries.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

Germany is more deeply entwined with the Arab-Israeli conflict than the other member states of the EU. The EU’s security interests in the Near East region of the world is due in part to geographical proximity and the risks it faces if conflict breaks out there or if instability leads to an increase of terrorist activity in the region. Thus the EU has a general interest in facilitating stability and peace in the region. Germany has a more intimate relationship with the problems of this area. Germany’s history, specifically the Holocaust and the crimes perpetrated against Jews during the Third Reich, have created a sense of obligation to people of Jewish faith and thus the Jewish state of Israel. On the other hand, Germany has long acknowledged the general right to self-determination, including specifically the Palestinian right to self-determination and the rights of the people. This is another side of the historical coin, as this support for self-determination stems from Germany’s own position during the Cold War period^[12].

On a less emotional note, Germany and the rest of Europe are reliant on the oil reserves that are found in the Middle East, and need to keep economic and commercial ties with Arab states open. Because of this reliance, European states cannot tie themselves to Israel to the exclusion of Palestinian interests (as supported by Arab states). For Germany, at least, the competing claims on both sides of the issue force it into a primarily neutral position.

Turkey

The subject of Turkey’s possible ascension into the EU is a recurring theme of EU discussions. While many member states of the EU have serious concerns regarding Turkey’s ability to meet the demands of EU membership, Germany has voiced more opposition than most other EU countries, due primarily to its proximity to Turkey and the number of Turkish immigrants within its borders. Germany’s relations to the Turkish immigrants within its borders have historically been polarized, due to the special situation of the Turkish Gastarbeiter, and the hostile targeting they have drawn from some right-wing groups in Germany as a result of unemployment. There are a variety of reasons for hesitance in allowing Turkey to join the EU, but some of these reasons amount to simple calculations of cultural difference^[13]. Although Turkey is not seen as a security threat to the EU in an immediate sense, its ascension (or the ascension of any state that is perceived as unstable) to the EU could weaken the EU’s ability to carry out collective security initiatives.

Turkey and its role in multinational organizations, specifically NATO, became an object of heated debates in the course of the recent Iraq crisis. Turkey’s willingness to provide a grounding base for military operations into Iraq was opposed by France, Russia, and Germany, who opposed supplying NATO defense abilities to Turkey if it did become a base for military operations into Iraq. Turkey’s decision to comply with U.S. requests and thereby become a visible and vulnerable target put NATO itself at risk and became the topic of what was possibly the biggest split in NATO opinion since its founding. This split was posited (BY SOME) as being big enough to cause a permanent rift in the organization. NATO’s own stability and ability to act as a strong and common force is dependent on the common interests of its member states. That Turkey seems to clearly possess different interests from the member states of the EU has been one of the obstacles to its’ ascension into the EU (in this case, the different interests could be defined as a willingness to abandon the general European pacifist tendencies in favor of gaining advantage through an alliance with the U.S.).

Conclusion:

Regardless of what international relations theory one subscribes to, it is difficult to ignore the significance of Germany’s history to its security and defense policies. Germany’s political development after WWII was a direct result of that war; it was a goal-oriented development, designed to create a country that would no longer pose a threat to others. The international system has changed since that time, creating external checks on Germany’s power while it developed internal checks on its power. These two factors have led to a Germany in which the population as a rule supports pacifist policies and there are strong incentives towards cooperation with multinational organizations. Despite Germany’s specific security interests, its security policy can best be explained and understood by two of its strongest interests: that of avoiding military intervention and the impulse to cooperate and preserve the allied strength of multinational organizations. These interests are those which we are most likely to see influencing German policy in the future.

Druckversion | Seite empfehlen

bookmarken bei...