Ausgewählte Literatur zu Theorien

Stormy Mildner

• Aggarwal, Vinod, Robert Keohane und David Yoffie: „Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism“, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, Nr. 2 (1987), S. 345-366.
• Arrow, K.: Social Choice and Individual Values, New York, 1951.
• Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Co-operation, NY 1984.
• Axelrod, Robert und Robert Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under Anarchie. Strategies and Institutions“, in: World Politics, Vol. 83, Nr. 1 (1985), S. 226-254.
• Baldwin, David: „Interdependence and Power, A Conceptual Analysis“, in: International Organisation, 4 (1980), S. 471-560.
• Baldwin, Robert: „The Political Economy of Trade Policy“, in: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3 (1998), 119-135.
• Baldwin, David: „Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics“, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate, New York 1993.
• Black, D.: The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
• Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962.
• Burchill, Scott and Andrew Linklater: Theories of International Relations, London 1996.
• Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society, London 1977.
• Carr, E.H.: The Twenty Years‘ Crisis 1919-1939, London 1946.
• Cerny, P.(Hrsg.): Finance and Word Politics, 1993.
• Coase, R. H.(Hg), The Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago 1988.
• Demsetz, H.: „Towards a Theory of property Rights“, in: American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 57 (1967), S. 347-359.
• Deutsch, Karl W.: Die Analyse internationaler Beziehungen, Frankfurt 1968.
• Dougherty, James and Robert Pfaltzgraff: Contending Theories of International Relations, NY 1990.
• Downs, A.: An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper and Row, 1957.
• Eichengreen, Barry: „Hegemonic Stability Theories,“ in: Richard Cooper et al.(Hg.), Can Nations Agree, Washington D.C. 1989.
• Evans, Graham: Dictionary of International Relations, London 1998.
• Fearson, James, Bargaining, Enforcement and international Cooperation, in: International Organization, Vol. 52 (1998), S. 269-305.
• Frey, Bruno:  “The Public Choice View of International Political Economy”, in: International Organization, Vol. 38, No.1 (1984), S. 199-223.
• Frieden, Jeffry and David Lake: „Economies in Development and Transition, in: Frieden, Jeffry and David Lake (Hg.), International Political Economy, London 2000.
• Gilpin, Robert: The Political Economy of International Relations, New Jersey 1987.
• Gourevitch, Alexander: „The Second Image Reversed: The international Sources of Domestic Politics“, in: International Organization, Vol. 32, Nr.4 (1978), S.881-912.
• Gowa, J: Allies Adversaries and International Trade, 1994.
• Gowa, Joanne: „Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade“, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, Nr. 4 (1988), S.1245-1256.
• Gowa, Joanne: „Power Politics and International Trade“, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, Nr. 2 (1993), S. 408-420.
• Grieco, Joseph: „Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the newest Neoliberal Institutionalism“, in: International Organization, Vol. 42 Nr. 3 (1988), S. 485-507.
• Grieco, Joseph: „The Realitve Gains Problem of International Relations“, in: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, Nr. 3 (1993), S. 729-743.
• Grieco , Joseph: Cooperation among Nations, Cornell, Ithaka 1990
• Haas, Ernst: Beyond the Nation-State: Funktionalism and International Organisation, Stanford 1964.
• Haggard, Stephen: Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration, Washington , D.C. 1995.
• Katzenstein, Peter, Robert Keohane und Stephen Krasner: „International Organization and the Study of World Politics“, in: International Organization, Nr. 52 (1998), S. 645-685.
• Keohane, Robert und Joseph Nye: „Interdependence and Integration“, in: Fred Greenstein und Nelson Polsby (Hrg.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol.8, Andover 1975.
• Keohane, Robert und Nye, J.: Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition, Booston 1977.
• Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony, Princeton 1984.
• Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye: Power and Interdependence, USA 1977.
• Kindelberger, C.: The World in Depression 1929-39, Washington D.C. 1986.
• Krasner, Stephen: International Regimes, Ithaca 1985.
• Krasner, Stephen: „State Power and the Structure of international Trade, in: World Politics, Vol. 28, Nr.3 1976), S. 317-347. 
• Krueger, Ann: The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 64, (1974), S. 291-303.
• Krueger, Anne: Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries, Washington 1993.
• Lang, Franz Peter: Prebisch-Singer-These, in: WiSt Heft 2, Februar 1985.
• Lehmkuhl, Ursula: Theorien internationaler Politik, München 1996.
• Mansfield, Edward und Marc Bush: „The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis“, in: International Organization, Vol. 49, Nr. 4 (1995), S. 723-749. 
• Milner, Helen: „International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability“, in: Foreign Policy Nr. 110 (1998), S. 112-123.
• Nash, John: “Equilibrium Points in N-Person Game,“ in: Proceedings of National Academy of Science USA, Nr. 36, 1950.
• Nash, John: „Non-Cooperative Games“, in: Annals of Mathematics, 54, 1951.
• Olson, M.: The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965.
• Ostrom, E: Governing the Commons, Cambridge 1990.
• Owen, J.: Gametheory, Philadelphia 1968.
• Pelzman, Sam: „Toward a More General Theory of Regulation“, in: Journal of Law and Economics 1976, S. 211- 241.
• Posner, Richard: „Theories of Economic Regulation“, in: Bell Journal of Economics 1974, S. 335-358.
• Putnam, Robert and Randall Henning: The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination, in: Richard Cooper et al., Can Nations Agree, Washington D.C. 1989.
• Putnam, Robert: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games, in: International Organization, Vol. 42 (1989), S. 269-305.
• Rogoff, Kenneth: „Bargaining and International Policy Cooperation“, in: American Economic Review, V0l. 80, Nr. 2 (1990), S. 139-142.
• Strange, Susan: States and Markets, London 1989.
• Strange, Susan: „States, Firms and Diplomacy“, in: International Organization, Vol. 86, No.1 (1992), S. 1-15.
• Stange, S.: Casino Capitalism, 1986.
• Stange, S.: Finance, Information and Power, in: Review of International Studies, July 1990.
• Von Neumann, J. und O. Morgenstern: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton 1944.
• Walter, A.: „The US and Western Europe: The Theory of Hegemonic Stability“, in: N. Woods (Hg.) Explaining International Relations after 1945, 1996.
• Waltz, Kenneth M.: Theory of International Politics. Reading 1979.

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